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Abstract
With the tremendous growth and usage of digital images nowadays, the integrity and 
authenticity of digital content is becoming increasingly important and of major concern 
to many government and commercial sectors. In the past decade or so, digital water­
marking has attracted much attention and offers some real solutions in protecting the 
copyright and authenticating the digital images. Recently, image forensics techniques, 
based on a passive statistical analysis of the image data only, is an alternative approach 
to the active embedding of data associated with digital watermarking. In this thesis, 
the concept of digital watermarking is described, and a number of algorithms used for 
robust, fragile and semi-fragile image watermarking are reviewed in detail. We dis­
cuss the concept of image forensics briefly and conclude image forensics techniques into 
two main areas: image source detection and image manipulation detection. Four novel 
robust and semi-fragile transform based image watermarking related schemes are intro­
duced. These include wavelet-based contourlet transform (WBCT) for both robust and 
semi-fragile watermarking, slant transform (SLT) for semi-fragile watermarking as well 
as applying the generalised Benford’s Law to estimate JPEG compression, then adjust 
the appropriate threshold for improving the semi-fragile watermarking technique.
In this thesis, the proposed WBCT for robust watermarking is evaluated and com­
pared with two other Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) based algorithms with results 
achieving high degree of robustness against most non-geometrical and geometrical at­
tacks, while maintaining an excellent perceptual quality. For semi-fragile watermarking, 
the proposed SLT as a block-based algorithm achieves more accuracy for copy & paste 
attacks with non-malicious manipulations, such as additive Gaussian noise when com­
pared with existing Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) based and Pinned Sine Transform 
based schemes. While for the proposed WBCT method, good performance is achieved 
in localising the tampered regions, even when the image has been subjected to non- 
malicious manipulations such as JPEG/JPEG2000 compressions, Gaussian noise, Gaus­
sian filtering, and contrast stretching. The average false negative rate is found to be 
approximately 1% while maintaining an average false positive rate below 6.5%. We also 
propose the use of generalised Benford’s Law model as an image forensics technique for 
semi-fragile watermarking. This model can improve the lower tampered detection rate 
caused by the predetermined threshold in semi-fragile watermarking. The threshold is 
typically fixed and cannot be easily adapted to different amounts of errors caused by 
unknown JPEG compression. Our proposed method can adaptively adjust the threshold 
for images based on the estimated Quality Factor (QF) by using the generalised Ben­
ford’s Law with overall average QF correct detection rate of approximately 99% when
5% of the pixels are subjected to image content tampering, as well as compression using 
different QFs (ranging from 95 to 65).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background and M otivation
Nowadays, the rapid development of technologies has led to the significant increase of 
digital information, particularly multimedia such as image, audio and video content. 
Such technological advances have led to easier illegally share, distribution, and copy 
of Intellectual Property (IP). Subsequently, the copyright infringement issue has been 
identified as a “hot topic” . According to a report from Oxford Economics in 2009, 
the UK film industry loses 531 million pounds per annum, as a direct result of copy­
right theft. Examples of this can include recording films at the cinema, illegal sale or 
purchase of copyrighted DVDs, household copying, file-sharing and downloading, and 
streaming material from unauthorised web servers [1]. Furthermore, the music industry 
is also affected. According to the US copyright industry group International Intellectual 
Property Alliance, two billion music tracks were illegally downloaded in Spain in 2008, 
compared to 2.2 million that were purchased legally [2]. Moreover, billions of digital im­
ages are widely available and can be accessed easily and quickly via almost any website 
containing graphics, or image search engines.
The primary reason for the requirement of authenticating images stems from the in­
creasing amount of doctored images that are presented as accurate representations of 
real-life events, but are later discovered to be faked. The history of manipulating images 
goes back to almost as far as photography itself, and with the ease of use and availability 
of image editing software, it has become ubiquitous in the digital age. Image authenti­
cation schemes attempt to restore trust in the image by accurately validating the data, 
positively or negatively. Especially for law enforcement scenarios, images captured at 
the scene, such as for crime scene investigation and traffic enforcement, can potentially 
be used as evidence in the court of law. If an image presented in court as evidence from
1
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a crime scene is to be effectively used by the jury, the integrity of the information must 
not be in question. The Crime Scene Investigators (CSIs) gathers forensic evidence, 
such as take the crime scene photographs. However, after the collection of evidence, 
there is no other way of examining the crime scene as a whole, apart from analysing the 
collected exhibits and photographs [3]. In order to maintain the integrity of the images, 
not only is it essential to verify that the photographic evidence remains unchanged and 
authentic, but any manipulated regions should also be localised to help identify which 
parts of the image cannot be trusted. With the tremendous growth and usage of digital 
cameras and video devices, the requirement to verify the digital content is paramount, 
especially if it is to be used as evidence in court [4],
An obvious requirement, therefore, is the development of solutions for copyright pro­
tection and image authentication for digital content. Cryptography and digital water­
marking are two commonly used technologies. The traditional cryptography can, for 
example, be utilised for message authentication by generating and embedding a digital 
signature into a message, in an effort to prevent the sending of forged messages [5]. In 
addition, according to Friedman [6], digital signatures can be embedded into images by 
applying cryptography if the signature is meta-data. In all cases, the use of cryptography 
is constrained by the fact that it can be lost easily during the image format conversion 
process, which subsequently invalidates the authentication process. Moreover, such so­
lutions do not prevent or track the content against illegitimate reproduction after it has 
been decrypted [7].
Digital watermarking has attracted much attention in the past decade or so, which is the 
process of embedding relevant information (such as a logo, fingerprint and serial number), 
into a media. This technique can be applied to different media types such as video, 
audio and image content. An example of visible digital watermark is the translucent 
logos that are often seen embedded at the corner of videos or images, in an attempt to 
prevent copyright infringement. However, these visible watermarks can be targeted and 
removed rather simply by cropping the media, or overwriting the logos. Subsequently, 
the field of digital watermarking is primarily focused on invisible watermarks, which 
are imperceptible and operate by tweaking the physical data of the media [7, 8]. The 
employing of digital watermarking technique is also recommended by the UK government 
agency, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), which expresses the 
following views: “To develop and adopt pre-competitive standards and unique identifiers, 
which are open and interoperable, to cover hardware and software for secure delivery of 
music, including encryption, watermarking and usage rules of music on-line” [9]. “The 
UK Film Council’s position is that an effective deterrence policy needs to be based on 
a blend of educative, technological and legislative interventions with the latter firmly 
enforced. This policy should be accompanied by detailed exploration by all parties of
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the potential of watermarking and other technologies to facilitate identification of illegal 
activity” [10].
There are three different classifications associated with digital watermarking, depend­
ing on the applications: “robust” , “fragile” and “semi-fragile” . Robust watermarking 
is primarily designed to provide copyright protection and proof of ownership for digital 
images. The most important property of robust watermarking is its ability to tolerate 
certain signal processing operations that usually occur during the lifetime of a media 
object, as well as preventing any more deliberate attacks. Fragile and semi-fragile digital 
watermarking techniques are often utilised for image content authentication applications 
to verify or authenticate the integrity of the digital media content. Fragile watermarking 
schemes are designed to detect any possible manipulations that affect the watermarked 
image pixel values [11,12]. In comparison, semi-fragile schemes make it possible to verify 
the content of the original image, as well as permit alterations caused by non-malicious 
(unintentional) modifications such as system processes [13-15]. Moreover, semi-fragile 
watermarking is more focused on detecting intentional attacks than validating the orig­
inality of the image [16, 17]. During the image transmission, the mild signal processing 
errors caused by signal reconstruction and storage, such as transmission noise or JPEG 
compression, are permissible. However, the image content tampering such as copy-and- 
paste attack will be identified as a malicious attack. Additionally, in the literature, a 
significant amount of research has been focused on the design of semi-fragile algorithms 
that could tolerate JPEG compression and other common non-malicious manipulations 
[18-24]. However, watermarked images could be compressed by unknown JPEG com­
pression rates of various quality factors (QFs). As a result, in order to authenticate the 
images, these algorithms have to set a pre-determined threshold that could allow them 
to tolerate different QF values when extracting the watermarks. If the QF could be 
estimated, then appropriate thresholds could be adapted for each test image, before ini­
tialising the watermark extraction and authentication process. This adaptive threshold 
could decrease the false alarm and missed detection rates.
In contrast to authenticating the image using active watermarking technique, the field 
of image forensics has been considered as a passive approach, and attracted much at­
tention recently [25-28]. The significant difference is that image forensic techniques 
seek to authenticate images based solely on the image data that are used for image 
statistical analysis. As such, no embedded information is loaded into an image, and 
so the security risks and robustness issues associated with a payload, are avoided. As 
described in [29, 30], image forensics could also identify anomalies that might exist due 
to non-malicious processing (such as a change in file format) or intentional, malicious 
modifications (such as cloning or creating composites). It could also identify the dif­
ference between natural and unnatural images. A natural image possesses its original
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characteristics, such as shape, contrast and size. While this image would become unnat­
ural if any of these characteristics were to be changed. Hence, there is a growing need to 
develop advanced image forensic techniques that could help to further analyse different 
natural and unnatural images, particularly, those have not been watermarked initially.
1.2 A im s and O bjectives
The main aims and objectives of this research are to develop and analyse advanced image 
watermarking and forensic schemes. This thesis begins with the fundamental concept 
and applications of digital watermarking, followed by a detailed review of existing active 
watermarking techniques, such as robust, fragile and semi-fragile methods as well as 
passive image forensics techniques. As shown in Figure 1.1, we propose four novel ro­
bust and semi-fragile transform based image watermarking and forensics schemes in this 
thesis. These include Wavelet-based Contourlet Transform (WBCT) for both robust 
and semi-fragile watermarking, Slant Transform (SLT) for semi-fragile watermarking, 
and also incorporating the generalised Benford’s Law, to estimate the JPEG QF are 
introduced to adaptively determine the threshold for improving semi-fragile watermark­
ing.
Robust
Watermarking
Semi-fragile
Watermarking
Image
Forensics
(1) WBCT-based Robust
(2) SLT-based Semi-fragile
(3) WBCT-based Semi-fragile
(4) Improve Semi-fragile 
Detection using Benford's Law
F igure 1.1: Four proposed image watermarking and forensics schemes
1.3 C ontributions
During my research on digital watermarking and image forensics, two main contributions 
have been made. Firstly, the characteristic of WBCT coefficients, parent and children re­
lationship, has been analysed and evaluated. We found the relationships between parents 
and their correlated four children coefficients maintain invariant if the image has been 
undergone some manipulations, such as JPEG / JPEG2000, pixel shifting, mean filtering, 
histogram equalisation, median filter, Gaussian filtering and sharpening. Therefore, we 
utilised this invariant property of WBCT for robust watermarking. Moreover, we further
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analysed the parent and children relationship, and found that this invariant property 
could be destroyed if the image has been tampered, such as copy-and-paste attack. 
Therefore, we applied it into semi-fragile watermarking for image authentication by ver­
ity if any parent and children relationships has been destroyed. Secondly, we discussed 
the issue of “predetermined” threshold for current semi-fragile watermarking schemes. 
We adapted an image forensics method, the generalised Benford’s Law to estimate JPEG 
compression rate of the test image. Hence, the threshold could be adaptively adjusted 
before initialise the authentication process that could reduce the error detection rates. 
Three book chapters, one international journal and six international conference papers 
have been accepted and published, as listed in Appendix 1.
1.4 Structure o f th e Thesis
The rest of thesis is organised as follows:
• Chapter 2 describes the concept of digital watermarking in various forms, such 
as visible and invisible watermarking, blind and non-blind watermarking schemes. 
We also discuss classifications of digital watermarking techniques such as robust, 
fragile and semi-fragile watermarking extensively. Moreover, the field of image 
forensics is also discussed.
e Chapter 3 describes a novel robust watermarking algorithm using the WBCT that 
exploits the energy relations between “parent” and “children” coefficients. The 
concept and advantages of the proposed algorithm, and its embedding and detec­
tion processes are described in detail. The experimental results are analysed and 
evaluated by comparing it with two discrete wavelet transform (DWT) domain 
based algorithms.
• Chapter 4 describes two novel semi-fragile watermarking algorithms using the SLT 
as a block based method, and WBCT as a non-block based method. Both algo­
rithm’s watermark embedding, detection, and authentication processes and their 
results including a performance analysis of false positive and false negative rates 
are discussed in detail. The SLT method will be compared with two existing trans­
forms, Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) and Pinned Sine Transform (PST). The 
performance of the WBCT semi-fragile watermarking will be evaluated against 
various attacks. Moreover, we analyse and compare the differences between the 
two proposed semi-fragile watermarking schemes.
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• Chapter 5 discusses the limitation of predetermined threshold in current semi- 
fragile watermarking schemes. The background of Benford’s Law, generalised Ben­
ford’s Law and their relationship with the watermarked image, JPEG compressed 
watermarked image are described. We propose a framework incorporating the gen­
eralised Benford’s Law to detect unknown JPEG compression QFs in semi-fragile 
watermarked images to adjust the appropriate threshold. Furthermore, we apply 
generalised Benford’s Law to the proposed SLT and WBCT based semi-fragile wa­
termarking schemes to improve accuracy rates in authenticating and localising the 
tampered regions.
• Chapter 6 presents the conclusion of the thesis and presents some directions for 
future work of our robust, semi-fragile watermarking and image forensics research.
Chapter 2
Literature R eview
In this chapter, we give a background review of digital watermarking and image foren­
sic techniques, highlighting the concept and related proposed schemes. We briefly de­
scribe visible and invisible watermarking, blind and non-blind watermarking schemes, 
imperceptibility, robustness, capacity and security as four requirements for digital image 
watermarking, and the differences between spatial domain based and transform domain 
based watermarking schemes. We also discuss classifications of digital watermarking 
techniques such as robust, fragile and semi-fragile watermarking. The field of image 
forensics is then reviewed. This chapter will also provide an overview of four proposed 
digital watermarking and image forensic schemes, which will be discussed with more 
details in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.
7
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2.1 D ig ita l W aterm arking Overview
The concept of watermarking has been used in many different forms and can be traced 
back to thousands of years ago. For instance, in the late 13th century in Italy, a thin, 
translucent layer was sewn with wire onto a paper mould to form a watermark [31]. 
Historically, postage stamps and currencies were commonly watermarked. Indeed, the 
currency watermark is still used today when printing banknotes. A digital watermark 
can be either visible or invisible. An example of digital visible watermark is the translu­
cent logos that are often seen embedded at the corner of videos or images, in an attempt 
to prevent copyright infringement. However, these visible watermarks can be targeted 
and removed rather simply by cropping the media, or overwriting the logos. Subse­
quently, the field of digital watermarking is primarily focused on embedding invisible 
watermarks, which operate by tweaking the content of the media imperceptibly. As the 
watermark cannot be seen, there must exist a robustness property that ensures the water­
mark data survives if the image is altered. Typical applications of digital watermarking 
can include broadcast monitoring, owner identification, proof of ownership, transaction 
tracking, content authentication, copy control, device control, legacy enhancement and 
content description [7, 8].
Figure 2.1 illustrates a typical watermark embedding process. The watermarked work 
is produced by an embedding algorithm that is traditionally comprised of three inputs: 
the original work, the watermark and a key. A blind watermark detection process is 
shown in Figure 2.2. The watermark is extracted from the watermarked work by using 
a detection algorithm in conjunction with the same key that was originally used to 
embed the watermark. In contrast, Figure 2.3 illustrates a non-blind (or informed) 
watermark detection process that extracts the watermark. Here, the original work has 
to be provided as a reference source in order for the detection algorithm to function. 
Therefore, the selection of a blind or non-blind watermarking detection system typically 
depends on whether the original work is accessible or not [8].
The original work is the host signal which is employed into a digital media such as, video 
[32-34], audio [35, 36], image [37-39], halftone image [40-42], binary text [43, 44], 3D 
meshes [45-47], holography [48, 49], optical [50, 51] and network protocol [52, 53]. The 
watermark is a binary sequence of data produced from a logo image, fingerprint, serial 
number, owner’s name or ID, or indeed anything that could identify the ownership of 
the media. The key is used to increase the security of the procedure; it prevents the 
possibility of a hacker modifying or removing the watermark as this can only be achieved 
if the key is known.
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F igure 2.3: A typical non-blind watermark detection process.
2.1 .1  R eq u irem en ts for D ig ita l Im age W aterm arking
In this subsection, four important properties for digital watermarking are discussed. 
These are imperceptibility, robustness, capacity and security.
• Imperceptibility
The embedded watermark should be imperceptible from the watermarked work. 
The degradation from original work to watermarked work is permitted that main­
taining image fidelity of the original work. Therefore, in order to evaluate the 
similarity between the original and watermarked image, objective and subjective 
evaluation methods will be needed. One of the standardised subjective methods 
for image and video is the Double Stimulus Impairment Scale (DSIS) [54]. The 
watermarked images are visually reviewed by observers who have no background 
knowledge of image processing and are not experienced assessors. The water­
marked images are compared against the original image and scored with a scale
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from one to five (1 = very annoying, 2 = annoying, 3 = slightly annoying, 4 = 
perceptible, but not annoying, 5 = imperceptible). To measure the quality of a 
watermarked image objectively, a well-known statistical metric called the Peak 
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR), in Equation 2.1, is commonly used to evaluate the 
quality of the watermarked image by comparing it with the statistics of the original 
image. The quality of the watermarked image can be considered as acceptable if 
the PSNR value is above 30dB [55].
P S N R  -  10log,o ( _ l  e j - j jI  j )  -  i m g M U w )  ^
where m  and n  are the size of the image (e.g. 512 x 512), img is the original image, 
imgjiv is the watermarked image, and M A X  is the maximum possible gray value 
of the image (e.g. 255 for a grayscale image).
Other alternative or supplementary methods of evaluating the similarity between 
the original image and the watermarked image are weighted PSNR (wPSNR) [56] 
and Mean Structural Similarity Index (MSSIM) [57]. The wPSNR is defined as 
follows:
(=.«)
where NVF is exploited as a Gaussian model to estimate the degree of texture in 
the image by providing a value between 0 and 1 (where 0 = highly textured and 1 = 
smooth) [58]. In contrast to PSNR and wPSNR, the MSSIM method, in Equation 
2.3, separates the luminance, contrast and structure of the images for similarity 
measurement. This metric is based on the degradation of structural information 
and attempts to measure the attributes that reflect the key structure and objects 
of importance in an image. The MSSIM values exhibit much better consistency 
with the qualitative visual appearance [57].
1 M
M S S I M  (X, Y )  = ~ Y / S S I M  (xj,yj)  (2.3)
J =  1
where S S I M  (x, y) = [l(x,y)]a • [c (x, y)Ÿ  • [s (æ,y)]7, the luminance comparison 
function is I (x,y), the contrast comparison function is c(x,y),  the structure com­
parison function is s (x,y), a  > 0, ft > 0 and 7 > 0 are parameters used to adjust 
the relative importance of the three components. X  and Y  are the original and 
the watermarked images, respectively, xj and yj are the image contents at the j th 
local window, and M  is the number of local windows of the image [57]. However, 
due to its popularity and simplicity for calculation, the PSNR technique is used as
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an objective metric in this thesis for assessing the image quality between original 
and watermarked images.
• Robustness
Robustness is an important property for robust watermarking schemes. The wa­
termark that is embedded into the image should be robust (to varying degrees 
according to the application) to tolerate different forms of attack or image pro­
cessing operations, when the watermarked image is transmitted. These image 
manipulations or attacks can be categorised into non-geometrical and geometrical 
groups. Non-geometrical distortion is derived from lossy compression algorithms 
such as JPEG or JPEG2000, as well as noise addition, image filtering and contrast 
stretching, while geometrical distortion includes rotation, scaling, cropping, trans­
lation, and shifting pixels. These distortions are often implemented to simulate 
possible attacks to analyse the performance trade-off of the proposed algorithms 
by the researchers in the community [7]. Maintaining the robustness of the water­
mark is much more difficult and challenging when considering geometrical attacks. 
This is due to the fact that each individual pixel location of the watermarked im­
age is likely to be shifted or translated. A possible approach is to find an invariant 
property of an image that can be used in the watermark embedding process to en­
hance the robustness against different attacks. More details on the use of invariant 
properties for watermarking are described in Chapters 3 and 4.
• Capacity
Capacity refers to the maximum amount of watermark bits that can be embedded
into the original image. The number of watermark bits embedded into the image 
data can affect the overall perceptual quality of the image. Figure 2.4 illustrates 
the performance trade-offs concerned with watermarking; specifically, the imper­
ceptibility of the watermarked image, the robustness of the watermark, and the 
capacity of the watermark data. Typically, if the quality of the watermarked im­
age increases, the robustness and capacity of the watermark data would decrease. 
Similarly, if the robustness increases, the quality of the watermarked image would 
decrease because more watermark bits will be used. Finally, if the capacity of wa­
termark data increases, the quality of the image and its robustness would decrease.
• Security
The approach to security in digital watermarking is mainly focused on malicious
removal or modification of the watermark bits. The watermark security can be 
defined as “the inability by unauthorised users to have access to the raw water­
marking channel” [59]. The watermarking systems could be compromised if an
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F igure 2.4: Trade-off among the imperceptibility, robustness and capacity
attacker manages to obtain the secret key. In this case, the attacker will have ac­
cess to parameters such as the watermark embedding locations, random frequency 
of the watermark bits, and the threshold for embedding the watermark bits. The 
secret key can be predicted by gathering the characteristics of a set of watermarked 
images and analysing their similarities, to evaluate whether the same secret key 
and watermark bits have been used repeatedly [60]. Some of the problems as­
sociated with secret key leakage have been studied by a number of researchers 
[61-63].
Spatial Dom ain Based Watermarking Schemes
Digital image watermarking techniques can be divided into two categories: spatial and 
transform domain. In the spatial domain, the watermark bits are embedded into the 
original image by modifying the image image intensity directly. These types of techniques 
are easy to implement and have higher embedding capacity than transform domain based 
watermarking techniques. However, the watermarks embedded with spatial domain 
based watermarking techniques are not robust against various manipulations, such as 
JPEG compression, additive noise, filtering and geometric distortions.
The least significant bit (LSB) watermarking is one of the first watermarking schemes 
operating in the spatial domain [64]. As seen from Figure 2.5, the image intensity 135, 
98 and 221 are first converted into 8 bits binary sequences. The three watermark bits 
0, 1 and 1 are then inserted by replacing the LSB of each binary sequence. Finally, 
the modified binary sequences are converted back to 134, 99 and 221, respectively. In 
essence, the original intensity can only be changed either by ±1 pixel value, or not at all 
(if the LSB already matches the watermark bit) when they are watermarked using this 
technique. As the changes are relatively minor, the quality of the watermarked image 
is high, especially if limited amount of changes occur. However, the watermark bits can 
be easily attacked by randomly overwriting the LSB values of the watermarked image, 
thereby destroying the watermark data.
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F igure 2.5: An illustration of LSB watermark bits embedding.
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Transform Dom ain Based Watermarking Schemes
In contrast, transform domain schemes operate by embedding the watermark data into 
frequency coefficients of the image. Transform domain techniques have been compre­
hensively studied in the context of image coding and compression as well as digital 
watermarking [8, 65]. An image can be represented as frequency coefficients by mapping 
the image intensity. Low frequencies represent the overall shapes and outlines of fea­
tures in the image, and its luminance and contrast characteristics, and high frequencies 
represent sharp edges and crispiness in the image, but contribute little spatial-frequency 
energy [66]. As some of the coefficients are not significantly distorted after some attacks 
(such as JPEG compression, additive noise, and filtering), robust watermarking schemes 
are commonly implemented in the transform domain [67-69]. One of first robust wa­
termarking scheme based on spread spectrum was first proposed by Cox et al. [37]. In 
general, robust watermarking in transform domain can be classified into two groups: 
block based and non-block based algorithms. Figure 2.6 shows the difference between 
block and non-block based in watermark embedding process.
2.2 R obust, Fragile and Sem i-fragile Im age W aterm arking
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there are three different classifications associated with digital 
watermarking, depending on the applications: robust, fragile and semi-fragile. Robust 
watermarking has been used extensively in the past decade, and is primarily designed 
to provide copyright protection and proof of ownership for digital images. In contrast to 
the applications of robust watermarking, fragile and semi-fragile techniques are geared 
towards image authentication and localisation of tampered regions. In this section, we 
discuss the concepts, characteristics, differences and related algorithms of these three 
classes.
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F igure 2.6: Difference between block and non-block based watermark embedding
process.
2.2 .1  R ob u st W aterm arking
The most important property of robust watermarking is its tolerate to certain signal pro­
cessing operations that usually occur during the lifetime of a media object. A schematic 
diagram illustrating the main functions of robust watermarking is shown in Figure 2.7. 
The sender watermarks the original work via a watermark embedding process, and then 
sends the watermarked work to the recipient. The recipient extracts the watermark via 
a watermark detection process. During the transmission of the watermarked work, the 
image is open to manipulations, meaning the integrity of the watermark data could be 
compromised.
^Manipulations
1 Watermark 
| Embedding 
i Process
Sender
Watermark
Detection
Process
Recipient
F igure 2.7: Schematic diagram for robust watermarking 
Block Based Robust W atermarking
The most common image transform framework, the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT), 
is frequently used for block based robust image watermarking [70-74]. Some researchers 
have also proposed adaptive watermarking schemes in the DCT domain based on image 
content. Perceptual models have been utilised to analyse the individual image content
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before the watermark bits are embedded into the DCT coefficients of each block, which 
could lead to an optimisation of the imperceptibility of the watermarked image [75].
Just Noticeable Distortion (JND) is designed to determine the maximum strength of 
a watermark signal that can be inserted into an image, and to improve the quality of 
the watermarked image. Kay and Izquierdo [72] proposed a robust content based image 
watermarking scheme by estimating a JND mask from image characteristics such as 
texture, edges and smoothness, from both the spatial and DCT domains. The watermark 
embedding process is shown in Figure 2.8. The original image is first divided into non­
overlapping blocks of 8 x 8  pixels, then the JND mask is calculated from both spatial and 
DCT domains of each block. To embed the watermark bits, the selected DCT coefficients 
are modified according to the JND mask by using a key. An inverse DCT transformation 
is then applied to the modified DCT coefficients, and the blocks are merged back into a 
watermarked image.
Original
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Watermarked
image
Key----
DCT
JND Inverse DCT
Divided into 
of 8 x 8 pixels
Watermark
embedding
Merge blocks 
back to image
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F igure 2.8: Kay and Izquierdo watermark embedding process [72].
In each block, the JND is derived in Equation 2.4.
JN D  = \ Dt  -  ^  (De  +  D u )\  +  (128 - 1)' (2.4)
where Dt  = log v? — Vq^J is the texture information retrieved directly from the
DCT coefficients of a block and Vi, i = 0, ...,63 are the 64 DCT coefficients of the 
considered block. Edges and smooth areas De  = max(p^) are extracted from the pixel 
domain, Pe  is the cardinality of the set of pixels within the block and at edge locations. 
The uniformity Du in a block is defined as the number of pixels belonging to a uniform 
area that is extracted by the Moravec corner detection operator [76] for each block. Ï  is 
the mean of the luminance values of each block. In order to insert the watermark, the 
modified DCT coefficients v'^  are derived in Equation 2.5.
Vj = Vi + a x JN D  x I ik I Xi (2.5)
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where a  is a scaling parameter, and x  is the watermark, consisting of a sequence of real 
pseudo-random numbers [72]. Another type of JND mask is generated from Watson’s 
visual model which was utilised in Podilchuk and Zeng’s image adaptive watermarking 
scheme [74], and then further adopted and extended by Hernandez et al. [73], Li and 
Cox [75] and Li et al [77]. In Watson’s visual model, the JND values are extracted by 
calculating the luminance and contrast masking of each block DCT coefficients of the 
image.
Wong et al [78] proposed an iterative watermark embedding algorithm for JPEG com­
pressed images capable of embedding multiple watermarks within the DCT domain with 
different keys. In addition, Dong et al [79] also proposed two algorithms that embedded 
a multi-bit watermark in the DCT domain of the image. Their first algorithm utilised 
an image normalisation technique which was robust to general geometric transformation 
attacks. Their second algorithm utilised a resynchronisation scheme based on a mesh 
model to combat nonlinear geometric attacks. Moreover, in Yeo and Kim’s scheme 
[80], a generalised patchwork algorithm (which is the combination of the additive patch­
work algorithm and the multiplicative patchwork algorithm) was employed to embed 
the watermark bits in the DCT domain. Their experimental results showed that their 
method was robust against JPEG compression attacks and some signal processing at­
tacks, such as median filtering, FMLR (frequency-mode Laplacian removal), Gaussian 
filtering, sharpening, and random bend attacks.
In order to maintain quality of the watermarked image and the watermark robustness, 
many researchers experimented with applying different image transform techniques for 
block based robust image watermarking schemes. Some examples include robust im­
age watermarking in the Fast Hadamard Transform (FHT) which resulted in a much 
shorter processing time and simpler hardware implementation [81]. Ho et al [68] used 
Slant Transform (SLT) which provided significant advantage for watermark insertion 
and retrieval for images with complex textures such as satellite images. Singular Value 
Decomposition (SVD) based scheme was found to be robust against typical attacks, 
such as low-pass and high-pass filtering [82]. A Curvelet Transform based scheme was 
proposed to overcome inherent limitations of traditional multiscale representations wa­
termarking schemes in [83]. Xie et al [84] chose the middle subband for embedding 
watermarks to achieve both good imperceptibility and robustness in Ridgelet Transform 
domain.
Non-block Based Robust W atermarking
One of the most popular image transform domains for non-block based robust water­
marking is the discrete wavelet transform (DWT) [67, 85-91]. In contrast to DCT, 
the original image is not divided into blocks in the DWT domain. DWT is one of
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the most computationally efficient frequency transforms that utilises the human visual 
system (HVS). Moreover, in DWT based watermarking schemes, it is possible to em­
bed watermarks with more energy, thereby significantly increasing their robustness [92]. 
A DWT domain based robust watermarking algorithm was proposed by Kundur and 
Hatzinakos [91], and their watermark embedding process is shown in Figure 2.9. In 
their scheme, both the original and logo images were first transformed into the wavelet 
domain and then decomposed into three levels (Figure 2.10(a)), and one level (Figure 
2.10(b)), respectively. The DWT coefficients of the logo image were next embedded 
into the coefficients of the original image by using the multi-resolution fusion technique 
integrated with a model of HVS. Finally, the modified coefficients are transformed back 
into the spatial domain to create the watermarked image. In the experimental results, 
the authors claimed their proposed scheme is highly robust to compression and additive 
noise attacks and resilient to moderate linear mean filtering.
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Inverse 
DWT (3 levels)
Watermark
embedding
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F igure 2.9: Kundur and Hatzinakos’s DWT watermark embedding process [91].
Two other schemes for DWT watermarking were proposed by Xia et al. [85] and Zhu et 
al [93]. Both algorithms used a Gaussian sequence of pseudo-random real numbers as 
the watermark data, instead of a logo image. Xia et al. [85] proposed a watermarking 
scheme that decomposes the image into two levels in the DWT domain. The watermark 
was embedded into the middle and high-pass sub-bands in the wavelet domain of the 
image, denoted by H Li, LH\, H H \, H L 2 , LH 2 and H H 2 , as shown in Figure 2.10(a). 
Xia et al claimed that their algorithm could tolerate additive noise, rescaling/ stretch­
ing, compression attacks and that the algorithm was also more robust than the DCT 
approach. Zhu et al [93] proposed a unified DWT watermarking approach that decom­
posed the original image into four levels in the DWT domain. Next, the watermark was 
embedded into the high-pass sub-bands in the wavelet domain of the image, denoted by 
H Li, LH\ and H H \ as shown in Figure 2.10(a).
In recent years, many researchers have attempted to develop watermarking algorithms 
based on the combination of two or more image transform techniques, with the aspiration 
of improving the schemes [69, 94-96]. For example, Yang and Zhang [95] improved the 
algorithm proposed by Lin et al [97] in the distributed discrete wavelet transform
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F igure 2.10: Three levels and one level of DWT decomposition
(DDWT) domain. The DDWT technique is adapted largely from the DWT approach, 
along with SVD for robust watermarking. A fragile watermark is adaptively embedded 
into the spatial domain of the watermarked image. By embedding both robust and 
fragile watermarks into a single image, the method is capable not only of identifying 
the ownership, but also of authenticating the integrity of the image to deduce whether 
it has been tampered or not. Mabtoul et al. [96] implemented a robust watermarking 
scheme based on Kingsbury’s Complex Dual Tree Wavelet Transform (DT-CWT) [98]. 
The aim of designing this scheme was to overcome the drawback of DWT caused by the 
lack of shift invariance and poor directional selectivity for diagonal features. Mabtoul et 
al. claimed that the DT-CWT approach was more robust and effective than the DWT 
approach.
Wang et al. [99] proposed a novel feature-based watermarking scheme for Discrete 
Fourier Transform (DFT) embedding. Their watermark embedding process is shown in 
Figure 2.11. In this scheme, the Local Characteristic Region (LCR) was first extracted 
from the original image. In the LCR extraction process, a set of feature points was 
obtained by employing the Harris-Laplace detector to the original image. Then LCRs 
were constructed from these characteristic scales of the feature points and their locations. 
The extracted LCRs were found to increase the robustness against various attacks such 
as signal processing and affine transformations. In order to embed the watermark bits 
into the DFT domain of the LCR, the zero-padding operation was applied to map the 
LCR circle areas into blocks of n x n pixels. Finally, after modifying the coefficients 
to embed the watermark bits in the DFT domain of these blocks, a zero-removing 
operation was applied to map these n x n-pixel blocks back into LCR circle areas to create 
the watermarked image. From the simulation results, the authors claimed that their 
proposed scheme was robust against common signal processing operators, such as median 
filtering, sharpening, noise adding, JPEG compression, rotation, scaling, translation, row 
or column removal, cropping and random bend attack. In Chapter 3, we will discuss our
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proposed wavelet-based contourlet transform (WBCT) non-block robust watermarking 
scheme.
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F igure 2.11: Wang et oZ.’s watermark embedding process [99].
2.2 .2  Fragile W aterm arking
As mentioned in Chapter 1, fragile watermarking can be used to detect any small ma­
nipulations made to the original image [100]. Hence, any attacks that ultimately alter 
the intensity of an image can be detected, and the tampered regions can be located ac­
curately when applying fragile watermarking schemes [101]. Many fragile watermarking 
algorithms are intentionally designed for use in the spatial domain (typically by altering 
the Least Significant Bits (LSB) of the image), as this domain is widely documented as 
being relatively fragile and sensitive to small changes [102-104], Therefore, it is possible 
to exploit the inherent weakness of the LSB schemes, and implement a fragile water­
marking scheme in the spatial domain. Fridrich [105] proposed a spatial domain based 
fragile watermarking scheme that could localise tampered regions of a watermarked im­
age, by adapting Wong’s method [106]. The watermark embedding process is shown in 
Figure 2.12. The original image is first divided into non-overlapping blocks of 8 x 16 
pixels. In each block, the seven Most Significant Bits (MSB) of each pixel are extracted, 
and a cryptographic hash function is applied as illustrated in Figure 2.13. The logo is 
also divided into blocks of 8 x 16 pixels and each block contains information about the 
original block position, image index, original image dimensions (resolution), camera ID 
and author ID (PIN). The seven MSBs of each block are hashed and then corresponding 
logo block are subjected to an Exclusive-OR (XOR) operation and then encrypted using 
a key. Finally, the LSBs of the original image are replaced with the result of the XOR 
operation and encrypted watermark bits, and creating the watermarked image. In the 
authentication process, the LSBs of the test image are extracted, and the seven MSBs 
from each block are hashed as shown in Figure 2.14. For each block, the LSBs are 
decrypted with a key, along with its corresponding hashed seven MSBs using the XOR 
operation. Finally, the authentication process is achieved by comparing each block of
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the image with the corresponding block from the logo. If any of the block in the set is 
not the same, the block of the image is flagged as a tampered block.
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F igure 2.12: Fridrich’s fragile watermark embedding process [105].
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F igure 2.13: MSBs and LSB of pixel value 221 in 8 bits binary sequence.
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F igure 2.14: Fridrich’s fragile watermark detection process [105].
Zhang and Wang [107] proposed a statistical scheme of fragile watermarking scheme that 
embeds a folded version of the authentication data derived from five most significant bits 
of the original image along with other additional data into the image with acceptable 
watermarked image quality (PSNR at 37.9<£B). Their results showed their algorithm 
could localise the tampered pixels accurately. They further improved their method in 
[107] that could restore the tampered image content after localising the tampered area 
without any errors [108]. He et al. [109] proposed a conventional self-embedding fragile 
watermarking scheme based on adjacent-block based statistical detection method (SDM) 
that could withstand copy-paste and collage attacks. Their algorithm could identify the 
tampered blocks with a probability of detection accuracy of greater than 98% even the 
tampered area was almost 70% of the host image.
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Fragile watermarking scheme can also be applied in transform domain. Li and Shi [11] 
proposed a fragile watermarking algorithm in DWT domain to achieve the requirements 
of high security, low distortion, and high accuracy of tamper localization for authenti­
cating JPEG2000 images. Their algorithm could also tolerate vector quantization at­
tack, Holliman-Memon attack, collage attack and transplantation attack. Aslantas et.al 
[110] proposed intelligent optimization algorithms (IOA) to improve fragile watermark­
ing schemes in DCT domain. They used IOA which included Genetic Algorithm (GA), 
Clonal Selection Algorithm (CSA), Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO), and Differen­
tial Evolution (DE) to correct rounding errors caused by transforming an image from 
the frequency domain to the spatial domain with the objective of improving DCT-based 
fragile watermarking. The experimental results showed that the CSA produced better 
PSNR results whereas DE has lower computational time among these four intelligent 
optimization algorithms. Yeh and Lee [111] proposed reversible fragile watermarking 
by utilizing the pyramidal structure method. They selected appropriate embedding ar­
eas by analysing the pyramid-structure of the image for embedding watermark bits in 
the wavelet domain. The experimental results showed that their scheme could success­
fully localise even when 50% of the watermarked image was tampered and detecting 
counterfeiting attacks.
2 .2 .3  Sem i-fragile W aterm arking
Semi-fragile watermarking techniques for image content authentication have recently 
attracted much attention [91, 112, 113]. This is due to the fact that comparing to frag­
ile watermarking, semi-fragile watermarking is not as sensitive as fragile watermarking. 
Semi-fragile schemes make it possible to verify the content of the original image, as well 
as permitting alterations caused by non-malicious (unintentional) modifications such as 
mild JPEG compression. A schematic diagram illustrating the main functions of semi- 
fragile watermarking is shown in Figure 2.15. The sender watermarks the original image 
via a watermark embedding process, and then sends the watermarked image to the re­
cipient through the transmission channel. The recipient authenticates the test image 
by way of a watermark detection and authentication process. During the image trans­
mission, the mild signal processing errors caused by signal reconstruction and storage, 
such as transmission noise or JPEG compression, are permissible. However, the image 
content tampering such as copy-and-paste attack will be identified as a malicious attack.
Many semi-fragile watermarking techniques have been already proposed by researchers. 
Lin et al. [114] proposed embedding algorithm that first applied DCT to 16 x 16-pixel 
blocks of the cover image, then embedded the watermarks in the middle to low frequency 
(except DC coefficient) of each block. Their scheme could identify the tampered area
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F igure 2.15: Main functions of semi-fragile watermarking
with 75% accuracy under moderate compression and with near 90% accuracy under 
light compression. Ho et al. [13] proposed a semi-fragile watermarking scheme in the 
Pinned Sine Transform (PST) domain. In their watermark embedding algorithm, as 
shown in Figure 2.16, the original image is applied by using PST to get the pinned 
and boundary fields in 8 by 8 blocks. The watermark bits were then inserted into 
middle to high frequency of each block in the pinned field. The scheme also used a 
self-restoration method, originally proposed by Fridrich and Goljan [115] to recover 
the tampered regions. Their scheme could tolerate some common image processing 
manipulations such as JPEG and wavelet compression, and the detection rate was higher 
than DCT-based scheme. The algorithm has been further improved by using irregular 
Sampling instead of the LSB method [21],which aimed to improve the robustness of 
tampering restoration. We have adapted their scheme and proposed the Slant Transform 
(SLT) based semi-fragile watermarking scheme, which will be discussed in more detail 
in Section 4.1. Kundur and Hatziankos [24] proposed a DWT based algorithm called 
telltale tamper-proofing, which made it possible to determine tampered regions in multi­
resolutions. Unlike other schemes that use DCT, this method does not require a block 
division process to detect the tampered regions due to the localisation ability of the 
wavelet transform. The localization ability of the wavelets in both spatial and frequency 
domains would potentially indicate a good candidate for semi-fragile watermarking.
Maeno et al. [116] presented two algorithms that focused on signature generation tech­
niques. The first algorithm used random bias to enhance the block based DCT water­
marking scheme proposed by Lin and Chang [18]. The second algorithm used nonuni­
form quantisation on a non-block based semi-fragile watermarking scheme in the wavelet 
domain. Their experimental results showed their method was fragile to malicious ma­
nipulations, but robust to non-malicious manipulations such as JPEG and JPEG2000 
compression. Ding et al. [117] also proposed a method by using DWT. In their algo­
rithm, chaos was used to generate a pseudo-random sequence as a watermark, in an
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F igure 2.16: Ho et oZ.’s PST-based watermark embedding process [13].
effort to improve the overall security. This was an improvement to the more traditional 
methods of generating a pseudo-random sequence. The sub-bands (H L 2 ,LH2 ,HH 2 ) 
were used for embedding the watermark after applying a 2-level wavelet decomposition 
of the original image. The normalized cross-correlation (NC) was used to evaluate their 
algorithm by comparing the original watermark with the extracted watermark after ap­
plying JPEG compression and Additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) manipulations. 
Ni et al. [118] proposed a robust lossless data hiding technique that could be employed 
into their semi-fragile watermarking scheme. The different bit-embedding strategies for 
groups of pixels with different pixel grayscale value distributions and error correction 
codes were utilized in their scheme. They analyzed their results under both lossless and 
lossy JPEG compression. If the watermarked image has experienced losslessly compres­
sion, the watermark bits can be extracted correctly and the image will be classified as 
authentic and the original image can be recovered exactly. If this losslessly compressed 
watermarked image has been further undergone lossy compression, the original image 
will not be able to recover and will be rendered authentic as long as the compression is 
not so severe that the content has been changed.
It was observed that Wavelet transforms are not optimal in capturing the contours or 
edges of the host image [119], which are vital to image authentication. To overcome 
this drawback, several multiscale and directional transforms have been proposed and 
proven to be more efficient than wavelets for capturing smooth contours and edges in 
natural images. Some examples include steerable pyramid [94], ridgelet [120], curvelet 
[119], bandlet [121], contourlet [122] and the WBCT [123]. In this thesis, we propose 
a novel WBCT based robust watermarking scheme. This will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 3. We then exploit the advantage of WBCT, and incorporate it into 
our proposed novel WBCT-based semi-fragile watermarking algorithm, which will be 
discussed in more detail in Section 4.2.
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2.3 Im age Forensics
Recently, there is a significant amount of interest in identifying reliable techniques ca­
pable of accurately proving the authenticity of an image, without the requirement of 
actively inserting a digital watermark or signature into the data. Whilst the watermark­
ing schemes have been shown to be useful for copyright protection and verifying the 
integrity of the image, there always exists the underlying risk that the watermark data 
might be forcibly or accidentally removed. When this happens, the image is effectively 
stripped of its identity. Forensic techniques aspire to achieve similar objectives but do 
not rely on the strength of embedded data. Instead, the ambition is to prove the authen­
ticity of an image based solely on the data provided. In the following subsections, we 
first classify the image forensic techniques into two main areas: image source detection 
and image manipulation detection. We then discuss one of the image forensic techniques 
- Benford’s Law, which can be utilised for improving the detection rates of semi-fragile 
watermarking schemes in Chapter 5.
2.3 .1  C lassification  o f Im age Forensics
Many researchers have classified image forensics into different categories according to the 
applications. For instance, Fridrich et al. classified image forensics into six categories, 
which are source classification, device identification, device linking, anomaly investiga­
tion, processing history recovery, and forgery detection [29]. Moreover, the field of image 
forensics has also been divided into image source identification, identification of syn­
thetic images and image forgery detection by Memon et al [124]. Furthermore, Farid 
et al. have classified image forensics into five areas, which are pixel based techniques, 
format based techniques, camera based techniques, physically based techniques and geo­
metric based techniques [30]. In general, image forensics can be divided into two main 
areas: image source detection and image manipulation detection.
Image Source Detection
Image source detection is the task of successfully linking suspect images to its source 
such as camera, scanner and printer devices. In this area, from the results of analysing 
captured images, the brand or model of device could be potentially classified, such as 
a Canon or Nikon camera. In addition, image source detection techniques could also 
be used to identify the source of the image by locating unique anomaly features within 
the image, and therefore determine which device is used in capturing the image. One 
of the earliest reported approaches for digital camera identification was based on the 
characteristic of the imaging sensor in the device [125]. The imaging sensor is arguably 
the most important component of the image acquisition process, as it captures the light
Chapter 2. Literature Review 25
intensity of the scene on a pixel-by-pixel basis, and converts it into an electrical signal. 
From here, the signal will pass through a Colour Filter Array (CFA), however, it is 
possible that the imaging sensor operates with an element of noise, caused by hot or 
dead pixels. Errors such as these dead pixels can often be seen in the final image, even if 
the image has been lossy compressed. As these errors are likely to be slightly different for 
different devices, the technique is useful for reliably linking images to the source sensor 
and therefore the source camera that captured the image. However, most modern and 
high-end digital cameras are able to detect deficiencies in the processing such as these 
dead pixels, and often remove them altogether. As the forensics scheme relies on the 
existence of such pixels, it can only be targeted towards less advanced cameras that do 
not correct these types of errors.
Another prominent research area of image source detection has been proposed by Lukas 
et al. [25, 126], and later by Khanna et al. in 2009 [27]. The technique relied on sensor 
pattern noise, which is a deterministic component that remains consistent for all images 
that the sensor captures. Pattern noise can be sub-divided into two categories: fixed 
pattern noise (FPN) and photo-response non-uniformity noise (PRNU). The FPN is an 
additive noise that is suppressed to varying standards by many camera manufacturers. 
This noise is amounted with the camera’s exposure and temperature [25]. For these 
reasons, it is not reliable for camera identification purposes as it can vary inconsistently. 
PRNU, on the other hand, is a multiplicative noise and contains a property refereed to 
as pixel non-uniformity (PNU), which is defined as the sensitivity differences to light at 
each pixel. The PNU is a direct result of the manufacturing process and is therefore 
not influenced by exposure and light. Indeed, the PNU noise remains the same for each 
image captured, meaning this component is extremely useful for determining the source 
camera. To perform the classification, a reference pattern for the camera must first be 
identified. The pattern noise obtained from a suspect image can now be compared with 
the pattern noise obtained from the device itself. If the correlation is identical, then 
there can be little doubt that the image is originated from the device, as the chances of 
two camera’s producing the same pattern noise are extremely remote.
Li [127] proposed an enhanced sensor pattern noise approach based on a hypothesis to 
improve the device identification rate of the identifier. The hypothesis is: the stronger a 
signal component is, the more likely it is associated with strong scene details, and thus 
the less trustworthy the component should be. The experimental results of his enhanced 
sensor pattern noise method illustrated a greater performance than the original sensor 
pattern noise based image forensic schemes.
In addition, Bateman et al. [128] demonstrated the benefits of using Statistical Process 
Control (SPC) for analysing image data on a range of different digital cameras. Based on
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their research, an anomaly in the camera processing elements was identified for iPhone 
3G devices, whereby the brightness of the images was found to be fluctuating. By 
analysing the latest iPhone 3GS model under the same conditions, they proved that the 
newer model does not show this property, indicating that reliable detecting iPhone 3G 
and iPhone 3GS devices is possible based on the captured images.
Im age M an ipu la tion  D etec tion
Image manipulation detection focuses on the detection of images tha t have been ma­
nipulated. These manipulations include malicious (intentional) modifications, such as 
image content copy-and-paste attack and non-malicious (unintentional) modifications, 
such as format changing, image enhancement and compression. One of the most com­
mon content malicious manipulations is splicing, which involves removing content from 
one image and overwriting it with something similar from another image to form a com­
posite. This type of modification can be dated back over 150 years; a famous example 
of which is the Abraham Lincoln portrait [129]. In this example as shown in Figure 
2.17, a portrait of John Calhoun was manipulated such that it appeared as if the por­
tra it was of Abraham Lincoln. In fact, Lincoln never posed for the portrait, and the 
image was actually constructed by flipping and resizing Lincoln’s head from a head-shot 
photograph taken by M atthew Brady such that it resembled the same proportions as 
the Calhoun portrait. Calhoun’s face was then replaced by Lincoln’s face to produce a 
composite image.
(a) John Calhoun portrait. (b) Lincoln head-shot. (c) Composite image.
F igure  2.17: The Lincoln composite.
An image forensic technique proposed by Farid et al. found tha t composite images 
could also be identified by studying the light reflected into the subjects eyes [130]. The 
positioning of white dots (caused by flash photography) indicated the direction of the 
light when the image was captured. When images were spliced together, these issues 
were often overlooked. When several people all appear in the scene the correlation of 
the light direction will match almost exactly. However, when a person has been spliced 
into the image from another image, the direction of light on the subjects eyes will not
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match. By studying the light pattern, it is often a fairly trivial process to determine 
whether the image is genuine or not. Similarly, Johnson and Farid [26] discusses how 
lighting observations would be applied more generally to images. They explained that 
the light striking a surface was dependant on the position of the light source. As such, an 
estimate of the direction of the light source could be derived from an image by reviewing 
a given object’s 2-D surface contour, such as a human jawline and chin. The lighting of 
an object can ultimately be compared against that of other objects in the photo, and if 
there exists a mismatch in lighting directions, then the image is likely to be faked.
Furthermore, the sensor pattern noise technique (PRNU), as discussed earlier for image 
source detection, can also be adapted to authenticate images. As the complete pattern 
noise exists for every pixel in an image, a manipulated image can be derived when 
the pattern noise is not present at a particular region of interest. It is important to 
note, however, that the PRNU noise will not be present in highly saturated areas of 
clean images, and is also highly supressed in dark areas, as the noise is multiplicative. 
Therefore, a region that does not contain the pattern noise should be checked to ensure 
that neither of these two properties hold true before classifying the image as tampered. 
Further details of how this can be achieved statistically are discussed in [131]. However, 
Li et al. [132] demonstrated that the sensor pattern noise of the original images can be 
modified or replaced. Therefore, the detection accuracy could be reduced if the image 
forensic investigation process relies on analysing sensor pattern noise only.
Image forensic techniques can be also used to detect the non-malicious (unintentional) 
modifications. For example, in some cases, images are enhanced through image edit­
ing software to provide better visual clarity, even though the content itself will remain 
true. Similarly, the images could have been compressed to minimise storage. Moreover, 
processing history recovery could be used to detect non-malicious (unintentional) modi­
fications, such as JPEG/JPEG200 compression ratio [29]. Zhang et al [133] proposed a 
double compression detection technique for JPEG2000 compressed images. Double com­
pression occurs when an image is saved twice in the same image format with different or 
similar compression. In their scheme, they applied the DWT to a JPEG2000 compressed 
image, and extracted the High/Low and Low/High sub-bands of the DWT coefficients. 
A histogram was then formed by applying the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) to these 
extracted coefficients. By analysing the sharp peaks and valleys of this histogram, the 
test image could be classified according to whether or not it has been subjected to a 
double JPEG2000 compression. Fu et al. [134] proposed an image forensic technique 
to detect the Quality Factor (QF) of unknown JPEG compressed images by using the 
Benford’s Law. The application of Benford’s Law will be discussed in more detail in the 
next section as this is one of the contributed areas of this thesis.
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2.3 .2  B en ford ’s Law for Im age Forensics
Benford’s Law was introduced by Frank Benford in 1938 [135] and developed by Hill 
[136] for analysis of the probability distribution of the first digit (1 — 9) of numbers from 
natural data in statistics. Benford’s Law has also been applied to accounting forensics 
[137, 138] and image processing [139], [140]. The basic principle of Benford’s Law is 
given as follows:
P (x) = logiQ ( 1 +  i  ) , æ =  1,2, ...9 (2.6)
where x  is the first digit of the number and p(x) is the probability distribution of x.
Fu et al. [134] observed that the 1st digits of DCT coefficients (uncompressed) of 1338 
images were found to be obeying the Benford’s Law, as shown in Figure 2.18.
0.35
Benford's law 
Actual distribution
a. 0.15
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
First Digit of the Block-DCT Coefficients
F igure 2.18: Comparison between Benford’s Law and the 1st digits of DCT coefficients
of 1338 images [134]
They also analysed the 1st digits of JPEG coefficients (compressed) of images with 
different Quality Factors (QF), and found that 1st digits of JPEG coefficients obeyed 
their proposed generalised Benford’s Law as given in the following shown equation:
P(x) = Nlogio ^1 +  —^ xq j^ ,% =  1,2, ...9 (2.7)
where N  denote normalisation, and s and q are model parameters. Table 2.1 illustrates 
an example of three best fitted parameters to their corresponded QFs by using the 
curve fitting tool in Matlab [134]. Moreover, the probability distributions were not
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following the generalized Benford’s Law if the image had been compressed twice with 
different quality factors. Thus, by utilizing this property, the QF of the image could be 
estimated. In Chapter 5, we propose a framework that further explores the generalised 
Benford’s Law as an image forensics technique, to accurately detect the unknown JPEG 
compression in semi-fragile watermarking images to improve the detection rate.
Table 2.1: Example of three parameters [134].
Q uality  Factors N q s
100 1.456 1.47 0.0372
90 1.255 1.563 -0.3784
80 1.324 1.653 -0.3739
70 1.412 1.732 -0.337
60 1.501 1.813 -0.3025
50 1.579 1.882 -0.2725
2.4 Sum m ary
In this chapter, The fundamental concept of digital watermarking was described. We 
presented requirements such as imperceptibility, robustness, capacity and security for 
digital watermarking, characteristic of spatial and transform domain based watermark­
ing schemes.We also reviewed different watermarking algorithms in the literature accord­
ing to three classifications: “robust” , “fragile” and “semi-fragile” . Finally, we reviewed 
image forensics techniques briefly, and outlined image forensics into two main areas: im­
age source detection and image manipulation detection, as well as the use of Benford’s 
Law for image forensics.
Chapter 3
Novel Robust W atermarking 
Algorithm  Based on W B C T
One of the important applications of digital watermarking technology is copyright pro­
tection and ownership identification for digital images. To achieve this goal, robust wa­
termarking has been rapidly developed in the past decade or so. Robust watermarking 
is designed to survive various non-geometric manipulations such as JPEG compression, 
additive noise and filtering as well as some geometric distortions such as rotation and 
scaling. In Chapter 2, a number of different transforms and algorithms used for robust 
image watermarking have been reviewed. These include block based DCT, non-block 
based DWT and other state-of-the-art watermarking algorithms operating in the trans­
form domain. In contrast to conventional transform domain methods, a new adaptive 
robust watermarking algorithm using the non-redundant contourlet transform known 
as the WBCT is presented in this chapter. From experiments, we exploit the energy 
relations between parent and children coefficients, which are invariant before and after 
JPEG compression. Results show that even for QF set as low as 10, the percentages of 
invariant energy relations of all test images were above 75% after JPEG compression. 
This invariance feature is therefore very useful for robust image watermarking. The 
results of WBCT are evaluated and compared with two other DWT based algorithms 
achieving a high degree of robustness against most non-geometrical and geometrical 
attacks, while maintaining an excellent perceptual invisibility.
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3.1 W avelet-based C ontourlet Transform (W B C T )
The contourlet transform can be realised efficiently via a double-iterated filter bank 
structure. In the double filter bank, the Laplacian Pyramid (LP) [141] is first used 
to capture the point discontinuities. In the LP stage, the image is decomposed into 
a low-pass and a set of band-pass sub-bands. Each band-pass image is then further 
decomposed by a directional filter bank (DEB) [142] into a number of sub-bands to 
capture the directional information and link-point discontinuities into linear structures. 
Subsequently, the image is decomposed into several directional sub-bands at multiple 
scales.
Eslami and Radha [123] developed a WBCT, also as non-redundant contourlet trans­
form, by replacing the LP with a wavelet, followed by implementing a directional filter 
bank (DEB) into the wavelet sub-bands to extract the directional information. As shown 
in Figure 3.1, at each level in the wavelet decomposition, the three high-pass bands cor­
responding to the LH, HL, and HE bands can be obtained. DEB is applied with the 
same number of directions to each band at a given level. As a result, each LH2, HL2 
and HH2 are decomposed into four directional subbands, and each LHI, HLI and HHI 
are decomposed into eight directional subbands.
WBCT was developed as an improvement to the wavelet transform that is inefficient 
when extracting smooth contours. It has the multiscale and time-frequency localisation 
property of wavelets, but it also provides a high degree of directionality and anisotropy 
[122]. The main advantage of WBCT is that a non-redundant multi-resolution and mul­
tidirectional expansion of images can be achieved. The transform has been successfully 
applied in image coding [123] and image fusion [143]. As an example, the WBCT coeffi­
cient map of the image ‘peppers’ is shown in Figure 3.2 to demonstrate the property of 
this transform.
Eslami and Radha [123] stated that the WBCT parent-children relationship was different 
from the relationship that exists in conventional wavelet domains. In a conventional 
wavelet-domain, the parent-children links are always in the same direction among the 
three wavelet directions, as shown in Figure 3.3(a). WBCT coefficients, on the other 
hand, comprise four children in two separate directional sub-bands for each LH, HL 
and HH sub-bands, as shown in Figure 3.3(b). In Figures 3.3(a) and 3.3(b), the blank 
square is the parent coefficient and the four white squares (arrowed) are their children. 
This special relationship and characteristic of WBCT form the fundamental basis for 
our novel robust watermarking algorithm.
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FIGURE 3.1: The framework of the WBCT.
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F igure  3.2: (a) Original image (b) coefficient map after level-2 WBCT applied.
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F igure  3.3: Parent-children relationship for DWT and WBCT.
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3.2 Coefficient R elations w ith  JPE G  Com pression of Orig­
inal Im ages
In this section, we first investigate the characteristics of the energy relations of the 
original images between the parent and the children coefficients before and after JPEG 
compression (the JPEG compression attack is one of the most common attacks in robust 
watermarking) in a three level WBCT. As per the pseudo-code below, suppose parent 
coefficients in the original image and JPEG compressed image are denoted as P  and P', 
respectively, and its corresponding four children as Q  and C%, where i =  1,2,3,4 .
if (|P| > m ean|Ci| A |P ;| > mean|C^|) V (|P| < mean\Ci\ A |P'| <  mean|Cj|) then  
We assume the energy relations are invariant before and after compression, 
end if
Six standard 512 x 512 test images (Figure 3.4) are used in this experiment to determine 
the invariant energy relationship as shown in Figure 3.5. As the quality factor (QF) 
decreases from 90 to 10, the average percentages of invariant relations also gradually 
decrease. For QF = 90, it reaches above 95%, and for QF = 10, although the image is 
distorted significantly, it still maintains above 75%. From Figure 3.5, it can be observed 
that highly textured images such as ‘San Diego’, ‘Bridge’ and ‘Baboon’ all performed 
relatively better than the other images. In addition, we also analysed 1000 standard 
grayscale test images and the results showed similar characteristics. Overall, an improved 
performance can be achieved for all images by exploiting the modulation of their energy 
relationship.
3.3 W aterm ark Em bedding Process
In this section, we describe the watermark embedding process as shown in Figure 3.6. 
Three level WBCT is first applied to the image. We then randomly select a number of 
parent coefficients (black squares) with their corresponded children coefficients (white 
squares) using a key, as shown in Figure 3.7. The total number of these parent coefficients 
is equal to the length of the watermark, which is a pseudo-random binary sequence 
{—1,1}. For each selected parent coefficient, we then embed the watermark bits by 
modulation as expressed in Equation 3.1.
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F igure 3.4: Six standard test images
P ' =
p,
p,
( | f |>
( M <
( |f |<P  K l  x  (|Caug| — P ) , 
f - K l x ( | C ^ | - | f | ) ,  ( | f | <
f +  K 2 x ( f - | C ^ | ) ,  ( | P | >
f - ^ 2 x ( | P | - | C ^ | ) ,  ( | f | >
where P' is the watermarked parent coefficient, 
is the average of four children coefficients, w 
thresholds to determine the trade-off between 
that we only modulate the parent coefficients
(3.1)
I CaVg | ) A (re — 1)
\ C a v g \ )  A (re =  -1 )
IQwgl) A (re =  1) A ( f  > 0)
\ C a v g \ )  A (re =  1) A (P  < 0)
|C ^ |) A ( r e  =  - l ) A ( P > 0 )  
l^augl) A (re =  -1 )  A (P  < 0)
P  is the original parent coefficient, C a v g  
is the watermark bit, K l  and K 2  are 
imperceptibility and robustness. Note 
selected from the LH3, HL3 and HH3
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F igure 3.5: Percentage of invariant energy relations after JPEG compression.
subbands. After the embedding steps, the watermarked image is reconstructed using 
the inverse WBCT transform.
Original
image
Watermarked
image
Key
WBCT InverseWBCT
Watermark
embedding
Parent-children
relationship
Watermark
F igure 3.6: The proposed WBCT watermark embedding process.
3.4 W aterm ark D etection  Process
In Figure 3.8, we present our proposed algorithm for watermark detection. First, the 
WBCT transform is performed on the watermarked image before the tree structures are 
selected using the key. The absolute value of the parent is compared with the absolute
Chapter 3. Novel Robust Watermarking Algorithm Based on WBCT 36
*=; ■nJtis
M \
» __^
F igure 3.7: A demonstration of parent with their corresponded children coefficients
in three level WBCT.
value of the average of the children, and if the former is greater than or equal to the 
latter, then the watermark bit ‘1’ is obtained, otherwise, ‘-1’ is obtained. The process 
is repeated for every tree structure to retrieve and construct the entire watermark data. 
A normalised correlation is used to determine whether a watermark is present or not, 
by comparing it to a pre-speciffed threshold. The normalized correlation is computed in 
Equation 3.2.
— (3 .2 )
where w is the given watermark, and w is the extracted watermark. If N C  > r  , then the 
watermark is present in the image. We adapt the threshold based on the false positive 
probability [144]. Based on empirical results for our algorithm, Nw =  512 is the number 
of the watermarks , r  is chosen to be 0.23 for a false positive probability of 1.03 x 10-7 , 
which has been proved in [144].
Watermarked
image WBCT
Watermark
Detection
Parent-children
relationship
Key
FIGURE 3.8: The proposed WBCT watermark detection process.
3.5 E xperim ental R esu lts
In this section, six grayscale images ‘Lena’, ‘Peppers’, ‘Goldhill’, ‘San Diego’, ‘Bridge’, 
and ‘Baboon’ (each of size 512 x 512) are used for our experiments to evaluate our 
proposed WBCT watermarking method.
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3.5 .1  Im p ercep tib ility
In Table 3.1, the PSNR is used to evaluate the perceptual distortion of these images be­
fore and after watermark embedding. High PSNR values indicate that the watermarked 
data is highly imperceptible. We compare these results with Wang and Lin [145], as 
they proposed a watermarking method based on a wavelet tree quantisation and ob­
tained a strong robustness to several different attacks. Our proposed contourlet method 
achieves higher PSNR values than the other two wavelet methods. Figure 3.9 illustrates 
the original and watermarked images for ‘Goldhill’ and ‘San Diego’, with approximately 
42dB and 39dB, respectively.
T a b l e  3.1: PSNR comparison between our and Wang’ method.
Im age O ur m e thod  (dB) W ang’s m eth o d  (dB ) [145]
Lena 41.46 38.2
Peppers 39.24 38.7
Goldhill 42.22 39.8
San Diego 38.81 Not Available (NA)
Bridge 39.43 NA
Baboon 40.22 NA
3.5 .2  R ob u stn ess
The robustness of our proposed WBCT watermarking method has been tested against 
different attacks including non-geometrical and geometrical attacks. Figures 3.10-3.15 
illustrate detailed analysis of watermark robustness of WBCT against JPEG2000 com­
pression, Gaussian noise, salt and pepper noise, contrast stretching, circular shifting 
and scaling, respectively. Furthermore, we compare these results with two conventional 
wavelet approaches based on Wang and Lin [145] and Tsai and Lin [146]. The experi­
ments on WBCT against different attacks are summarised in Table 3.2, and comparative 
results between WBCT and the two wavelet transforms are shown in Table 3.3. The 
normalised correlation value below a threshold of approximately 0.23 means it has failed 
to detect the embedded watermark.
For JPEG and JPEG2000 compression attacks, different quality factors (QF) were used 
on watermarked images. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show the effectiveness of our algorithm even 
when QF  =  10, whereas the other two algorithms only provided results at QF = 20 and 
QF = 30. For the case of JPEG2000 shown in Figure 3.10, our method achieved results 
even at QF=10. This has not been reported by other existing watermarking algorithms 
at this low compression value. Figure 3.11 illustrates the images distorted under different 
Gaussian white noise. Similarly, salt and pepper noise addition for different amount of
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I###
(a) Original (b) Watermarked
(c) Original (d) Watermarked
F igure  3.9: ‘Goldhill’ - the original image and the watermarked image. ‘San Diego’ - 
the original image and the watermarked image.
noise densities is shown in Figure 3.12. Figure 3.13 shows the images under contrast 
stretching attack for different degrees of strength. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 also highlight 
the results achieved for mean filtering, histogram equalisation, median filter, Gaussian 
filtering, and sharpening. From the results, our method outperformed the other two 
algorithms in all cases, with median filtering the only exception in Table 3.3.
For geometrical attacks, we investigate the robustness of our proposed W BCT water­
marking algorithm against different amounts of pixels due to circular shifting and scal­
ing, as shown in Figures 3.14 and 3.15, respectively. Table 3.3 summarises the different 
non-geometrical and geometrical attacks used in comparing our m ethod with the other 
two methods. In Table 3.3, “shifting A” indicates circular shifting, and “shifting B” 
indicates a deletion of lines followed by duplication of the adjacent lines. Figure 3.16 
illustrates the watermark detected from watermarked images ‘Goldhill’ after attacked 
with JPEG  Compression Q F — 20 (Figure 3.16(a)), 400 pixels random shifted (Figure 
3.16(b)), 20 degree of contrast stretching (Figure 3.16(c)) and Gaussian white noise with
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variance = 0.01 (Figure 3.16(d)), respectively. Overall, our method achieved relatively 
better performance than Wang [145] and Tsai [146] except for the rotation and scaling 
attacks in Table 3.3.
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F i g u r e  3.10: Performance of our method after JPEG2000 compression
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F igure 3.12: Performance of our method after Salt & Pepper noise
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F i g u r e  3.13: Performance of our method after contrast stretching
No
rm
al
ize
d 
Co
rr
ela
tio
n 
No
rm
al
ize
d 
C
or
re
la
tio
n
Chapter 3. Novel Robust Watermarking Algorithm Based on WBCT 41
0.9
0.8
0.7
Lena 
M—  Peppers 
-A— Goldhill 
■X— San Diego 
Bridge 
■o—  Baboon
0.3
0.2
0.1
9 50 100 200 300 400
Pixels shifted
F igure 3.14: Performance of our method after pixel circular shifting
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F igure 3.15: Performance of our method after scaling
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TABLE 3.2: Performance of our method under different attacks.
Im age JP E G  (QF = 
10)
M ean  F ilte r  
( 3 x 3 )
M ean
F ilte r (5 x 5)
H istog ram
E qualiza tion
Lena 0.28 0.54 0.29 0.47
Peppers 0.26 0.60 0.23 0.45
Goldhill 0.34 0.60 0.32 0.55
San Diego 0.52 0.59 0.29 0.60
Bridge 0.48 0.63 0.33 0.67
Baboon 0.45 0.65 0.30 0.77
3.6 Sum m ary
In this chapter, a novel robust image watermark embedding and detection algorithm 
in wavelet-based contourlet transform domain was presented. Through experiments, 
most of the energy relations between parent and children non-redundant contourlet 
coefficients maintained 75% of invariance before and after JPEG compression QF = 10, 
although the image was distorted significantly. Therefore, performance improvement 
was obtained by means of embedding a watermark via exploiting the modulation of 
the energy relations. By comparing with Wang and Lin[145] and Tsai and Lin’s [146] 
methods, the experimental results based on 16 set of attacks using 6 images showed 
that our non-redundant contourlet method was more robust to attacks such as JPEG, 
JPEG2000 compression, pixel shifting, histogram equalisation, median filter, Gaussian 
filtering, and sharpening. The results showed that our non-redundant contourlet method 
was highly robust to different kinds of attacks including non-geometrical and geometrical 
attacks. These include JPEG2000 compression (as low as QF=10), 400 pixels circular 
shifting, and contrast stretching, (as low as 20%). However, for the median filtering, 
scale and rotation attacks, our results are lower than other two methods that need to 
be further improved.
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Table 3.3: Comparison of our method’s performance with two other Methods
A ttacks Im age W ang’s
M ethod
T sa i’s
M ethod
O ur M ethod
1 0.15 0.45 0.55
JPEG (QF = 30) 2 0.23 0.44 0.54
3 0.34 0.37 0.63
1 NA 0.37 0.45
JPEG (QF = 25) 2 NA 0.29 0.56
3 NA 0.23 0.50
1 0.23 0.38 0.28
Median Filter (4 x 4) 2 0.24 0.33 0.27
3 0.25 0.36 0.30
1 NA 0.43 0.29
Median Filter (5 x 5) 2 NA 0.32 0.25
3 NA 0.41 0.29
1 0.26 0.27 0.79
Shifting A (9 pixels) 2 0.29 0.35 0.86
3 0.29 0.36 0.90
1 0.25 0.29 0.54
Shifting B (9 pixels) 2 0.25 0.26 0.56
3 0.28 0.31 0.54
1 0.11 0.24 0.93
Multiple Watermarking 2 0.18 0.29 0.93
3 0.22 0.25 0.91
1 0.24 0.25 0.13
Scale & Rotation (1°) 2 0.15 0.25 0.04
3 0.17 0.26 0.04
1 0.24 0.30 0.06
Scale & Rotation (—0.75°) 2 0.25 0.38 0.03
3 0.25 0.30 0.01
1 0.64 0.89 0.83
Gaussian Filtering 2 0.56 0.91 0.91
3 0.74 0.92 0.90
1 0.46 0.87 0.90
Sharpening 2 0.39 0.63 0.71
3 0.62 0.89 0.91
Where ‘1’ means Lena image, ‘2’ means Peppers image, ‘3’ means Goldhill image.
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:
F ig u r e  3.16: Attacked watermarked image ‘Goldhill’ - (a) JPEG Compression QF=20, 
(b)400 pixel random shifted, (c) 20 degree of contrast stretching, (d) Gaussian white
noise, variance=0.01.
Chapter 4
Novel Semi-fragile W atermarking 
Algorithm s Based on SLT and 
W B C T
With the tremendous growth and use of digital cameras and video devices, the need 
to verify the collected digital content for law enforcement applications such as crime 
scene investigations and traffic violations, becomes paramount if they are to be used 
as evidence in courts. Semi-fragile watermarking has become increasingly important 
within the past few years as it can be used to verify the content of images by accurately 
localising the tampered area and tolerating some non-malicious manipulations. There 
have been a number of different transforms used for semi-fragile image watermarking, 
as reviewed in Chapter 2.
In this chapter, we present two novel transforms for semi-fragile watermarking, using 
the Slant transform (SLT) as a block-based algorithm and the wavelet-based contourlet 
transform (WBCT) as a non-block based algorithm. The proposed SLT is compared 
with existing DCT and PST semi-fragile watermarking schemes. Experimental results 
indicate that the SLT is more accurate for copy and paste attacks with non-malicious 
manipulations, such as additive Gaussian noise. In Chapter 3, WBCT has already 
been successfully demonstrated its capability for robust watermarking. For semi-fragile 
watermarking, watermarking embedding is performed again by modulating the parent- 
children relationship in the contourlet domain. Experimental results using the same 
test images have demonstrated that our proposed WBCT method achieves good perfor­
mances in localising the tampered regions, even when the image has been subjected to 
non-malicious manipulations such as JPEG/JPEG2000 compressions, Gaussian noise, 
Gaussian filtering, and contrast stretching. The average false positive rate is found to
45
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be approximately 1% while maintaining an average false negative rate below 6.5%. We 
will also analyse and compare the difference between these two schemes.
4.1 N ovel SLT B ased Sem i-fragile W aterm arking A lgorithm
This section provides an introduction to the slant transform, and discusses the details of 
the embedding, detection and authentication processes associated with watermarking. 
Experimental results are also presented in this section.
4.1 .1  T h e Slant Transform  (SLT)
The Slant Transform has been applied to image coding in the past [147] and was recently 
adopted for robust image watermarking [148]. The SLT can be considered as a fast 
computational algorithm that provides a significant bandwidth reduction, resulting in a 
lower mean-square error for moderate size image blocks [147]. In addition, for textured 
images, the quality of the Slant Transformed images is higher than images coded by 
using other transforms such as DCT and Hadamard [149]. Moreover, as a similar image 
processing application to Walsh-Hadamard transform, Slant transform can be identified 
as a sub-optimum for energy compaction. This is essential for digital watermarking 
as the robust information hiding can be ensured by capturing the spread of middle
to higher frequency bands [148]. Furthermore, Slant transform is simpler, faster and
especially suitable for highly textured images [148]. Hence, the Slant Transform is 
proposed for semi-fragile watermarking and authentication of images in this section. 
The authentication as the method to corroborate the genuineness of an object is mainly 
focusing on examining whether the image has been tampered or not, the location(s) of 
tampered region(s) and to what extent it has been changed. Furthermore, the SLT can 
also be used for compressing the original image [149], providing a mean to self-recovering 
the tampered regions by embedding the compressed cover image into the LSBs of the 
watermarked image [115]. The forward and inverse of SLT [147-149] can be expressed 
as follows:
[V] = [SjvHUHSivf (4.1)
[U] = [S^nVMSiv] (4.2)
where [U] represents the original image of size N  x N,  [V] represents the transformed 
components and [Sjv] is the N  x N  unitary Slant matrix given by
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as base case, I ( j v / 2 ) - 2  i s  the identity matrix of dimension 
(iV/2) -  2, and a2N = ( i l f e ) /  » &2iV =  ( ^ E ^ )   ^ are constants.
4 .1 .2  SLT W aterm ark E m bedd ing P rocess
A novel semi-fragile Slant Transform digital watermarking method is adopted based on 
previous work relating to PST [13] and a self-restoration method [115]. The embedding 
process using the Slant Transform is illustrated in Figure 4.1. The first 7 bits of the 
original image are extracted and divided into 8 x 8-pixel blocks, SLT method is then 
applied to each block. The watermark embedding algorithm is then utilised, which is
illustrated in the pseudo-code below. The watermarks for each block are then random
generated by input a key as a seed. The obtained watermarks are embedded into the 
mid-band of each 8 x 8-pixel block. After watermark embedding, frequency coefficients 
of each block of the watermarked image are converted back by using the inverse Slant 
Transform. Consequently, the first 7 bits of watermarked image is obtained.
I f  iy =  1 And x  > r , Then y = x ,  E lse y = a.
I Î  w = 0 And x < —r , Then y = x ,  E lse y = —a.
where w is the watermark bit, x  is the SLT coefficient of the host, y is the modified 
SLT coefficient. Through empirical experiments, we set r  =  3.5 is the threshold which 
controls the perceptual quality of the watermarked image, and a  is a constant that 
randomly selected between 2.5 and r.
The original image is also divided into 8 x 8-pixel blocks and undergoes the same Slant 
Transform; compression for each sub-block is then achieved by discarding the high fre­
quency coefficients. Accordingly, 64 bits information for each block is acquired after 
compression and then encrypted by utilizing a key. Obtained blocks are then shuffled, 
e.g. the value of block 1 moves to block 50, the value of block 35 moves to block 10.
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Therefore, the LSBs of the watermarked image are then gained. Finally, the combination 
of the first 7 bits and LSBs of the watermarked images are formed into final watermarked 
image.
Original
image
Watermarked
image
Key
Extract 
1st 7 bits
SLT
SLT
Inverse SLT
Compressed
&Encrypted
Divided into 
8 by 8 blocks
Watermark
embedding
Merge blocks 
back to image
LSBs replace 
& blocks shuffle
Watermark
F igure 4.1: Proposed SLT watermark embedding process.
4 .1 .3  SLT W a te rm a rk  D e te c tio n , A u th e n t ic a t io n  a n d  R e s to ra t io n
The proposed semi-fragile Slant Transform for image authentication and restoration 
method is shown in Figure 4.2. Similar to the embedding process, the first 7 bits of the 
test image are extracted and divided into 8 x 8-pixel blocks by applying SLT and then 
apply the detection algorithm to the first 7 bits. Meanwhile, the LSBs are extracted 
from the test image and only the LSBs of the detected regions are quantized back for 
recovery according to authentication result. Consequently, authenticated and recovered 
images can be output.
The watermark bits can be detected by extracting the watermarked coefficients y. If y 
is larger than 0, the watermark bit value is 1; if y is smaller than 0, the watermark bit 
value is 0. The retrieved watermark needs to be compared with the original watermark. 
After the watermark bits from the entire block have been retrieved, the comparison 
between the watermark bits can be accomplished by using the correlation coefficient p, 
computed as follows:
E E ( w ' - w ' H w - w ) (4 4 )
\ / £  £  (w' -  w')2 E  £  (w -  w)2
where w is the original and w z is the retrieved watermarks corresponding to the block. 
The correlation coefficient p can be compared with a pre-determined threshold value 
À =  0.5, which based on empirical observation of 1000 watermarked images. If p < A, 
which indicates that the block has been tampered with as part of authentication process.
Chapter 4. Novel Semi-fragile Watermarking Algorithms Based on SLT and WBCT 49
This is followed by restoration of the tampered regions based on the decompression and 
extraction of the LSBs for the watermarked image.
Test
image
Restored
image
Authenticated
image
Extract
LSBs
Extract 
1st 7 bits
SLT
Divided into 
8 by 8 blocks
Watermark
detection Authentication
Decompressed^
Decrypted
Restoration
Key Watermark
F i g u r e  4.2: Our proposed SLT watermark detection, authentication and restoration
process.
4 .1 .4  E xp erim en ta l R esu lts
A number of experiments have been carried out to evaluate the performance of the 
proposed SLT watermarking scheme. The proposed watermarking scheme is compared 
with two other watermarking schemes: the PST-based [13] and the DCT-based [114]. 
For a fair comparison, the embedding strength of the watermark in each scheme is 
adjusted such that the peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) of the watermarked images is 
approximately 33 dB, which is considered acceptable subjectively. The performance of 
the watermarking schemes is measured in terms of the false positive rate ( P f p r ) ,  the 
false negative rate ( P f n r )  and the average detection rate (Pau5), defined as:
p  _  Number of pixels in the untampared region detected as tampered
Total number of pixels in the untampered region
p  _  Number of pixels in the tampared region detected as untampered
Total number of pixels in the tampered region
—^ y ^ xlOO. (4.7)
where Na is the number of area(s) have been tampered with. A number of standard test 
images are used in the experiments and the results for 6 images, each of size 512 x 512 
are obtained.
JPEG  Compression Attack
Table 4.1 shows that SLT, DCT and PST are compared by applying JPEG compression
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attack to 6 different grayscale images (512 x 512) in order to determine the Pf-  As 
can be seen from the table below, SLT, DCT and PST have similar false positive rates 
when QF = 85. After experiencing 75% JPEG compression attack, the P f p r  of SLT is 
still considerably low with average rate of 1.2%, whereas PST and DCT have the higher 
average false positive rates of 86% and 31.4%, respectively. Although the P f p r  of all 
three methods have increased when QF  =  65, SLT still has the lowest increased rate 
of 30.8% comparing with the average value of P f p r  of PST and DCT, of 92.2% and 
88.2% respectively. The reason for the relatively better results using the Slant Transform 
was that the embedding locations concentrated mainly on the middle frequency band, 
which is considered to be more robust, whereas DCT and PST mainly concentrated more 
on high frequencies. Overall, the results indicate that the SLT watermarking method 
achieves lower detection errors than PST and DCT based on the JPEG compression 
attack.
T a b le  4.1: Comparative performance in term of P f p r  (%) the watermarking schemes 
against JPEG compression with varying quality factor
T est Im age Q F =  85 Q F =  75 Q F =  65SLT P S T D C T SLT P S T D C T SLT P S T D C T
Lena 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.7 91.2 31.5 37.2 93.5 81.4
Baboon 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.9 91.2 31.6 24.1 91.2 91.0
Bridge 0.4 1.2 0.5 1.6 83.7 32.9 28.4 91.8 91.5
Trucks 0.2 0.8 0.4 1.4 87.4 31.2 33.3 92.8 90.1
Ship 0.2 0.8 0.4 2.0 89.0 31.3 37.5 92.3 85.0
San Diego 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.6 83.4 30.0 24.2 91.3 90.2
A verage 0.2 0.7 0.2 1.2 86.0 31.4 30.8 92.2 88.2
Copy and Paste Attack
The copy and paste attack is utilized to compare the performance in term of detection 
rates of SLT, DCT and PST for six grayscale test images (512 x 512) as given in Ta­
ble 4.2. Three different tampering rates of 10%, 20% and 30% will be applied to each 
test image to analyse the overall detection rate of the three transform methods. The 
tamper tests are performed with 100 random locations on each image. Consequently, 
5400 test images are obtained based on this experimental setup. Table 4.2 shows the 
comparative performance of the three watermarking schemes against copy and paste 
attack with different amount of tampering. However, the results show that PST is the 
most sensitive method as it has the highest overall detection rate after experiencing all 
three tamper tests (10%, 20% and 30%) for all images. Figure 4.3(a-e), shows the orig­
inal, watermarked, tampered, authenticated and restored images for the image Trucks, 
respectively.
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T a b l e  4.2: Comparative performance in term of Pavg (%) the watermarking schemes
against copy and paste attack
Test Im age 10% ta m p er 20% ta m p er 30% ta m p erSLT P S T D C T SLT P S T D C T SLT P S T D C T
Lena 96.0 97.6 95.5 97.9 98.7 97.1 98.3 99.0 97.3
Baboon 96.7 97.3 96.3 98.1 98.8 96.5 98.5 99.0 97.0
Bridge 96.3 97.5 95.4 97.9 98.6 97.0 98.2 98.8 96.9
Trucks 95.7 97.6 95.1 97.6 98.7 96.7 98.3 98.8 96.9
Ship 96.1 97.6 95.2 97.7 98.8 96.2 98.3 98.8 96.7
San Diego 96.6 97.6 95.4 98.1 98.8 96.6 98.6 99.0 97.5
A verage 96.2 97.5 95.5 97.9 98.7 96.7 98.4 98.9 97.0
(a) Original (b) Watermarked (c) Tampered
(d) Authenticated (e) Restored
F ig u r e  4.3: Demonstration of the image Trucks in SLT semi-fragile watermarking
scheme
C om bined JP E G  C om pression and Copy and  P a s te  A ttack
In Table 4.3, the six watermarked images (512 x 512) are compressed with three different 
JPEG  compression rates QF of 85, 75 and 65. Th experimental setup is similar to 
the previous copy and paste attack with 100 random locations for tam pered areas. 
Overall, the PST achieves a relatively higher detection rate than DCT and SLT after 
experiencing QF of 85. However, for detection, it is as worse as at 54.1% with Q F  = 75. 
In comparison, SLT has the highest Pavg of 91.9% at Q F  =  75 and 65. From the analysis, 
SLT achieves a more accurate detection result than PST and DCT. As a whole, the result 
indicates that the best Pavg among the three methods is SLT, which has 91.9% detection 
rate with Q F  =  75. However, all the attacked images could not be recovered by any of 
the three transform schemes after applying JPEG  compression attack. This is due to
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the fact that the restoration technique is based on LSB embedding in the spatial domain 
of the watermarked image which is fragile. As such, it can be easily removed by JPEG 
compression.
Table 4.3: Comparative performance in term of Pavg (%) the watermarking schemes 
against copy and paste attack (20% tampering) followed by JPEG compression with
varying quality factor
Test Im age Q F = 85 QF = 75 Q F = 65SLT P S T D C T SLT P S T D C T SLT P S T D C T
Lena 92.1 94.9 91.6 91.6 51.4 77.0 75.3 50.7 54.0
Baboon 92.1 94.7 92.1 92.3 56.1 77.0 81.8 51.8 49.9
Bridge 91.9 94.0 91.6 92.3 55.3 76.6 79.5 51.6 49.5
Trucks 92.0 94.5 91.2 91.4 53.5 76.9 76.7 51.0 50.4
Ship 91.5 93.7 91.9 91.4 52.7 76.9 75.7 50.8 52.7
San Diego 93.1 94.5 92.2 92.4 55.4 77.6 81.6 51.5 49.7
A verage 92.1 94.4 91.8 91.9 54.1 77.0 78.4 51.2 51.0
4.1 .5  Further E xp erim en ta l R esu lts
According to the results obtained in Section 4.1.4, we found that our SLT based scheme 
could be further compared with the DCT and PST based semi-fragile watermarking 
schemes using the following additional test criteria:
• The LSB image restoration method has been excluded when compared with the 
PST and DCT, as it will fail to work if any JPEG Compression has been applied 
to the test image.
• The P f p r  and P f n r  have been calculated separately instead of P avg-
• In addition to six common test images, three simulated law enforcement images 
have also been included for analysis. These simulated images are ‘Gun’, ‘C arl’ 
and ‘Car2’, as shown in Figure 4.4.
• For cross-comparison purposes across the difference schemes, eight watermarks 
(with different watermark sequences) are randomly embedded in the mid-frequency 
coefficients each 8 x 8  block in the respective transform domain. In Figure 4.5, the 
shaded areas are considered as random embedding locations for all the SLT, PST 
and DCT based schemes.
• Additive Gaussian noise has been added into test images for further comparison 
as it is also considered to be a common and unintentional operation.
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(a) Gun (b) Carl (c) Car2
F i g u r e  4.4: Three law enforcement images
F ig u r e  4.5: Mid-frequency bands for embedding watermarks in SLT, PST and DCT
based schemes
Similar to the first set of experiments, we compare the performance of the watermarking 
schemes against the copy and paste attack. In the attack, a number of blocks within 
the watermarked image are replaced with blocks randomly selected from the same test 
image. To achieve a better statistical confidence level, the experiment is repeated 100 
times using different watermark keys and tampered blocks, and the average results 
are then calculated. Figure 4.6, shows the watermarked, tampered, and authenticated 
images for image ‘C a rl’.
The performance of the watermarking schemes is also measured in terms of the false 
positive rate ( P f p r ) ,  and false negative rate ( P f n r )-  Table 4.4 compares the perfor­
mance of the watermarking schemes against the copy and paste attack, where 20% of 
the blocks have been tampered. It can be observed that the three watermarking schemes 
perform similarly against the copy and paste attack, with the P f n r  of SLT performing 
approximately lower than the others, by 0.06% approximately. For P p ,  the performance 
of SLT and PST are same at 0%, whereas DCT is 0.15% higher than others on average.
The performance of the watermarking schemes against the copy and paste attack is also 
compared against the presence of JPEG  compression and additive Gaussian noise. The
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(a) Watermarked (b) Tampered (c) Authenticated
F igure 4.6: The watermarked, tampered, and authenticated images for image ‘C a r l’
T able 4.4: New comparative performance of the watermarking schemes against copy 
and paste attack (20%), detection rate (%)
Test Im age SLT P S T D C T
P F P R P f n r P f p r P f n r P f p r P f n r
Lena 0 9.06 0 9.95 0.05 9.68
Baboon 0 9.41 0 10.11 0.19 9.47
Ship 0 9.99 0 9.78 0.08 10.26
Trucks 0 9.47 0 9.47 0.01 9.56
Bridge 0 9.38 0 9.57 0.17 10.01
San Diego 0 9.65 0 9.06 0.04 9.69
Gun 0 10.05 0 9.24 0.12 9.07
C arl 0 9.54 0 9.66 0.2 9.28
Car 2 0 9.37 0 9.72 0.5 9.51
A verage 0 9.55 0 9.62 0.15 9.61
results are presented in Tables 4.5-4.8. It should be noted that a slightly moderate JPEG  
compression and additive Gaussian noise are considered to be legitimate manipulations 
and commonly considered as part of the system processing. Hence, the semi-fragile 
watermarking schemes are expected to be robust against these manipulations.
For JPEG  compression with quality factor Q F  =  85 in Table 4.5, the P f p r  of SLT and 
PST based watermarking schemes perform similarly at 0.03% and 0.01%, in comparison 
with the results obtained when no JPEG  compression is applied. In contrast to the 
DCT based scheme, the P f p r  is ten time higher than the SLT based scheme, at 0.3% 
on average. Especially, the three law enforcement images are highest at approximately 
0.6% on average based on the DCT scheme. The P f n r  of all watermarking schemes 
achieved on average at 10% on average, which is also similar to the results obtained when 
no JPEG  compression is applied. Hence, these results demonstrate that our semi-fragile 
watermarking scheme could detect the tam pered areas correctly with acceptable errors, 
and is robust to JPEG  compression non-malicious manipulation.
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However, with increased compression (QF=75) as shown in Table 4.6, there is a clear 
difference in the performance of the watermarking schemes. From the results, it can be 
seen that the P f p r  of PST and the DCT based schemes are at approximately 0.19% and 
1.5%, respectively, which performed much better than the proposed SLT based scheme, 
approximately at 16.22%. The P f n r  of SLT is also gradually increased by 0.31%, 
compared to QF=85. Moreover, there is a difference in the performance of the proposed 
watermarking schemes for different images on P f p r - For images with high texture 
(Baboon and San-Diego), then P f p r  is less than 10%, which is better in comparison to 
other images with less texture (Lena and Gun) with exceeded 20%.
For additive Gaussian noise, as shown in Tables 4.7 and 4.8, the P f p r  of our proposed 
SLT based scheme increases on average from 8.59% to 13.35% with noise variance in­
creasing from 0.003 to 0.005. Our proposed SLT based scheme also achieves much lower 
false positive rates than the DCT and PST based schemes, at 11.01% and 15.71% for 
noise variance is at 0.003, and 18.43% and 23.88% with noise variance is 0.005, respec­
tively. The three law enforcement images for our SLT based scheme archived the lowest 
false positive rates at 5.75% 5.16% and 6.35%, with noise variance at 0.003 as shown in 
Table 4.7. Therefore, it is clear from the results obtained that the proposed SLT based 
scheme provides an improvement of robustness to additive Gaussian noise as compared 
to other two schemes.
Table 4.5: New comparative performance of the watermarking schemes against copy 
and paste attack (20%) and JPEG compression (QF=85).
Test Im age SLT P S T D C T
P f p r P f n r P f p r P f n r P f p r P f n r
Lena 0 8.58 0 9.99 0.23 9.85
Baboon 0.01 9.63 0 9.9 0.35 9.44
Ship 0 9.47 0 9.35 0.13 10.05
Trucks 0 9.89 0 9.39 0.07 9.58
Bridge 0.05 9.56 0.03 9.56 0.4 10.13
San Diego 0 9.55 0 9.57 0.15 9.8
Gun 0.03 9.1 0.01 9.63 0.35 9.66
Carl 0.01 9.78 0 9.22 0.42 9.56
Car2 0.17 9.11 0.04 9.56 1 9.29
A verage 0.03 9.41 0.01 9.57 0.3 9.71
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Table 4.6: New comparative performance of the watermarking schemes against copy 
and paste attack (20%) and JPEG compression (QF=75).
T est Im age SLT P S T D C T
P f p r P f n r P f p r P f n r P f p r P f n r
Lena 21.07 9.58 0 9.49 0.75 9.07
Baboon 9.69 9.84 0.01 10.04 1.58 9.13
Ship 20.21 9.32 0.01 8.86 0.96 9.93
Trucks 15.04 9.22 0 9.78 0.88 9.55
Bridge 12.54 9.8 0.32 9.78 1.73 10.29
San Diego 8.94 9.99 0 9.63 1.4 9.43
Gun 24.84 9.85 0.26 9.17 1.2 9.18
Carl 15.89 10.44 0.03
00OO05 1.45 9.13
Car2 17.79 9.48 1.11 9.54 3.51 9.11
A verage 16.22 9.72 0.19 9.57 1.5 9.42
Table 4.7: New comparative performance of the watermarking schemes against copy 
and paste attack (20%) and Additive Gaussian noise (variance=0.003).
Test Im age SLT P S T D C T
P f p r P f n r P f p r P f n r P f p r P f n r
Lena 10.21 9.48 11.72 9.2 15.6 9.65
Baboon 10.39 9.4 11.47 10.5 16.14 8.59
Ship 10.58 9.56 11.77 9.36 16.23 10.58
Trucks 10.53 8.79 12.17 9.44 15.84 9.81
Bridge 10.19 10.46 11.6 10.26 16.18 9.89
San Diego 10.26 9.93 11.45 9.97 15.5 10.66
Gun 5.75 9.24 9.64 9.28 15.24 10.02
Carl 5.16 10.17 8.97 9.55 14.47 9.22
Car2 6.35 9.45 10.33 9.61 16.23 9.29
A verage 8.49 9.61 11.01 9.69 15.71 9.75
4.2 N ovel W B C T  B ased Sem i-fragile W aterm arking A lgo­
rithm
In this section, we discuss our proposed WBCT semi-fragile watermarking algorithm 
by analysing the patterns of the parent and children relationships and how they can be 
affected by the different manipulations in the WBCT domain. We also discuss the details 
of the watermark embedding, detection, and authentication processes. Experimental 
results are also presented in this section.
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Table 4.8: New comparative performance of the watermarking schemes against copy 
and paste attack (20%) and Additive Gaussian noise (variance=0.005).
Test Im age SLT P S T D C T
P f p r P f n r P f p r P f n r P f p r P f n r
Lena 13.52 8.83 16.94 9.61 21.97 10.62
Baboon 13.49 9.52 15.80 10.46 21.34 9.93
Ship 14.21 9.81 16.96 9.85 22.33 10.62
Trucks 13.46 10.18 16.87 9.52 21.76 9.85
Bridge 13.59 10.22 16.90 9.08 21.89 9.52
San Diego 13.50 10.26 16.64 9.56 21.66 10.91
Gun 16.24 9.55 22.58 9.05 28.63 9.41
Carl 15.14 9.74 20.87 9.58 26.91 9.38
Car2 17.04 9.28 22.3 9.67 28.47 9.3
A verage 13.35 9.71 18.43 9.6 23.88 9.95
4.2 .1  P arent and C hildren  C oefficient R ela tion s before and after N on- 
m alicious M anipu lations
In Section 3.2, we investigated the characteristics of the energy relations of the original 
images between the parent and the children coefficients before and after JPEG com­
pression. The results showed that these invariant relations still maintained above 75% 
when the QF=10. A three level WBCT was applied to the test images, the robustness 
characteristics of the parent and children relationship were then utilised for our proposed 
robust watermarking scheme. In this section, we further analyse the invariant relations 
of WBCT for different non-malicious manipulations to determine if it is also be feasible 
for semi-fragile watermarking. Note that we analyse these parent and children invariant 
relationships after two level WBCT applied, due to more watermarks are required for 
our proposed WBCT-based semi-fragile watermarking. For our experiment, we analyse 
the following non-malicious manipulations:
• Mild compression, JPEG and JPEG 2000, up to 50%
• 3 x 3  Gaussian filtering
• Additive Gaussian noise (PSNR above 35db)
• Contrast stretching (1%)
The parent and children coefficient relations before and after JPEG compression are first 
analysed in detail. The original image and its JPEG compressed images are initially 
decomposed by a two level WBCT. The average percentage of invariant energy relations 
between parent and children coefficients in the non-redundant contourlet domain before
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and after JPEG compression is then calculated, similar to the discussion that mentioned 
in Section 3.2.
Figure 4.7 illustrates the average of the percentages of the numbers of invariant relations 
in 12 different subbands, as shown in Figure 3.3(b), by using six images. This figure 
shows the percentages of the numbers of invariant relations to the total numbers of 
relations against the quality factors (QF) of JPEG compression. The average percentage 
of invariant relations is defined as follows:
12
P average — (^   ^P j ) / ^  (4.8)
1=1
where Pi(i =  1,2, • • • ,12) represent the percentages of the numbers of invariant relations 
to the total numbers of relations in i subbands. Further analysis are performed for 
JPEG2000, Gaussian noise, Gaussian filtering and contrast stretching. The JPEG2000 
results are shown in Figure 4.8 for QF=90 to QF=50. Different Gaussian noise, Gaussian 
filtering and contrast stretching results are summarised in Table 4.9. Six standard 
test images are used in this experiment to determine the invariant energy relationship. 
For JPEG and JPEG2000 compression, we observe from Figures 4.7 and 4.8 that the 
percentages of invariant relations gradually decrease with increasing compression rates. 
For example, in Figure 4.7 , for QF=90, the highest invariant relation exceeds 92% while 
the lowest achieves approximately 85%. For JPEG2000, all the invariant relations are 
above 98% as shown in Figure 4.8. Even though all the test images have been compressed 
significantly at QF=50, the average invariant relations remained between 72% and 86% 
as shown in Figure 4.7.
h—  lena 
■O—  boats 
-*—  trucks 
-*—  San Diego 
-a—  peppers 
-0— goldhillO)
JPEG -  Quality Factor
F ig u r e  4.7: The average percentages of invariant relations after JPEG compression
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F igure 4.8: The average percentages of invariant relations after JPEG2000 compres­
sion
Overall, the JPEG2000 compression results achieve better performance as compared to 
JPEG compression results. The reason for this is due to both JPEG2000 and WBCT are 
wavelet-based methods. In Table 4.9, the results for contrast stretching also demonstrate 
an excellent invariance with the results averaging 98%, followed by Gaussian filtering 
averaging 90%. Of all non-malicious manipulations, Gaussian noise achieves the lowest 
performance at approximately 79% of invariant relation. From Figures 4.7, 4.8 and Ta­
ble 4.9, we observe that highly textured images, such as San Diego can achieve relatively 
better results than the other five images. Overall, for all images after JPEG / JPEG2000 
at QF=90 to QF=50, Gaussian noise (PSNR above 35db), Gaussian filtering and con­
trast stretching (1%), over 70% invariant relations can be achieved by exploiting and 
adopting the modulation of their energy relationship.
Table 4.9: The average percentages of invariant relations after three types manipula­
tions
Test im age G aussian  noise G aussian  filtering C o n tra s t s tre tch in g
Lena 72.26 90.06 97.18
Boats 78.50 89.84 97.56
Trucks 82.98 90.56 98.89
San Diego 88.56 90.21 99.24
Peppers 75.03 87.99 97.79
Goldhill 77.48 90.51 96.53
A verage 79.14 89.86 97.87
h—  lena 
-e—  boats 
-*—  trucks 
-x—  San Diego 
■a—  peppers 
-0—  goldhill
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4 .2 .2  C oefficient D ifferences A nalysis
In this section, we analyse the patterns of the parent and children relationships and how 
they can be affected by the different manipulations in the WBCT domain. The ‘Goldhill’, 
as one of commonly used test image, is used for our detailed analysis. In Figure 4.9, six 
scatter plots illustrate the differences between the absolute value of parent-coefRcients 
and the averages of its children-coefficients before manipulations and the differences after 
manipulations. The diagonal line represents the y=x axis. From Figure 4.9(a) to (e), 
each scatter plot illustrates the difference before and after non-malicious manipulations 
with cluster points varying along the diagonal line. In Figure 4.9(f), the differences 
after malicious manipulation (copy and paste) are changed significantly and clusters are 
formed and spread around the origin.
From our analysis, we conclude that the characteristic of parent-children relationship is 
robust against a significant amount of non-malicious manipulations and still fragile to 
content modification. This demonstrates that the parent-children relationship is indeed 
feasible for incorporation into our proposed semi-fragile watermarking algorithm.
4 .2 .3  W B C T  W aterm ark E m bedd ing P rocess
From our experiments described above, we can summarise that any alterations of the 
image can be detected from any of the 12 subbands. Since different subbands represent 
different directional information, we can reasonably expect that embedding a watermark 
into four different subbands can achieve a good trade-off between image quality and false 
negative rate. The detail of selecting four subbands will be explained in Section 4.2.6.
In our proposed method, the size of the cover image is 512 x 512 and the watermark 
is 128 x 128 . The watermark is a pseudo-random binary (1, 0) sequence. The block 
diagram of the proposed embedding process is shown in Figure 4.10. To begin with, the 
original image is decomposed into 12 sets of parent and children coefficients by applying 
WBCT. Afterwards, the parent-children relationships of four subbands are extracted. 
According to these relationships, the watermark bits, which are encrypted a random 
binary sequence obtained by a key, are embedded by modulating the corresponding 
parent coefficients, as follows:
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goldhill
0
0
goldhill
0
(a) (b)
goldhill
0
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(c)
goldhill
0
goldhill
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(d)
goldhill
0
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(e) (f)
F ig u r e  4.9: Scatter plots showing the distributions of the coefficient differences before 
and after manipulations of image Goldhill (a) JPEG (QF=70) (b) JPEG2000 (QF=70) 
(c) Gaussian noise (v=0.0003) (d) Gaussian filtering (e) Contrast stretching (f) copy
and paste (64 x 128)
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P' = <
fp, ( ( | f |  -  \Cavg\
p, ( ( | f |  -  \Cav9\
P +  |C aug| +  r  — P )  X Kl, ( ( | f |  -  \Cmg\
p - | C L , , |  +  r - | P | ) x . & i , ( ( | f |  -  \Cav9\
p  +  ( p - | c 0„g | - r ) x j V 2 , ( ( | f |  -  \Cavg\
p - ( P - | c „ „ a | - T ) x / r 2 , ( ( | f |  -  |C „„g |
(4.9)
,|)>:r)A(w = l))
J )< T )A (« ; =  0)) 
, |< T ) A ( f  > 0 )A (w  =  l))
,| <  T) A (P  <  0) A (iu =  1)) 
,| <  T) A (P  > 0) A (w =  0)) 
,| < T) A (P  <  0) A (u; =  0))
where P  is denoted as a parent coefficient in the image, Cavg is the average of four 
children coefficients, and w is the watermark bit. The threshold T  controls the perceptual 
quality and robustness of the watermarked image, where T  — 10. The parameters K\  
and K 2 are both constants. Finally, the watermarked image is reconstructed by applying 
the inverse WBCT transform.
i->
Original
image WBCT
Children
coefficient
Relationship
extraction
Parent
coefficient
Watermark
embedding
K ey-
Watermark
IWBCT
Watermarked 
image
F ig u r e  4.10: WBCT semi-fragile watermark embedding process
4 .2 .4  W B C T  W aterm ark D etec tio n  P rocess
The detection and authentication process is shown in Figure 4.11. The WBCT is first 
performed on the test image, which is decomposed into 12 sets of parent and children co­
efficients. A key is used for extracting four subbands of the parent-children relationships 
from the 12 sets. The watermark bits w' are then extracted from these relationships, 
using the following detection algorithm:
1, (( \P' \- \C'avg\ ) > ( T  + M))
=  < 0, (( |P' |- |C'„a| ) < ( T - M ) )
, - 1 ,  ( ( T - M ) < ( \ P ' \ - \ C ' avg\ ) < ( T  + M))
(4.10)
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where w' = —1 represents the area that has not been tampered with, T  =  10 and M  
is an error tolerance margin value to decrease the false positive rates caused by non- 
malicious manipulations. However, higher values of M  result in increasing false negative 
rates, while lower values of M  result in increasing false positive rate. Thus, a value for 
M  to adjust the trade-off between the false positive and false negative rates needs to be 
determined.
i->
Test
image WBCT
Children
coefficient
Watermark
Detection
........  4-
<— Key
extraction
Parent
Authentication <— Original Watermark
 ^ Authenticated 
imageMorphology
coefficient
F i g u r e  4.11: WBCT semi-fragile watermark detection and image authentication pro­
cess
Figures 4.12-4.14 show the histograms of differences before and after non-malicious ma­
nipulations in the first embedding subband of the image ‘Goldhilf. Note that in order to 
illustrate and compare the histograms clearly, Figures 4.12-4.14 have been scaled. The 
differences are defined as the original |P | -  \ C a v g \  minus the manipulated \ P ' \ -  \ C 'a v g \ . 
These distributions exhibit a sharp peak at zero amplitude and tail off rapidly on both 
sides of the peak. This implies that the differences distribute sparsely, as the majority 
of differences are close to zero, which further prove that most of the parent-children 
relationships before and after non-malicious manipulations maintain their invariance. 
Similar distributions are also observed from other test images during the experiments. 
We found th a t the differences between the distributions vary from 5 to -5. Therefore, 
we set the error tolerance margin value M  =  5 in order to minimise the errors.
goldhill goldhill goldhill
FIGURE 4.12: The histogram of differences before and after JPEG compression (a)
QF=90 (b) QF=70 (c) QF=50
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F ig u r e  4.13: T he histogram  of differences before and after JPEG2000 com pression
(a) QF=90 (b) QF=70 (c) QF=50
goldhill goldhill
F ig u r e  4.14: The histogram of differences before and after (a) Gaussian noise (b) 
Gaussian filtering (c) contrast stretch
4 .2 .5  W B C T  W a te rm a rk e d  Im a g e  A u th e n tic a t io n  P ro c e s s
For the authentication process as shown in Figure 4.11, a difference image is obtained by 
comparing the original watermark with the extracted watermark. The authentication 
algorithm is shown as follows:
1, (w w')
<&/=<( ^  (4.11)
0, (w = w' V w' = —1)
This difference image is used for locating the tam pered regions. The difference image is 
divided into four parts, and each part represents the difference image of each subband. In 
order to obtain more directional information, the four parts are fused into one difference 
image through XOR operation, as pseudo-code below:
if P a r t i  = Part2  =  PartS = Part^l =  0 th en  
D i f  ference  =  0 
else
D i f  ference = 1 
end if
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Examples for the fusion results are shown in Figure 4.15. The white spots represent the 
detected tampered region from four subbands which are then fused into one difference 
image. It can be clearly seen from the fused image that the white spots are now much 
more prominent.
Fusion
F ig u r e  4.15: Example of XOR fusion process
Finally, for the authenticated image, we apply the morphological operators to improve 
the detection performance. Most of the false positive errors distribute sparsely as a 
result of artefacts caused by signal processing operations such as JPEG  compression, 
whereas false negative errors from the copy and paste attack distribute more densely 
relatively. Morphological operators are commonly used as a nonlinear technique in image 
processing [150] to reduce false positive and false negative rates. Erosion (denoted as 
A Q  B)  and dilation (denoted as A © B) are two fundamental morphological operators. 
For many applications, the two operators are commonly combined to form opening and 
closing transformation. The opening of A by B, denoted A o B, is defined as A ° B — 
(A © B} 0  B. The closing of A by B, denoted A • B, is defined as A • B =  {A 0 B} © B. 
In our proposed method, we first use the open and then close operations that could first 
decrease false negative rate and then decrease the false positive rate for the authenticated 
image. Experiments showing the improvements of detection performance are presented 
in Section 4.2.6.
4.2 .6  E x p e r im e n ta l R e su lts
The PSNR is also used to evaluate the perceptual distortion of these test images before 
and after watermark embedding and the results are illustrated in Figures 4.16. The x- 
axis represents the number of subbands randomly selected for embedding the watermark 
bits. Figure 4.16 shows the PSNR values decrease with increasing number of subbands 
embedded. However, there is some slight fluctuation and the reason for tha t could be 
due to different subbands having different influence on the image quality. The PSNR
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may decrease if a more effective subband has been randomly selected. We observe that 
by using four subbands embedded an acceptable image quality above 30dB is achieved. 
Figure 4.17 shows that the P f n r  decrease with increasing number of subbands embedded 
when copy and paste attack with 64x128 pixels applied. Using four subbands also obtain 
lower P f n r  than using only one, two or three subbands. Therefore, we decide to embed 
watermark bits into four random subbands for our algorithm as a trade-off between 
imperceptibility and P f n r -
46
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F igure 4.16: PSNR with different number of subband embedded randomly
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F igure 4.17: P f n r  with different number of subband embedded randomly
To evaluate the performance of our semi-fragile watermarking scheme, similar to Section 
4.1.5, nine test images of size 512 x 512 are also used for our experiments. These images
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include common test images such as Lena, Boats, Trucks, San Diego, Peppers, and 
Goldhill, as well as three simulated law enforcement images, Gun, C arl and Car2 (as 
shown in Figure 4.4). The PSNR of these watermarked images is approximately 33 dB. 
Figure 4..18(a)-(c), shows the watermarked, tampered and authenticated images for the 
‘Car2’ photograph, respectively.
(a) Watermarked (b) Tampered (c) Authenticated
F ig u r e  4.18: The watermarked, tampered, and authenticated images for image ‘Car2’
In order to analyse the false positive and false negative rates, we investigate the following 
manipulations:
• JPEG  compression only from QF=90 to 50 (Figure 4.19)
• JPEG2000 compression only from QF=90 to 50 (Figure 4.20)
• 3 x 3  Gaussian filtering only (Table 4.10)
• Additive Gaussian noise (PSNR above 35db) only (Table 4.10)
• Contrast stretch (1%) only (Table 4.10)
• JPEG  compression QF=90, 70, 50 with copy and paste attack (Table 4.11)
• JPEG2000 compression QF=90, 70, 50 with copy and paste attack (Table 4.12)
• 3 x 3  Gaussian filtering with copy and paste attack (Table 4.13)
• Additive Gaussian noise (PSNR above 35db) with copy and paste attack (Table 
4.13)
• Contrast stretch (1%) with copy and paste attack (Table 4.13)
Figures 4.19 and 4.20 illustrate the detection performance for JPEG  and JPEG2000 
at different quality factors of compression. The P f p r  increase gradually as the quality
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factor decreases. In the case of high compression at QF=50, the P f p r  are relatively low; 
less than 20% for JPEG compression and 6% for JPEG2000. The results clearly indicate 
that the detection performance for JPEG2000 compression is much better than JPEG at 
the same quality factor. The performances of our algorithm against additive Gaussian 
noise, filtering and contrast stretching are given in Table 4.10. From the results, we 
can observe that our proposed algorithm is robust against different signal processing 
operations, which are considered to be non-malicious manipulations.
i-—  lena 
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0— goldhill 
&— gun 
v — carl 
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80 75 70 65 60
JPEG -  Quality Factor
F ig u r e  4.19: Performance of false positive rate after JPEG compression
Table 4.10: Performance of false positive rate after Gaussian noise, Gaussian filtering
and contrast stretching
Test im age G aussian  noise G aussian  filtering C o n tra st s tre tch in g
P f p r P f p r P f p r
Lena 8.03 1.20 0.95
Boats 7.86 1.17 1.44
Trucks 4.22 0.51 3.49
San Diego 2.69 0.90 0.98
Peppers 8.33 0.93 0.32
Goldhill 7.28 1.22 0.27
Gun 8.40 1.47 0.88
Carl 5.22 1.90 0.32
Car2 6.49 1.90 0.10
A verage 6.50 1.24 0.97
The performance of the proposed watermarking algorithm against the copy and paste
Chapter 4. Novel Semi-fragile Watermarking Algorithms Based on SLT and WBCT  69
-i—  lena 
■e—  boats 
-*—  trucks 
-*—  San Diego 
-B—  peppers 
—  goldhill 
— gun
I
J5ro
<D«
£
*0
car2
<D
c
2
o!
JPEG2000 — Quality Factor
F ig u r e  4.20: Performance of false positive rate after JPEG2000 compression
attack with 64 x 128 pixels is also compared in the presence of non-malicious manip­
ulations. Tables 4.11 and 4.12 illustrate the watermarked images that are JPEG and 
JPEG2000 compressed with QF=90, 70 and 50, after copy and paste modifications have 
been made. The detection performance after copy and paste attacks with additive Gaus­
sian noise, Gaussian filtering and contrast stretching are given in Table 4.13. In Table
4.11, the results indicate that our method can detect the tampered regions accurately. 
On average, P f n r  is approximately 1%, while P f p r  is below 4%. Test images ‘Trucks’ 
and ‘San Diego’ and image ‘C arl’ indicate a better performance with approximately 2% 
for both P f p r  and P f n r - In terms of JPEG2000 compression with the copy and paste 
attack, the results given in Table 4.12 indicate better performances than JPEG com­
pression. In Tables 4.11 and 4.12, the two outdoor images, ‘C arl’ and ‘Car2’, achieve 
much better performance than the indoor image ‘Gun’ in terms of P f p r - When the false 
positive rates are below 6%, P f n r  are approximately 0.5%. In particular, the ‘Goldhill’ 
test image performs better when P f n r  are very close to 0% and the P f p r  is approxi­
mately 4%. The P f p r  and P f n r  from Tables 4.11 to 4.13 indicate that our proposed 
WBCT based semi-fragile watermarking scheme is able to authenticate and localise the 
tampered regions accurately, as well as being sufficiently robust against some legitimate 
attacks.
Samples of authenticated images are shown in Figures 4.21 to 4.23. The modifica­
tion results shown in Figure 4.21(b) have two areas tampered with JPEG compression 
(QF=70). Figure 4.22(b) shows that four areas have been tampered JPEG compression
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(QF=70) and Figure 4.23(b) with one area tampered with contrast stretching. These 
results also indicate that the artifacts caused by non-malicious manipulations distribute 
sparsely, which can be removed by morphological operations.
Table 4.11: Performance after copy and paste with JPEG compression
T est Im age QF90 QF70 QF50
P f p r P f n r P f p r P f n r P f p r P f n r
Lena 4.47 0.69 3.69 0.74 1.70 1.28
Boats 5.49 0.61 5.60 0.50 5.14 1.07
Trucks 1.81 0.73 0.83 1.19 1.50 0.73
San Diego 2.29 0.89 1.73 1.77 0.92 1.49
Peppers 4.27 0.08 3.16 0.54 1.78 0.78
Goldhill 4.63 0.55 6.29 0.53 1.71 1.76
Gun 6.11 0.36 4.35 0.42 3.36 1.41
Carl 2.48 0.72 1.25 1.15 0.01 2.25
Car2 1.23 1.17 6.68 1.31 0.52 2.86
A verage 3.64 0.64 3.73 0.91 1.85 1.51
Table 4.12: Performance after copy and paste with JPEGOOO compression
Test Im age QF90 QF70 QF50
P f p r P f n r P f p r P f n r P f p r P f n r
Lena 3.49 0.61 5.05 0.76 1.44 0.72
Boats 5.40 0.53 5.49 0.51 5.59 0.49
Trucks 1.81 0.64 1.81 0.64 1.61 0.73
San Diego 3.05 0.53 2.03 0.77 1.93 1.19
Peppers 4.64 0 8.74 0 4.64 0
Goldhill 4.63 0.55 4.92 0.49 5.31 0.40
Gun 6.20 0.34 7.08 0.31 7.08 0.31
Carl 2.48 0.60 2.48 0.60 2.26 0.65
Car2 1.33 0.96 1.27 0.99 1.11 2.31
A verage 3.67 0.53 4.32 0.56 3.44 0.76
4.3 Com parison B etw een  SLT and W B C T  B ased Schem es
In Sections 4.1 and 4.2, we discussed our proposed semi-fragile watermarking schemes 
based on SLT and WBCT image processing techniques. In this section, we will analyse 
and compare the difference between these two schemes, as summarised in Table 4.14.
In Table 4.14, we can see that in SLT-based scheme, the image is divided into 8 x 8 -  
pixel blocks, then the watermarks are embedded into mid-frequency of each block that is 
applied with DCT. On the other hand, in WBCT-based scheme, the watermarks are ran­
domly embedded into HL2, LH2 and HH2 sub-bands after applying 2 level of WBCT to
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Table 4.13: Performance after copy and paste with three signal processing
T est Im age G aussian  noise G aussian  filtering C o n tra st s tre tch in g
P f p r P f n r P f p r P f n r P f p r P f n r
Lena 3.83 0.36 3.37 0.46 8.54 0
Boats 9.5 0.49 6.37 0.69 6.47 0.56
Trucks 7.15 0.31 11.06 0.31 6.36 0.64
San Diego 4.5 0.70 4.91 0.59 5.10 0.54
Peppers 1.42 0.87 5.30 0.38 6.13 0.19
Goldhill 3.63 0.25 4.27 0.08 4.59 0.19
Gun 2.39 1.23 2.49 0.63 5.05 0.08
Carl 7.52 0.40 6.63 0.63 9.33 0.29
Car2 4.49 1.20 1.03 0.91 4.64 0.90
A verage 4.94 0.65 5.05 0.52 6.25 0.38
Table 4.14: Comparsion Between SLT and WBCT Semi-fragile
SLT W B C T
B lock E m bedding Yes, 8 x 8 No, 2 level of WBCT
C on ten t A dap tive No Yes, parent-children relationships
Size of Im age 512 x 512 512 x 512
N o. of W aterm arks 32768 16384
P S N R Around 33dB Around 33dB
Block A u th en tica tio n Yes, block independent No
E rro r Tolerance M argin r  =  0.5 M  =  5
R educe E rro rs  P rocess No Yes, morphological operators
E xperim en ta l R esu lts Reasonable Good
the image. As a result, comparing to SLT-based scheme, the WBCT-based watermarked 
image could avoid the issue of blockness distortion, which is the commonly drawback 
issue for block-based watermarking schemes. Moreover, the WBCT domain scheme is 
more preferable for use with a wide range of images, as a result of the unique parent 
and child relationship for each image. This characteristic of parent-child relationships 
can be utilised for semi-fragile watermark embedding, extraction and authentication 
processes, and is adaptive for a wide range of images, each with varying details. Both 
schemes tested with 512 x 512 images and obtained acceptable PSNR valuses approxi­
mately 33dB, in spite of embedding 32768 (8 bits each block, 4096 blocks) watermarks 
for SLT-based scheme and 16384 (128 x 128) watermarks for WBCT-based scheme. In 
addition, they also used error tolerance margin, that r  =  0.5 for SLT-based and M  =  5 
for WBCT-based, which could tolerated some non-malicious manipulations, particularly, 
JPEG compression. However, the experimental results have been further improved with 
the help of morphological operators in WBCT-based scheme.
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(c) (d)
F igure  4.21: ‘Lena’ image (a) watermarked image (b) copy-and-pasted then JPEG 
compressed (QF=70) (c) authenticated image (d) authenticated image with morpho­
logical operations
4.4 Sum m ary
In this chapter, we have discussed two proposed semi-fragile watermarking schemes, 
namely, SLT-based and WBCT-based. For the SLT semi-fragile watermarking scheme, 
the watermark was embedded into the middle frequency SLT coefficients of non-overlapping 
blocks of the test images. The performance of the SLT based semi-fragile scheme was 
compared with the DCT and PST based schemes. The comparative studies showed that 
the SLT-domain watermarking scheme performed better against the copy and paste 
attack and additive Gaussian noise. However, the PST and DCT-domain watermark­
ing schemes performed better than the SLT-domain watermarking against JPEG  com­
pression. For the WBCT semi-fragile watermarking scheme, watermarking bits were 
embedded by modulating the parent-children relationship in the contourlet domain. 
The experimental results demonstrated that our proposed W BCT watermarking scheme
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.
* ''
F igure  4.22: ‘Goldhill’ image (a) watermarked image (b) four areas have been modi­
fied with JPEG compression (QF=70) (c) authenticated image (d) authenticated image
with morphological operations
achieved good performances in detecting different kinds of manipulations with P f n r  at 
approximately 1%, whilst maintaining a P f p r  below 6.5%. Overall, the use of the 
parent-children relationship of W BCT allowed our algorithm to detect and localise the 
manipulated areas accurately when certain degrees of non-malicious manipulations were 
applied. Furthermore, we also analysed and compared the difference between these two 
schemes.
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F igure  4.23: ‘Trucks’ image (a) watermarked image (b) copy-and-pasted image with 
Contrast stretching (c) authenticated image (d) authenticated image with morphologi­
cal operations
Chapter 5
Proposed Image Forensics 
Technique for Semi-fragile 
W atermarking
As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 4, semi-fragile watermarking has become increasingly 
important to verify the content of images and localise the tampered areas, while toler­
ating some non-malicious manipulations. In the literature, the majority of semi-fragile 
algorithms have applied a predetermined threshold to tolerate errors caused by JPEG 
compression. However, this predetermined threshold is typically fixed and cannot be 
easily adapted to different amounts of errors caused by unknown JPEG compression at 
different quality factors (QFs). In this chapter, we analyse the relationship between QF 
and threshold, and propose the use of generalised Benford’s Law as an image forensics 
technique for semi-fragile watermarking. Hence, our scheme can adaptively adjust the 
threshold for images based on the estimated QF, improving accuracy rates in authen­
ticating and localising the tampered regions for semi-fragile watermarking. We also 
investigate the improved method on our proposed SLT and WBCT-based semi-fragile 
watermarking schemes, as discussed in Chapter 4.
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5.1 Three C om m on A pproaches U sing Pre-determ ined  Threshold  
in Sem i-fragile W aterm arking
tampering of image content, while permitting some non-malicious or unintentional ma­
nipulations. These manipulations can include some mild signal processing operations 
such as those caused by transmission and storage of JPEG images. However, water­
marked images could be compressed by unknown JPEG QFs. As a result, in order to 
authenticate the images, these algorithms have to set a pre-determined threshold that 
could allow them to tolerate different QF values when extracting the watermarks.
The art of determining the threshold values for semi-fragile watermarking schemes has 
been extensively documented by several researchers [19], [20], [21], [24]. In this section, 
we review three common approaches. The first approach uses a threshold for authen­
ticating each block of the image [19],[21]. In this scheme, if correlation coefficients 
(between the extracted watermark and its corresponding original watermark) is smaller 
than a specified threshold, this block is then classified as a tampered block, as given in 
Equation 5.1.
where max(r) =  1 is the maximum threshold value with w = w', and TM  is the 
JPEG compression tolerance margin. We discuss this approach in more detail in Section 
5.2. The second approach uses a threshold, which has been pre-determined during the 
watermark embedding process [20], [21]. An example is illustrated in Figure 5.1, where 
the watermarks w are embedded into each side of threshold r  according to the watermark 
value (e.g., 0 or 1), by shifting or substituting the corresponding coefficient. The value 
of T  and —T  controls the perceptual quality of the watermarked image. Threshold r  
is determined empirically to detect the watermark while extracting the watermarks w'. 
TM  is the JPEG compression tolerance margin. If it;' > r  then w' = 1, otherwise w' = 0.
The third approach uses a threshold for comparison with the results from the Tamper 
Assessment Function (TAF) during the authentication of images [24]. The extracted 
watermarks u / and their corresponding original watermarks w are calculated by using 
TAF,  as in Equation 5.2.
Semi-fragile watermarking scheme has been used to authenticate and localise malicious
cr(w,w') < T,max(T) — r  =  TM (5.1)
(5 .2)
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—T w TM t  TM
F igure 5.1: The pre-determined threshold during the watermark embedding process.
where Nw is the length of the watermark, and ® is the exclusive-OR (XOR) operator. 
The T A F  value is compared with a threshold r , where 0 < r  < 1 . If TAF(w, w') > r , 
then the watermarked image is considered as a tampered image, otherwise it is not. The 
tolerance margin can also be denoted as T M  =  1 — r  . The thresholds r  mentioned 
previously are pre-determined which will result in some fixed tolerance margins. A sig­
nificant amount of research has been dedicated to improving the watermark embedding 
algorithms by analysing the characteristics of JPEG coefficients of the compressed wa­
termarked image [22], [23], [24]. Alternatively, error correction coding (ECC) has been 
used for improving watermark detection and authentication rates [20]. However, as far 
as we know, the relationship between QF and threshold has not been discussed in the lit­
erature. If the QF could be estimated, then appropriate thresholds could be adapted for 
each test image, before initialising the watermark extraction and authentication process.
5.2 Issue of Threshold in a Sim ple D C T  Sem i-fragile W a­
term arking A lgorithm
In this section, the feasibility of our proposed method is investigated in detail. By 
analysing the first approach previously reviewed in [19],[21], a simple semi-fragile water­
marking algorithm based on the discrete cosine transform (DCT) and the importance 
of threshold is also described.
5.2 .1  T h e D C T  W aterm ark E m bedd ing P rocess
As shown in Figure 5.2, the original image is divided into non-overlapping sub-blocks 
of 8 x 8  pixels and DCT is applied to each block. The watermark embedding process is
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achieved by modifying the randomly selected mid-frequency of the DCT coefficients in 
each block as follows:
c o e f  = <
coef, (coef > T  A w  = 1)V (coef < —T  A w  = —1)
a, (coef < T  A w  = 1)
—a, (coef > T  A w  = —1)
(5.3)
where coef is the original DCT coefficient, coef' is the modified DCT coefficient, w is 
the watermark bits generated via a pseudo-random sequence (1 and -1) using a secret 
key. T  > 0 determines the perceptual quality of the watermarked image and a  G [^, T] 
is the watermark strength factor. The inverse DCT is then applied to each block to 
obtain the watermarked image.
Original
image
Divide
Wate ■mark
Merge Watermarked
into 8x8 8x8 image
Blocks Key —— Blocks
DCT Watermarkembedding
Inverse
DCT
F igure 5.2: An illustration of the DCT watermark embedding process.
5.2 .2  T h e D C T  W aterm ark D etec tio n  and A u th en tica tio n  P rocess
In Figure 5.3, the test image is first divided into non-overlapping sub-blocks of 8 x 8  
pixels, and DCT is then applied to each block.The watermark detection algorithm shown 
in Equation 5.4 is then applied.
(COe/' - 0) (5.4)
-1 , (coe f  < 0)
where w' is the extracted watermark bits and c o e f  is the DCT coefficient of the test 
image. The extracted watermark bits w' from each block are compared with its corre­
sponding original watermark bits w to obtain the correlation coefficient cr as shown in 
Equation 5.5.
The correlation coefficient of each block is then compared with a pre-determined thresh­
old - 1  < t < 1 as given in Equation 5.6.
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I Not tampered. cr(w, w') > r  
Block = < (5.6)
[tampered, cr(tü,iü,) < r
Test
image
Divide 
into 8x8 
Blocks
Original Watermark 
1 Authenticated
Authentication -> image
DCT —) WatermarkDetection (—Key
F igure 5.3: An illustration of the DCT watermark detection and authentication pro­
cesses.
5.2 .3  T h e Im portance o f th e  T hreshold
As we mentioned in 4, the magnitude of the threshold affects the false positive rate 
{ P f p r ) ,  which is the percentage of un-tampered blocks detected as being tampered and 
the false negative rate { P f n r ) ,  which is the percentage of tampered blocks detected 
as being un-tampered. Figure 5.4 shows that the P f n r  decreases if the threshold is 
in close proximity to 1. This also leads to an increase in the P f p r - However, if the 
threshold is set to be of a close proximity to —1, then the P f n r  increases and the P f p r  
will decrease. This results in a dilemma in determining a suitable threshold. For the 
proposed semi-fragile watermarking scheme, the threshold is set at 0.5, which provides 
a good trade-off between P f p r  and P f n r -
False 
Negative Rate
False 
Positive Rate
1 0 Threshold 1
F ig u re  5.4: The relationship among threshold Pf p r  and Pf n r -
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 illustrate the overall relationship between the threshold, false positive 
and false negative detection rates. The watermarked image Lena has been tampered
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with a rectangular block and JPEG  compressed at QF  =  75. Figure 5.5(a) shows the 
pre-determined threshold T  =  0.5 used for authentication. The authenticated image 
shows tha t the proposed semi-fragile watermarking scheme can localise the tampered 
region with reasonable accuracy, but with some false positive detection errors. In Figures 
5.5(b) and 5.5(c), the lower and upper thresholds T  =  0.3 and T  = 0.7 were used for 
comparison, respectively. Figure 5.5(b) shows that the false positive rate has decreased 
whilst the false negative rate has increased in the authenticated image. Figure 5.5(c) 
shows the image has a lower false negative rate but with a higher false positive rate. 
From this comparison, T  = 0.5 was chosen for JPEG  compression at Q F = 75. However, 
if Q F = 95, then T  =  0.5 may not be adequate as shown in Figure 5.6(a). The 
false negative rate is higher than Figure 5.6(b) with T  = 0.9. Therefore, it would be 
advantageous to be able to estimate the QF of JPEG  compression, so that an adaptive 
threshold can be applied for increasing the authentication accuracy.
In this chapter, we discuss our proposed method [151] using the generalised Benford’s 
Law, as an image forensics technique to estimate the QF for semi-fragile watermarked 
images. The background of Benford’s Law, generalised Benford’s Law and their relation­
ship with the watermarked image, JPEG  compressed watermarked image are discussed 
in the next section.
(a) T =  0.5 (b) T  = 0.3 (c) T =  0.7
F igure  5.5: Different thresholds for QF = 75
5.3 G eneralized B enford’s Law vs. W aterm arked Im ages
As discussed in Section 2.3.2, Benford’s Law has recently attracted a significant amount 
of research interests in image processing and image forensics. As the I st digits of DCT 
coefficients of a digital image obey the Benford’s Law, Fu et al. [134] proposed a gen­
eralised Benford’s Law, used for estimating the QF of the JPEG  compressed image for 
image forensics. In this section, the feasibility of generalised Benford’s Law for use in 
semi-fragile watermarking was first investigated. In our experiment, we selected 1338
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(a) T =  0.5 (b) T =  0.9
F ig u r e  5.6: Different thresholds for QF — 95
uncompressed grayscale images from the Uncompressed Image Database (UCID) [152] 
for analysis to ensure that there was no compression performed on the images previ­
ously. Throughout this section we adhere to the same terminology as used in [184], 
where JPEG coefficients refer to the 8 x 8  block-DCT coefficients after the quantisation.
Figure 5.7 illustrates the comparison between the probability distribution of Benford’s 
Law, mean distribution of the I s* digit of block-DCT coefficients of 1338 images and 
the watermarked images. The average PSNR between the original images and water­
marked images was approximately 35.71dB, which is considered to be of acceptable 
image quality. Figure 5.7 shows that the distribution of the I s* digits of the block-DCT 
coefficients for the uncompressed images obeys the Benford’s Law closely. This was also 
observed by Fu et al. [134] in their analysis. In terms of the watermarked images, the 
mean distribution also follows the Benford’s Law. The mean standard deviations of the 
1338 uncompressed images and their watermarked images are considered to be relatively 
small, as shown in Table 5.1. The average divergence [134] for watermarked images is 
also found to be small at 0.0115. This indicates a good fit between the Benford’s Law 
and watermarked images. The average divergence is given in Equation 5.7.
where p- is the 1st digit probability of the DCT coefficients of the watermarked images
indicate that the probability distribution of the I s* digits of the block-DCT coefficients of 
the watermarked images follow the Benford’s Law. Figure 5.8(a) illustrates an example 
of 8 x 8  DCT coefficients. The I st digits of the AC coefficients are then extracted as 
shown in Figure 5.8(b).
(5.7)
and pi is the 1stdigit probability from Benford’s Law in Equation 2.6. Hence, the results
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F igure  5.7: 1st digit of block-DCT coefficients
T able 5.1: Mean standard deviations of 1338 images
I s* digit O riginal im ages W aterm arked  im ages
1 0.0139 0.0145
2 0.0084 0.0078
3 0.0067 0.0068
4 0.0050 0.0049
5 0.0037 0.0030
6 0.0032 0.0023
7 0.0028 0.0021
8 0.0028 0.0023
9 0.0022 0.0021
Figures 5.9 to 5.11 illustrate the comparisons between the probability distribution of 
Benford’s Law, generalized Benford’s Law and the mean distributions of the 1st digits 
of block JPEG  coefficients of the watermarked images compressed at Q F  = 100, 75, 50, 
respectively. Table 5.2 summarises the mean standard deviations obtained for the 1338 
original and watermarked images, JPEG compressed at the three QF rates, which are 
considered to be relatively small. Furthermore, as shown in Table 5.3, the x 2 divergences 
indicate a good fitting between the generalized Benford’s Law and watermarked images 
compressed with different QFs. The results indicate that the probability distributions 
of the 1st digits of JPEG  coefficients of the watermarked images, in Figures 5.9 to 5.11,
Benford's Law
Mean distribution of 1338 images
Mean distribution of 1338 watermarked images
Chapter 5. Proposed Image Forensics for Semi-fragile Watermarking 83
i.3e + 3 4.7 3.2 -0.19 0.25 -0.5 -4.5 5.6
7.9 -0.7 0.6 -4.9 1.9 2.9 -3.7 3.3
-5.0 -0.2 -1,6 1.7 -0.6 -0.4 1.8 -2.2
2.3 LI 1.7 0,9 -0.7 -1.3 0.2 1.1
-1.0 -1.2 —0,3 -1,4 1.7 1.1 -1.4 -0.6
1.2 0.4 -1.8 -0.1 -2.0 -0.7 1.6 0,7
-1.7 0.2 3.1 1.6 1.6 -1 2 —1.2 -0,9
1.3 -0.4 -2.4 -1,6 -0.8 1.9 0.5 0,6
4 3 1 2 5 4 5
7 7 6 4 1 2 3 3
5 2 1 1 6 4 1 2
2 1 1 9 7 1 2 1
1 1 3 1 1 1 1 6
1 4 1 1 2 7 1 7
1 2 3 1 1 2 1 9
1 4 2 1 8 1 5 6
(a) (b)
F igure 5.8: 1st digit of 8 x 8  Block-DCT coefficients
obey the generalised Benford’s Law model proposed by Fu et al. [134], as given in 
Equation 2.7. Hence, we could employ their model to estimate the unknown QF of 
test images to determine the threshold for authentication. The improved authentication 
process is described in Section 5.4.
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F igure  5.9: 1st digit of JPEG coefficients (QF — 100)
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F igure  5.10: 1st digit of JPEG coefficients {QF = 75)
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F ig u r e  5.11: 1st digit of JPEG coefficients {QF = 50)
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Table 5.2: Mean standard deviations of 1338 JPEG compressed images
I5* d igits O riginal im ages W aterm arked  im agesQF100 QF75 QF50 QF100 QF75 QF50
1 0.0828 0.0327 0.0399 0.0664 0.0514 0.0509
2 0.0165 0.0067 0.0089 0.0122 0.0132 0.0149
3 0.0169 0.0066 0.0088 0.0143 0.0111 0.0112
4 0.0163 0.0058 0.0072 0.0140 0.0082 0.0084
5 0.0142 0.0049 0.0059 0.0121 0.0064 0.0065
6 0.0123 0.0043 0.0048 0.0102 0.0052 0.0051
7 0.0107 0.0037 0.0039 0.0087 0.0042 0.0041
8 0.0094 0.0032 0.0033 0.0075 0.0035 0.0034
9 0.0084 0.0027 0.0027 0.0065 0.0030 0.0028
Table 5.3: Average x2 of 1338 compressed watermarked images
QF M odel P a ram e te rs x2N q s
100 1.456 1.47 0.0372 0.0257
70 1.412 1.732 -0.337 0.0292
50 1.579 1.882 -0.2725 0.0166
5.4 T he Im proved A uthentication  M ethod
In this section, we explain the improved authentication process which uses the gen­
eralised Benford’s Law model. In Figure 5.12, the test image is divided into non­
overlapping blocks of 8 x 8  pixels and DCT is applied to each block. The watermark 
detection process then extracts the watermark bits using a secret key. The same test 
image is also used for detecting the QF in the quality factor estimation process. This 
process works by firstly classifying the test image as compressed (.jpg) or uncompressed 
(.bmp) by checking the extension name of the image. If the test image has been com­
pressed, it will then be recompressed with the largest QF, starting from QF = 100 to 
QF = 50, in decreasing steps of 5. We decrease in steps of 5 as this gives us the most 
frequently used quality factors for JPEG compressed images (i.e. 95, 90, 85 etc.).
For each compressed test image, the probability distribution of the 1st digits of JPEG 
coefficients is obtained. Each set of values is then analysed by employing the generalized 
Benford’s Law and using the best curve-fitting to plot the data. In order to obtain the 
goodness of fit, we calculate the Sum of Squared Error (SSE) of the recompressed images. 
We can detect the QF of the test image by iteratively calculating the SSE for all QFs 
(starting at QF = 100, and decreasing in steps of 5), and as soon as S S E  <  10-6 , 
we have reached the estimated QF for the test image. As per the pseudo-code given 
below, the threshold 10"6 has been set to allow us to detect the QF of the test image.
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Test Divide
image into 8x8 Blocks
Quality Factor 3Z
Estimation DCT
Original
Watermark
Watermark
DetectionAuthentication <-
Authenticated image
F igure 5.12: Improved authentication process
This threshold value was reported in [134], and has been verified by the results in our
experiment.
if S S E  < lO"6 th e n  
QF has been detected 
break 
end if
Figure 5.13 illustrates the results of estimating the QF for a test image that has pre­
viously been compressed with QF = 70. Three curves have been drawn in order to fit 
the three probability distribution data sets: generalized Benford’s Law for QF  =  70, 
the test image recompressed with QF = 70, and separately recompressed at QF = 90. 
The distribution of QF = 90 shows the worst fit and is shown to fluctuate considerably, 
while the distribution of QF  =  70 is a generally decreasing curve, which also follows the 
trend of generalized Benford’s Law. These results indicate that if the test image has 
been double compressed without the same quality factor, the probability distribution 
will not obey the generalised Benford’s Law.
Once the QF is estimated, the threshold T  can be adapted according to different es­
timated QFs, based on the following conditions in Equation 5.8 that could reduce the 
error detection rates. Finally, the correlation coefficient between original watermarks 
and extracted watermarks for each block is compared using the attuned threshold T  as 
part of the authentication process, in order to determine whether any blocks have been 
tampered with.
0.9, QF > 90 
T  = 0.7, 90 > Q F > 75
0.5, Q F <  75
(5.8)
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F i g u r e  5.13: Estimating the QF of a watermarked image
5.5 E xperim ental R esu lts (for a Sim ple D C T  Sem i-fragile 
W aterm arking Schem e)
The watermarked images are generated by a simple DCT domain based semi-fragile 
watermarking algorithm (as discussed in Section 5.2.1) using the 1338 test images from 
UCID [152]. In order to achieve a fair comparison, different embedding parameters 
are randomised for each image such as the watermark location, watermark string and 
watermark bits. Ten types of test images, with and without attacks are considered for 
our analysis, as shown in Figure 5.14. Each set illustrated in Figure 5.14 is performed 
individually for the 1338 watermarked images.
Table 5.4 summaries the results obtained for the test images that have been JPEG 
compressed only. To evaluate the accuracy of the quality factor estimation process, each 
test image has been blind compressed from QF = 100 to QF = 50 in decreasing steps 
of 5. For each JPEG compression, the quality factor estimation process was used to 
determine the QF. The mean estimated QFs for all 1338 test images and each correctly 
identified detection accuracy rate Pde for each JPEG compression quality factor are 
shown in Table 5.4, based on equation 5.9.
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Watermarked
image
I____
None modification
JPEG compression
Copy&Paste attack (5%)
Copy&Paste attack (5%) 
+JPEG compression
Copy&Paste attack (20%) 
+JPEG compression
Copy&Paste attack (30%) 
+JPEG compression
Copy&Paste attack (20%) 
+Median lîltering(3*3) 
+JPEG compression__
Copy&Paste attack (20%) 
4-Average filtering(3*3) 
+JPEG compression
Copy&Paste attack (20%) 
4-Gaussian lowpass filtering(3*3) 
 4-JPEG compression_____
Copy&Paste attack (20%) 
4-Histogram equalization 
4-JPEG compression
Receiver
Test
image
F ig u r e  5.14: Ten types of test images with and without attacks
Pde = Jj x 100% (5.9)
where d is the number of image s with their QF correctly detected and /? is the number 
of images tested. The mean estimated QF results indicate the QFs can be estimated 
with high accuracy. The only exceptions for lower correct detection rates, Pde, were 
obtained for QF — 50, QF = 60, and QF = 100. In the case of QF = 50, Pde was 
very low at approximately 18.2%, indicating that the process was probably detecting 
QFs close to QF = 55. For QF = 60, and QF = 100, the detection rates were slightly 
better at 38.6% and 65.7%, respectively. For comparison, both the mean estimated 
QF value and correct detection rate were used for each result to estimate the actual 
QF for the images. The QFs were then grouped into three different ranges: QF > 90, 
90 > QF > 75 and QF < 75. The grouping into three QF ranges did not have an overall 
effect on the authentication process. Results obtained for Pde2, which show the correct 
detection accuracy rates in these QF ranges, also were on average at 99%. Two further 
experiments were performed with the test image: no modification, and copy and paste 
attack (5%). All of the detected QFs achieved for both experiments were approximately 
99%, and fit well in the upper range of QF > 90.
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Table 5.5 summaries the results obtained for test images that have been attacked via 
copy and paste and then JPEG compressed. Each watermarked image has been tam­
pered randomly in different regions by applying a copy and paste attack to 5% of the 
watermarked image (9830 pixels in 384512 pixels image), and also compressed with dif­
ferent QF values. In order to further investigate our proposed method, we undertake 
the analysis of increasing the copy and paste attack area in the watermarked image. Ta­
bles 5.6 and 5.7 illustrate the average QF estimation rates based on 1338 watermarked 
images, each attacked via copy and paste (20% and 30%), and then JPEG compression. 
Tables 5.5 to 5.7 show that each watermarked image was exposed to three different re­
gions of tampering: 5%, 20%, and 30%. Each tampering iteration was performed by 
selecting random blocks from the watermarked images. Each tampered watermarked 
image is then blind JPEG compressed from QF = 100 to QF = 50 in decreasing steps 
of 5. Consequently, 44154 test images were obtained during these copy and paste at­
tack and JPEG compression simulations. The results showed that the quality factor 
estimation process was highly accurate even under these attacks.
From Table 5.5, the lowest correct detection rates were obtained for QF  =  50, QF = 60, 
and QF = 100 with a tamper region of 5%. On the other hand, in Tables 5.6 and 
5.7, the correct detection rates for QF = 100 were increased to 94% and 100%, when 
the tampered regions were 20% and 30%, respectively. However, the correct detection 
rates Pde for QF — 50 and QF = 60 were still maintaining the lowest in Tables 5.6 
and 5.7. Nevertheless, from Tables 5.5 to 5.7, all the results of Pde2 showed the correct 
detection rates in three QF ranges (QF > 90, 90 >  QF > 75 and QF < 75), with an 
overall average of 99%. As such, the threshold can be adapted into the three QF ranges 
according to the estimated QF of each test image as described in Section 5.4.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, semi-fragile watermarking techniques can permit some non- 
malicious or unintentional manipulations. Aside from JPEG compression as one of the 
main unintentional manipulations, other non-malicious manipulation can include image 
enhancement techniques such as median filtering, average filtering, Gaussian lowpass 
filtering, and histogram equalisation. Hence, we perform the experiments to obtain 58872 
test images by firstly tampering 20% of the watermarked image, before applying these 
image enhancement techniques along with blind JPEG compression from QF  — 100 to 
QF = 50 in decreasing steps of 5. The results are shown in Tables 5.8 to 5.11. Table 
5.8 indicates that the average performance of the correct detection rates Pde is increased 
when the median filtering is added to the test images. When QF = 95 to QF = 65, the 
correct detection rates Pde reach 100%, which implies that all of the corresponding QFs 
for each test images are correctly detected.
Chapter 5. Proposed Image Forensics for Semi-fragile Watermarking 90
In Table 5.9, the test images are subjected to average filtering. The results illustrate 
that Pde have been decreased relatively small, while the results of QF  =  95 to QF  =  65 
still maintained at over 96%. Table 5.10 shows that the highest correct detection rates 
(100%) are achieved when Gaussian lowpass filtering is applied to the test images with 
QF = 100 to QF = 80. However, the decreased approximately 8% from QF = 75 
to QF = 50, and Pde2 decreased to the lowest at 96.6%. In Table 5.11, we evaluate 
the results of the test images after histogram equalisation. From Tables 5.4 to 5.11, we 
found that Pde for QF  =  60 increased to 87.5% (the highest Pde for QF = 60), whereas 
Pde for QF  =  50 decreased to the lowest at 4%. Tables 5.8 to 5.11 show the correct 
detection rates Pde2 were highly accurate with an overall average of 99.5%, which can 
also be adapted to adjust the threshold into three ranges.
T a b l e  5.4: JPEG compression only
A ctual QF E stim a ted  Q F Pde T Pde2
100 98.2 65.7%
95 94.9 97.3% 0.9 98.8%
90 90.1 98.2%
85 84.2 91.4% 0.7 99.1%80 79.8 97.5%
75 75.4 97.0%
70 69.8 98.8%
65 64.4 93.7% 0.5 99.4%60 62.4 38.6%
55 55.2 94.1%
50 54.3 18.2%
T a b l e  5.5: Combined (5%) copy and paste attack and JPEG compi
A ctual QF E stim ated  QF Pde T Pde2
100 98.6 72%
95 95.0 100% 0.9 99.1%
90 90.1 98.6%
85 84.8 97.9% 0.7 99.3%80 79.9 99.6%
75 75.2 99.1%
70 69.9 99.5%
65 64.5 98.7% 0.5 99.2%60 61.5 63.9%
55 54.9 96.6%
50 53.3 20.4%
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T a b l e  5.6: Combined (20%) copy and paste attack and JPEG compression
A ctual QF E stim a ted  QF Pde T Pde2
100 99.7 94%
95 95.0 100% 0.9 100%
90 90.0 100%
85
80
85.0
80.0
100%
100% 0.7 99.9%
75 75.5 98%
70 70.0 100%
65
60
65.2
61.6
96%
68% 0.5 99.9%
55 55.0 100%
50 54.9 20%
T a b l e  5.7: Combined (30%) copy and paste attack and JPEG compression
A ctua l QF E stim ated  QF Pde T Pde2
100 100 100%
95 95.00 100% 0.9 99.9%
90 90.2 99.8%
85 84.8 98% 0.7 99.9%80 79.1 99.8%
75 75.2 99.7%
70 69.4 99.6%
65 65.3 99.5% 0.5 99.9%60 62.1 58%
55 55.0 100%
50 55.2 14%
5.6 Im proved R esu lts (for B oth  SLT and W B C T  Sem i- 
fragile W aterm arking Schem es)
In this section, we further analyse the use of Benford’s Law to improve the accuracy 
rates in authenticating and localising the tampered regions for our proposed SLT and 
WBCT based semi-fragile watermarking schemes.
5 .6 .1  B en ford ’s Law for SLT-based Sem i-fragile W aterm arking
In Section 4.1.3, we discussed the SLT based semi-fragile watermark detection and au­
thentication process. The original watermarks and the retrieved watermarks correspond­
ing to the block from test image were compared by using the correlation coefficient p. 
Then, the correlation coefficient p could be compared with a pre-determined threshold 
value A. If p < X, the authentication process indicates that the block has been tampered
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T a b l e  5.8: Combined (20%) copy and paste attack and Median filtering (3 x 3) and
JPEG compression
A ctual QF E stim ated  QF Pde T Pie2
100 99.9 98%
95 95.1 100% 0.9 100%
90 90.3 100%
85
80
85.0
80.0
100%
100% 0.7 100%
75 75.0 100%
70 70.0 100%
65
60
65.0
62.4
100%
52% 0.5 98.0%
55 56.6 92%
50 54.0 30%
T a b l e  5.9: Combined (20%) copy and paste attack and Average filtering (3 x 3) and
JPEG compression
A ctual QF E stim ated  QF Pde T Pde2
100 99.8 96%
95 94.9 98% 0.9 100%
90 90.0 100%
85 85.0 100% 0.7 100%80 80.0 100%
75 74.5 98%
70 67.2 96%
65 58.5 90% 0.5 100%60 59.7 54%
55 48.4 88%
50 44.4 58%
with. In this case, the A has been set as 0.5 in order to get acceptable error rates. How­
ever, both PpP R  and P f n r ) could be reduced by using our improved authentication 
process based on the generalized Benford’s Law.
The test image is first estimated to obtain the QF by using the generalized Benford’s 
Law. Then, the threshold A can be adapted according to different estimated QFs, based 
on the following conditions in Equation 5.10. The adaptive three thresholds A were 
estimated 0.95, 0.75 or 0.5 through experiments. Finally, the correlation coefficient p 
of each block was compared with this adaptive threshold A to determine whether any 
blocks have been tampered with.
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TABLE 5.10: Combined (20%) copy and paste attack and Gaussian lowpass filtering
(3 x 3) and JPEG compression
A ctual QF E stim ated  QF Pde T Pde2
100 100 100%
95 95.0 100% 0.9 100%
90 90.0 100%
85
80
85.0
80.0
100%
100% 0.7 100%
75 72.9 89.8%
70 68.4 85.7%
65 59.7 91.8% 0.5 96.6%60 61.3 46.9%
55 57.0 91.8%
50 57.9 32.7%
Table 5.11: Combined (20%) copy and paste attack and Histogram equalization and
JPEG compression
A ctual QF E stim ated  QF Pde T Pde2
100 99.7 93.9%
95 94.9 97.9% 0.9 100%
90 90.0 100%
85 84.9 97.9% 0.7 98.9%80 79.7 97.9%
75 75.0 100%
70 70.0 100%
65 65.0 100% 0.5 100%60 60.6 87.8%
55 55.1 97.9%
50 54.8 4.1%
10.95, QF > 950.75, 95 > Q F > 80 (5.10)
0.5, QF < 80
In Table 5.12, the results based on nine images show the improved performance of the 
SLT semi-fragile watermarking scheme against copy and paste attack comparing with 
their original results obtained from Section 4.1.5. The adaptive threshold has been set to 
0.95 if the test image has been compressed with QF > 95 or uncompressed. From Table
5.12, P f n r  has decreased significantly, from approximately 9.55% to 1%. Especially, 
images ‘baboon’, ‘San Diego’ and ’Cun’, have been decreased 9% compared with their 
original results. On average, P f n r  has approximately decreased 8.55%.
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In addition, Table 5.13 shows an improved performance of the SLT semi-fragile wa­
termarking scheme against copy and paste attack and JPEG compression (QF=85) by 
using the generalized Benford’s Law. The adaptive threshold has been set to 0.75 as 
the estimated QF is between 95 and 80. Similarly, Pf n r  also has also decreased signif­
icantly, from 9.41% to 2.16% on average. However, when applying JPEG compressison 
to the watermarked images, P f n r  increases to approximately 2.16% comparing with 
Table 5.12. However, with the improved authentication process based on the general­
ized Benford’s Law, P f n r  still decreases approximately by 7.25%. On the other hand, 
P f p r  has risen slightly to 0.04%, with approximately only 0.01% increased on average, 
as indicated in Table 5.13.
Table 5.12: The improved performance of the SLT semi-fragile watermarking scheme 
against copy and paste attack (20%) by using Benford’s Law.
O riginal Im proved  E rro rs  D ecreased /Increased
P f p r P f n r P f p r P f n r P f p r P f n r
Lena 0 9.06 0 2.08 0 -6.98
Baboon 0 9.41 0 0.37 0 -9.04
Ship 0 9.99 0 2.39 0 -7.6
Trucks 0 9.47 0 0.49 0 -8.98
Bridge 0 9.38 0 0.44 0 -8.94
San Diego 0 9.65 0 0.5 0 -9.15
Gun 0 10.05 0 0.44 0 -9.61
Carl 0 9.54 0 1.75 0 -7.79
Car2 0 9.37 0 0.5 0 -8.87
A verage 0 9.55 0 1.00 0 -8.55
Table 5.13: The improved performance of the SLT semi-fragile watermarking scheme
against copy and paste attack (20%) and JPEG compression (QF=85) by using Ben-
ford’s Law.
Test Im age O riginal Im proved E rro rs  D ecreased /Increased
P f p r P f n r Pf p r P f n r P f p r P f n r
Lena 0 8.58 0 2.36 0 -6.22
Baboon 0.01 9.63 0 2.23 -0.01 -7.4
Ship 0 9.47 0 1.84 0 -7.63
Trucks 0 9.89 0.02 2.26 +0.02 -7.63
Bridge 0.05 9.56 0.23 2.15 +0.18 -7.41
San Diego 0 9.55 0.02 2.25 +0.02 -7.3
Gun 0.03 9.1 0 2.42 -0.03 -6.68
Carl 0.01 9.78 0.06 2 +0.05 -7.78
Car2 0.17 9.11 0 1.95 -0.17 -7.16
A verage 0.03 9.41 0.04 2.16 +0.01 -7.25
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5.6 .2  B en ford ’s Law for W B C T -b ased  Sem i-fragile W aterm arking
Similarly, in this section, we show that the WBCT based semi-fragile watermark detec­
tion process can also be improved by using the generalized Benford’s Law. As discussed 
in Section 4.2.4, the M, the error tolerance margin value M  is pre-determined to be 
5 and is used to control P f p r  and P f n r - In the new improved watermark detection 
process, the test image is first used to estimate the QF value through the generalized 
Benford’s Law. The threshold M  was then set adaptively according to the estimated 
QF, as given in Equation 5.11. The watermark bits w' were extracted from the parent 
and children relationships using the adaptive threshold M, as discussed in Section 4.2.4.
3, QF  > 90
M  =  < 4 , 90 > QF > 70 (5.11)
[5, QF < 70
In Equation 5.11, the adaptive thresholds 3, 4, and 5 were found through our experi­
ments, which could reduce the detection rates according to different QFs. Tables 5.14 
and 5.15 show the experiential results of improved performance of the WBCT-based 
semi-fragile watermarking scheme against copy and paste attack with JPEG compres­
sion (QF=90 and 70) based on the same nine images. The results are compared with 
their original results obtained from Section 4.2.6. As shown in Table 5.14, the adaptive 
threshold M  is set to 3, when the estimated QF  > 90. P f p r  has reduced 1.35%. For 
image ‘Lena’, P f p r  increased to 1.34% from 4.47%. When the test image has been 
detected with JPEG compression (QF=70), the adaptive threshold M  is set as 4, with 
P f p r  decreased to 1.50% on average, as indicated in Table 5.15. Particularly, for image 
‘Car2’ , P f p r  has decreased by 5.96% from 6.68% to 0.72%. However, P f n r  in Tables 
5.14 and 5.15 have increased 0.32% and 0.22% on average, respectively.
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T a b l e  5.14: The improved performance of the W BCT semi-fragile watermarking 
scheme against copy and paste attack  (20%) and JPE G  compression (QF=90) by using
Benford’s Law.
Test Im age O riginal Im proved E rro rs  D ecreased /Increased
P f p r P f n r P f p r P f n r P f p r P f n r
Lena 4.47 0.69 1.34 1.1 -3.13 +0.41
Boats 5.49 0.61 4.13 1.08 -1.36 +0.47
Trucks 1.81 0.73 1.33 0.98 -0.48 +0.25
San Diego 2.29 0.89 2.1 1.08 -0.19 +0.19
Peppers 4.27 0.08 4.91 0.34 +0.64 +0.26
Goldhill 4.63 0.55 1.99 0.83 -2.64 +0.28
Gun 6.11 0.36 3.27 0.49 -2.84 +0.13
Carl 2.48 0.72 0.84 1.19 -1.64 +0.47
Car2 1.23 1.17 0.74 1.58 -0.49 +0.41
A verage 3.64 0.64 2.29 0.96 -1.35 +0.32
T a b l e  5.15: The improved performance of the W BCT semi-fragile watermarking 
scheme against copy and paste attack  (20%) and JPE G  compression (QF=70) by using
Benford’s Law.
Test Im age O riginal Im proved E rro rs  D ecreased /In creased
P f p r P f n r P f p r P f n r P f p r P f n r
Lena 3.69 0.74 1.53 1.08 -2.16 +0.34
Boats 5.6 0.5 1.62 0.8 -3.98 +0.3
Trucks 0.83 1.19 1.81 1.22 +0.98 +0.03
San Diego 1.73 1.77 2.51 2.17 +0.78 +0.4
Peppers 3.16 0.54 4.35 0.7 +1.19 +0.16
Goldhill 6.29 0.53 3.74 0.38 -2.55 -0.15
Gun 4.35 0.42 2.89 0.59 -1.46 +0.17
Carl 1.25 1.15 0.94 1.44 -0.31 +0.29
Car2 6.68 1.31 0.72 1.76 -5.96 +0.45
A verage 3.73 0.91 2.23 1.13 -1.50 +0.22
5.7 Sum m ary
In this chapter, we discussed the relationship between QF and threshold, and proposed a 
framework incorporating the generalised Benford’s Law as an image forensics technique 
to accurately detect unknown JPEG compression levels in semi-fragile watermarked im­
ages. We discussed the limitations of using predetermined thresholds in semi-fragile 
watermarking algorithm. In our improved semi-fragile watermarking method, the test 
image was first analysed to detect its previously unknown quality factor for JPEG com­
pression by using the generalised Benford’s Law model, before proceeding with the 
semi-fragile authentication process. The results showed that QFs could be accurately 
detected for most unknown JPEG compressions. In particular, the average QF detec­
tion rate was as high as 96% for watermarked images compressed with QFs between
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95 and 65, and 99% when the image was subjected to tampering of 5% pixels of the 
image and compressed with QFs from 95 to 65. The threshold was adapted into three 
specific ranges according to the estimated QF of each test image. We also applied the 
generalised Benford’s Law to improve our proposed SLT and WBCT based semi-fragile 
watermarking schemes, which discussed in Chapter 4. The improved results showed that 
P f n r  has deceased approximately by 8% for SLT-based scheme, and approximately by 
1.4% reducing for P f p r  on average in WBCT-based semi-fragile watermarking scheme.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future work
6.1 C onclusion
In this thesis, we introduced four novel robust and semi-fragile transform based im­
age watermarking related schemes. These include wavelet-based contourlet transform 
(WBCT) for both robust and semi-fragile watermarking, slant transform (SLT) for semi- 
fragile watermarking as well as using generalised Benfords Law to adaptively adjust the 
appropriate threshold for improving semi-fragile watermarking technique.
One of the important applications of digital watermarking technology is copyright pro­
tection and ownership identification for digital images. To achieve this goal, robust 
watermarking has been rapidly developed in the past fifteen years. Robust watermark­
ing is designed to survive various manipulations, such as JPEG compression, additive 
noise, filtering and geometric distortions. In contrast to conventional methods operating 
in the wavelet domain, we proposed a novel robust watermarking algorithm using non- 
redundant contourlet transform that exploited the energy relations between “parent” 
and “children” coefficients. In our proposed scheme, we embedded the watermarks by 
modulating these energy relations. The modulation was performed by modifying the 
parent coefficients in relation with children coefficients. Through experiments, we found 
that most of the energy relations between “parent” and “children” non-redundant con­
tourlet coefficients maintained 75% of invariance before and after JPEG compression 
with QF=10, even when the image was distorted significantly. Therefore, performance 
improvement was obtained by means of embedding a watermark exploiting the mod­
ulation of the energy relations. By comparing with two other wavelet methods, the 
experimental results showed that our method was more robust to attacks such as JPEG 
and JPEG2000 compression, pixel shifting, histogram equalisation, Gaussian filtering
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and sharpening. However, for the median filtering, scale and rotation attacks, our re­
sults are lower than other two methods that need to be further improved.
In our proposed two semi-fragile watermarking schemes for image authentication, the 
block based SLT algorithm, and the non-block based wavelet-based contourlet transform 
were analysed and compared in detail. For the SLT scheme, the watermark was em­
bedded into the middle frequency SLT coefficients of non-overlapping blocks of the test 
images. The comparative studies showed that the SLT-domain watermarking scheme 
performed better against the copy and paste attack and additive Gaussian noise by 
comparing with the DOT and PST based schemes. However, the PST and DCT-domain 
watermarking schemes performed better than the SLT-domain watermarking against 
JPEG compression. For instance, in the new comparative performance of the water­
marking schemes against copy &; paste attack (20%) and JPEG compression (QF=75), 
P f p r  was achieved at 16.22% for SLT-based scheme, whereas PST and DOT achieved 
on average at 0.19% and 1.5%, respectively.
For the WBCT based scheme, we analysed the parent and children coefficients relation­
ship before and after non-malicious manipulations, as well as copy and pasted attack. We 
found that most of the parent and children relationships before and after non-malicious 
manipulations maintained their invariance, whereas the coefficients relations for copy 
and paste attack exhibited a sharp peak at zero amplitude and tail off rapidly on both 
sides of the peak. This implies that the differences distribute sparsely, as the majority 
of differences were close to zero. Therefore, the watermark bits were embedded by mod­
ulating the parent and children relationship in the contourlet domain for our proposed 
semi-fragile watermarking scheme. The experimental results demonstrated that our pro­
posed WBCT watermarking scheme achieved good performances in detecting different 
kinds of manipulations such as JPE G / JPEG2000 compression, Gaussian noise, Gaussian 
filtering and contrast stretching with P f n r  at approximately 1%, whilst maintaining a 
P f p r  below 6.5%. Overall, the use of the parent and children relationship of WBCT 
allowed our algorithm to detect and localise the manipulated areas accurately when 
certain degrees of non-malicious manipulations were applied. When compared with the 
SLT-domain semi-fragile watermarking scheme, the WBCT domain scheme was found to 
be successful for a wide range of images, as a result of the unique parent and child rela­
tionship for each image. This characteristic of parent-child relationships can be utilised 
for semi-fragile watermark embedding, extraction and authentication processes.
Semi-fragile watermarking has become increasingly important to verify the content of 
images and localise the tampered areas, while tolerating some non-malicious manip­
ulations, such as JPEG compression. In the literature, the majority of semi-fragile 
algorithms have applied a predetermined threshold to tolerate errors caused by JPEG
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compression. However, this predetermined threshold is typically fixed and cannot be 
easily adapted to different amounts of errors caused by unknown JPEG compression at 
different quality factors (QFs). We reviewed three typical methods of employing pre­
determined thresholds in semi-fragile watermarking algorithms and the limitations of 
using predetermined thresholds were also highlighted. We analysed the relationship be­
tween QF and threshold, and proposed an improved method by utilizing the generalised 
Benford’s Law model for semi-fragile watermarking scheme. The test image was first 
analysed to detect its previously unknown quality factor for JPEG compression, before 
proceeding with the semi-fragile authentication process. The results showed that QFs 
could be accurately detected for most unknown JPEG compressions. In particular, the 
average QF detection rate was as high as 96% for watermarked images compressed with 
QFs between 95-65, and 99% when the image was subjected to tampering of 5% pixels 
of the image and compressed with QFs between 95-65. The threshold was adapted into 
three specific ranges according to the estimated QF of each test image. We also applied 
the generalised Benford’s Law to improve our proposed SLT and WBCT based semi- 
fragile watermarking schemes. The improved results showed that the P f n r  has been 
deceased around 8% for SLT-based scheme, and about 1.4% decrease for P f p r  on aver­
age in WBCT-based semi-fragile watermarking scheme. In addition, we applied different 
image enhancement techniques, such as median filtering, average filtering, Gaussian low- 
pass filtering, and histogram equalisation, to these test images, and the results showed 
that the QF correct detection rates were above 90%. Hence, our proposed image foren­
sics method can be used to adaptively adjust the threshold for images based on the 
estimated QF, improving accuracy rates in authenticating and localising the tampered 
regions for semi-fragile watermarking.
6.2 Future W ork
As future work for our proposed robust watermarking method, we plan to extend our 
proposed algorithms further by improving the watermark robustness against different 
forms of mild signal processing attacks. The embedding method could be further im­
proved by analyzing the parent and children WBCT coefficients before and after different 
attacks, such as, Gaussian white additive noise, different image filtering operations and 
some geometrical modifications. In addition, the watermark detection results could also 
be improved by having a more adaptive watermark detection threshold according to 
different forms of attacks. Currently, many researchers are focusing on the analysis 
of the characteristics of the image to find the invariant areas for embedding the water­
marks. This trend could lead to a better design and development of robust watermarking 
scheme against geometrical attacks such as print-and-scan process. Another potential
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area is the use of pattern recognition and neural network techniques to determine the 
type of attacks from the retrieved watermark patterns which could further enhance the 
development of robust image watermarking algorithms.
For semi-fragile watermarking, we plan to improve our proposed algorithms further with 
increasing accuracies in localisation and authentication, against different forms of mild 
signal processing attacks. Moreover, a security issue may occur when applying semi- 
fragile watermarking, as the watermark is embedded into each image with same key, 
which can be extracted easily by an attacker. Although much research is aimed at 
solving this issue, it is computationally intensive. It would be advantageous to develop 
a new and secure semi-fragile watermarking algorithm that could reduce the compu­
tational requirements of security. Both of SLT and WBCT based schemes need to be 
further analysed to find the optimal watermark embedding, detection and authentica­
tion algorithms, and adaptive correlated parameters, such as number of watermarks, 
watermark locations, watermark strength and threshold. Furthermore, the self-recovery 
and restoration of tampered regions requires further investigation, particularly in the 
use of more advanced restoration techniques such as irregular sampling and iterative 
techniques. Recently, we have proposed a novel fast self-restoration scheme resisting 
to JPEG compression for semi-fragile watermarking, which has been accepted by 10th 
International Workshop on Digital-forensics and Watermarking (IWDW11). In the wa­
termark embedding process, we embed ten watermarks (six for authentication and four 
for self-restoration) into each 8 x 8-pixel block of the original image. We then utilise four 
(4 x 4-pixel ) sub-blocks mean pixel values (extracted watermarks) to restore its corre­
sponding (8 x 8-pixel) blocks first four DOT coefficients for image content recovering. We 
also plan to merge the ten watermarks for authentication and self-restoration together 
to reduce the number of watermarks for each block, which could further improve the 
imperceptibility of both watermarked and restored images.
Based on the Benford’s Law, we plan to further analyse and estimate other signal process­
ing operations caused by transmission such as Gaussian noise, median filtering, Gaussian 
filtering and print-scan processes in semi-fragile and robust watermarking of images. We 
are also planning to utilise other image forensics techniques that could provide an im­
provement in semi-fragile watermarking schemes. In our recent research, we proposed 
two image forensics techniques based on analysing DWT coefficients of a image by using 
the Benford’s Law. Firstly, we proposed a scheme to analyse DWT coefficients and 
JPEG2000 compressed images using the Benford’s Law for image forensic applications. 
The uncompressed DWT coefficients were found to obey the Benford’s Law based on 
1338 test images. We also analysed the compressed DWT coefficients with different com­
pression rates for JPEG2000 images. The results indicated that the compressed DWT 
coefficients still obeyed the Benford’s Law with some slight difference between them.
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For instance, the mean divergence for JPEG2000 compression rate at 0.1 was 0.0108, 
which was much higher than uncompressed DWT coefficients. Hence, from these initial 
results, we can estimate a presence of JPEG2000 compression and could further analyse 
to estimate the unknown JPEG2000 compression rates in the image. Secondly, we pro­
posed an image forensics technique of extracting images with glare feature. We found 
via experiments that 142 images have this irregularity from 1338 images, and the pro­
portion of glare feature (unbalance light) in an image could affect the magnitude of digit 
5 in I5* digits probabilities. In order to further analyse irregular Benford’s Law curve, 
the intensity distribution histogram of test images was also calculated for comparison. 
We found a good correlation between the l sf digits probabilities and intensity distribu­
tion of its gray level. Furthermore, we simulated histogram equalization attack on the 
test images, and results showed our proposed method based on Is* digits probabilities 
are not affected by the histogram equalization attack, and the glare featured images 
could be detected more effective than analysing graylevels distribution of the images. 
Presently, We are planning to improve our two image forensics schemes. The coded 
stream of JPEG2000 can be analysed to further improve the accuracy of detecting un­
known JPEG2000 compression rates, as well as using the proposed method to accurately 
estimate double compression in JPEG2000 images. For detecting glare featured images, 
more tests will be performed on images under different natural light conditions, and 
further research with Fourier Transform instead of DWT for comparative analysis will 
also be considered. Finally, we plan to further analyse the characteristic of parent and 
children coefficients relationship of WBCT that could be utilised for image forensics.
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A bstract— Whilst it is sometimes essential that a scene is well 
it before image capture, too much light can cause exposure or 
'lare-based problems. Typically, glare is introduced to images 
vhen the camera is pointed towards the light source, and results 
n a visible distortion in the image. In this paper, we analyse 
ind identify images that contain the ‘glare’ property using 
he empirical Benford’s Law. The experiment is performed on 
.338 images, and extracts discrete wavelet High High (HH), 
ligh Low (HL) and Low High (LH) sub bands as raw data. 
The significant digit from each coefficient of all sub bands is 
hen calculated. We then analyse the probability of occurrence 
if large digits against smaller digits to detect anomalies. All 
mages containing these anomalies are further analysed for 
he identification of additional salient features. This analysis 
s performed in accordance with the Benford’s Law plot and 
he help of probability intensity histogram and divergence. Our 
esults indicate that 142 images have irregular Benford’s Law 
urves. For most images, the irregularity occurs at the hth digit. 
Lfter visual examination, we have found the unbalanced light and 
tigh level of brightness in these images. To measure the intensity 
if light in an image, we compute the probability histogram 
if gray levels. These results also correlate with the irregular 
teak identified from the Benford’s Law curves. In addition, the 
divergence is then computed, which shows the deviation between 
he actual Benford’s Law curve and the Benford’s Law graph of 
in image. Our proposed technique is novel and has a potential 
o be an image forensic tool for quick image analysis.
I. In t r o d u c t io n
The field of digital image forensics is striving hard to restore 
he lost trust in digital content. Images, which are becoming a 
•art of today’s life, are growing vulnerable to digital forgery 
1]. The readily available image manipulation software, such 
s Photoshop and GIMP are primarily responsible for this. 
Application of state of the art digital forensic methods for ex- 
mination and authentication of digital images is not possible 
yhen images are available in such huge quantity. In order to 
race or extract images of certain features or characteristics, 
n automated system is useful which will save precious time 
Dst while scanning each image manually. There are systems 
Iready in place doing image retrieval with the help of feature 
xtraction algorithms such as edge detection, etc.
A statistical law called, Benford’s Law [2]-[5], has been 
sed previously in accounting forensics to detect fraudulent 
ata by Nigirini [5]. Similarly, another study in the field of 
sychology noticed a peak at the digit 5 when people are 
sked to choose from a tampered set of data [6]. In recent 
ears it has attracted the attention of image processing experts.
In 2005, Acebo et al [7], showed how light intensity in an 
image can be used to determine if an image is genuine or 
computer generated. Unlike [7], we have applied DWT before 
calculating 1st digit probabilities and analysed images in the 
frequency domain, which is better to separate edge details from 
low frequencies. Similarly, Fu et al [8] have applied Benford’s 
Law on DCT coefficients in order to detect unknown JPEG 
compression. In our previous work [9], we have analysed DWT 
coefficients using Benford’s Law and audited the processing 
history applied to JPEG2000 images. We have noticed a sharp 
peak at digit 5 in Benford’s Law curve for some images, which 
became the basis for this paper.
Therefore, we propose a novel use of the Benford’s Law 
to identify unbalanced lighting in an image with the help of 
DWT. In this paper, we will analyse the irregularity in the 
Benford’s Law curve that appears for images with a certain 
feature. This feature is ‘glare’, when appeared in or near, a 
field of view induces unbalanced light that makes an image 
comparatively brighter in various parts. In effect, the image 
loses its visual quality. To determine if an image possesses 
unbalanced lighting, we will apply a single level of DWT 
to an image and compute its 1st digit probabilities of DWT 
coefficients. Images with irregular Benford’s Law curves are 
then identified and analysed further. The divergence, adopted 
from Eu et al [8] and Acebo et al [7], which shows how much 
the Benford’s Law curve of an image deviates from the actual 
Benford’s Law, is also calculated. Furthermore, the intensity 
histogram, used for measuring the strength of gray levels in 
various sections of an image, will compare with its 1st digit 
probabilities.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section II, will 
briefly describe Benford’s Law, Discrete Wavelet Transform 
and intensity distribution for gray level images. Section III il­
lustrates our proposed glare image detection method, followed 
by our experimental results and analysis in Section IV. This 
is followed by conclusion and future work in Section V.
II. B a c k g r o u n d
A. Benford’s Law
Benford’s Law, also known as the 1st digits law and sig­
nificant digits law, was introduced by Frank Benford in 1938
[3]. Then, Hill [4] expressed Benford’s Law as a logarithmic 
distribution, for analysis of the probability distribution of 
the 1st digit (1 — 9) of the number from natural data in
tatistics. The distribution for Benford’s Law can be expressed and Woods [12] discussed, the probability of occurrence of 
>y Equation 1. intensity level r& in an image is approximated by Equation 2.
p  (x) =  logio ( 1 +  -  ) , x =  1,2, ...9 ( 1)
nk
Where x  is the 1st digit of the number and p(x)  is the 
nobability distribution of x. A typical probability distribution 
)f Benford’s Law is shown in Figure 1. Any peaks or irreg- 
ilarities in the curve mean that the data has been tampered 
vith or is unnatural [5], [6], [7].
Benford's Law Distribution
Fig. 1. Probability Distribution o f Benford’s Law
3. Discrete Wavelet Transform
As shown in Figure 2, Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) 
lecomposes an image into a power of single resolution levels 
>y applying a collection of low-pass and high-pass filters onto 
he image in vertical and horizontal directions. This resolution 
evel consists of four sub-bands, which are Low Low (LL), 
.ow High {LH),  High Low {H L )  and High High { HH) .  
The L L  sub-band contains most energy and therefore can be 
lecomposed further [11]. The rest of the sub-bands contain 
sdge details.
LL LH
HL HH
Fig. 2. DWT Decomposition
Pr(, r k )  — — 0 ,1 ,2 ,  ■■■, L  1 (2)
Where M  and N  are the total number of pixel in an image, 
nk is the number of pixels that have intensity r&, and L  is the 
possible intensity levels in the image (256 for 8 bit image).
I I I .  P r o p o s e d  M e t h o d
In this section, we explain the proposed glare image detec­
tion process which uses the Benford’s Law model. As shown 
in Figure 3, the test image is first decomposed into LL, LH, HL 
and HH sub-bands through single level DWT (2, 3 and 4 levels 
of DWT can also be applied, but could decrease the detection 
rates). In our experiment, we used the wavelet with Daubechies 
9/7 filter, which is standard for lossy JPEG2000 compression. 
Secondly, the DWT coefficients of LH, HL and HH sub-bands 
are extracted (LL sub-band is not used as it contains highest 
amount of energies and is more sensitive to low frequencies 
[11]), and then the probability distribution of the 1st digits of 
these DWT coefficients is obtained by using the Benford’s Law 
model, as shown in Equation 1. Finally, in order to detect glare, 
these 1st digit probabilities undergo an image retrieval process, 
as per the pseudocode below.
if  p(x)  <  p {x  +  1) then
This 1st digit’s probability does not obey Benford’s Law 
This image could have glare 
end if
In addition, with the purpose of further investigate the re­
lationship between the 1st digit probability and intensity 
distribution, the intensities of the image are calculated using 
Equation 2, which estimate the strength of gray levels present 
in an image in the spatial domain. Moreover, the divergence is 
also calculated, which measures how much deviation of the 1st 
digit probability graph from the actual Benford’s Law curve. 
The divergence adopted from Acebo et al [7] and Fu et al [8], 
is shown in Equation 3.
= E
i = l
{P'i - P i ) : 
Pi
,2 =  1, 2 , - 9 (3)
Where p' is the actual 1st digit probability of the DWT 
coefficients and pi is the Benford’s Law from Equation 1.
7. Intensity Distribution
Digital images (and particularly gray scale images) can be 
[escribed in finite terms and discrete quantities, which are 
)ixel and amplitude [12]. A pixel, which contains a gray level, 
s arranged into two dimensional orders to form a digital 
mage. The intensities are spread randomly over the entire 
mage. In order to calculate the strength of various intensity 
evels or gray levels, a histogram is computed. As Gonzalez
Image I ) \ \T Benford's
Law
Image
Retrieval
Process
Glare Image
Fig. 3. Proposed glare image detection process
IV. E x p e r im e n t a l  R e s u l t s  a n d  A n a l y s is
Our proposed glare image detection method has detected 
42 (128, 123 and 121 if 2, 3 and 4 levels of DWT applied, 
espectively) out of 1338 images from UCID [10], which 
tad irregular Benford’s Law curves. Figures 4(b) and 6(b) 
how two irregular Benford’s Law curves of images ‘Statue 
.’ (Figure 4(a) ) and ‘Street’ (Figure 6(a) ), which compared 
vith the actual Benford’s Law curve. By comparing with 
he regular Benford’s Law curve of image ‘Statue 2’ (Figure 
i(a)) visually, the unbalance light caused by glare can also 
>e found from Figures 4(a) and 6(a)), which possesses extra 
mount of brightness in some parts. Moreover, the intensity 
listribution histograms of a normal image ‘Statue 2’, in Figure 
1(c), is somewhat smoother than the glare images ‘Statue 1’ 
ind ‘Street’, in Figures 4(c) and 6(c)).
In image ‘Statue 1’, due to its glare affect, the top boundary 
>f the image can not be found visually, which also correlates 
vith its 1st digit probabilities, which do not obey Benford’s 
,aw. Especially, its irregular peak at digit 5 in Figure 4(b), 
vhich is nearly five times higher. Similarly, the top right 
>oundary of image ’Street’ is also difficult to find visually 
ind the amount of its unbalanced light is much less than the 
mage ‘Statue 1’. Furthermore, in Figure 6(b), the irregular 
>eak at digit 5 from its 1st digit probabilities is only twice 
is high. In addition, the intensity distribution histogram in 
ngure 6(c), is smoother than image ‘Statue 1’ in Figure 4(c). 
fherefore, we conclude that the amount of unbalanced light 
n an image could affect the magnitude of the digit 5 in the 
)robabilities. In contrast, the distribution of gray levels in the 
ntensity histogram in Figure 5(c) for image ‘Statue 2’, is 
pread across a wider range of gray levels smoothly. In Figure 
i(b), the image obeys Benford’s Law and there appears to be 
io  significant brightness in the image. The divergence between 
hese 1st digit probabilities and Benford’s Law is shown in 
fable I.
table  i
D iv e r g e n c e  f r o m  B e n f o r d ’s L a w  c u r v e
Image Divergence
Statue 1 1.7590
Statue 2 0.0024
Street 0.0919
From Table I, we observe that the divergence of image 
Statue 2’ is showing the best fit to Benford’s Law, at 0.0024. 
n comparison, the worst fit at 1.759 is image ‘Statue 1’ 
ind followed by image ‘Street’ at 0.0919. Furthermore, by 
leducing common artefacts that are present in both sets of 
mages that follow or do not follow Benford’s Law, the only 
eature left is glare (extra brightness). Hence, we can conclude 
hat the glare feature in an image results in an irregularity in 
ts 1st digit probabilities.
In addition, we also simulated an attack by appending 
irtificial glare into the images. The attack is implemented by 
ising “lens flare filter” function with the brightness increased 
o 135% in Adobe Photoshop CS5 image editing software.
From this experiment, the results showed that both regular 
and irregular 1st digit probabilities are not influenced by the 
artificial glare, and therefore our method could also identify 
whether there is natural or artificial glare present in an image.
V. C o n c l u s io n  a n d  F u t u r e  W o r k
In this paper, we presented a method of extracting images 
with glare (such as unbalanced lighting) out of the bulk of im­
ages in DWT domain using Benford’s Law. Any irregularities 
in an image could be detected as peaks via the Benford’s Law 
curves. The peaks were mainly located at digit 5. We found 
via experiments that 142 images have this irregularity from 
1338 images, and the amount of glare feature (unbalanced 
light) in an image could affect the magnitude of digit 5 in 
1st digit probabilities. In order to further analyse the irregular 
Benford’s Law curve, the intensity distribution histogram of 
test images was also calculated for comparison. We found 
a good correlation between the 1st digit probabilities and 
intensity distribution of its gray level. The divergence was 
also calculated between the I s* digit probability curve and 
Benford’s Law, such as image ‘Statue 2’, at 0.0024. Our 
method could also identify whether there is natural or artificial 
glare present in an image. In future work, more tests will be 
performed on images under different natural light conditions. 
Further research with Fourier Transform instead of DWT for 
comparative analysis will also be considered.
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A B ST R A C T
With the tremendous growth and usage of digital images nowadays, the integrity and authenticity of digital content is 
becoming increasingly important, and a growing concern to many government and commercial sectors. Image Forensics, 
based on a passive statistical analysis of the image data only, is an alternative approach to the active embedding of data 
associated with Digital Watermarking.
Benford’s Law was first introduced to analyse the probability distribution of the 1st digit (1-9) numbers of natural data, 
and has since been applied to Accounting Forensics for detecting fraudulent income tax returns [9]. More recently, 
Benford's Law has been further applied to image processing and image forensics. For example, Fu et al. [5] proposed a 
Generalised Benford’s Law technique for estimating the Quality Factor (QF) of JPEG compressed images. In our 
previous work, we proposed a framework incorporating the Generalised Benford’s Law to accurately detect unknown 
JPEG compression rates of watermarked images in semi-fragile watermarking schemes. JPEG2000 (a relatively new 
image compression standard) offers higher compression rates and better image quality as compared to JPEG 
compression. In this paper, we propose the novel use of Benford’s Law for estimating JPEG2000 compression for image 
forensics applications. By analysing the DWT coefficients and JPEG2000 compression on 1338 test images, the initial 
results indicate that the 1st digit probability of DWT coefficients follow the Benford's Law. The unknown JPEG2000 
compression rates of the image can also be derived, and proved with the help of a divergence factor, which shows the 
deviation between the probabilities and Benford’s Law.
Based on 1338 test images, the mean divergence for DWT coefficients is approximately 0.0016, which is lower than 
DCT coefficients at 0.0034. However, the mean divergence for JPEG2000 images compression rate at 0.1 is 0.0108, 
which is much higher than uncompressed DWT coefficients. This result clearly indicates a presence of compression in 
the image. Moreover, we compare the results of 1st digit probability and divergence among JPEG2000 compression rates 
at 0.1, 0.3, 0.5 and 0.9. The initial results show that the expected difference among them could be used for further 
analysis to estimate the unknown JPEG2000 compression rates.
Keywords: Image Forensics, JPEG2000, Benford’s Law, DWT, DCT, JASPER
1. IN T R O D U C T IO N
As digital imaging devices such as digital cameras, camcorders and scanners have become very popular and widely 
available in the market place; the use of digital images has grown considerably in our daily life. This, coupled with the 
ease-of-use and effectiveness of advanced image manipulation software, has made altered images ubiquitous in the 
digital world, raising a concern regarding the integrity of images. In order to restore trust in an image, the field of image 
forensics has been developed to analyse images based solely on the image data itself. The primary focus of image 
forensics is to detect and authenticate any kind of manipulation in a digital image. Image forensics can be viewed as an 
alternate approach to digital watermarking, where secret information (watermarks) are embedded into an image to 
protect its authenticity. The advantage of Image forensics, however, is that it works only with the data in hand, and does 
not require embedding any additional information. As described in [1, 2] image forensics also isolates anomalies that 
might exist due to non-malicious processing (such as a change in file format) or intentional, malicious modifications
(such as cloning or creating composites), as well as identifying the difference between natural and unnatural images [3]. 
A natural image possesses its original characteristics, such as shape, contrast and size. On the other hand, this image 
becomes unnatural if any of these characteristics are changed.
Fridrich et al [2] classified image forensic techniques according to six different categories: source classification; device 
identification; images linking to source device [4]; processing history recovery; integrity detection; and anomaly 
investigation. Processing histoiy recovery relates to the part recovery of the processing chain associated with an image
[2], This area of image forensics focuses on detecting non-malicious alterations in an image such as lossy compression 
(JPEG, JPEG2000), resizing, and colour/contrast adjustments. Fu et a l [5] proposed an image forensic technique to 
detect the Quality Factor (QF) of unknown JPEG compressed images. They found that DCT coefficients of an image 
obey the Benford’s Law distribution closely, and that the 1st digit probability distributions do not follow the Generalized 
Benford’s Law if the image has been compressed twice with different QFs. Hence, the actual QF can be accurately 
estimated by analysing its JPEG coefficients according to the Generalised Benford's Law [6-8]. Benford's Law is a 
statistical model of probabilities [8], used originally in accounting forensics [9] to detect financial frauds. We also 
adapted this approach to determine adaptive thresholds that could improve the authentication accuracy in semi-fragile 
watermarking [10].
Zhang et al. [11] proposed a double compression detection technique for JPEG2000 compressed images. Double 
compression occurs when an image is saved twice in same format with different or similar compression. In their scheme, 
they applied the Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) to a JPEG2000 compressed image, to extract the High/Low and 
Low/High sub-bands of the DWT coefficients. A histogram was then formed by applying the Fast Fourier Transform 
(FFT) to these extracted coefficients. By analysing the sharp peaks and valleys of this histogram, this test image could 
be classified according to whether or not it has been subjected to double JPEG2000 compression. There currently exists 
no literature regarding the analysis of single JPEG2000 compression for image forensics. In this paper, we propose the 
novel use of Benford's Law for single JPEG2000 compressed images. We will analyse the DWT coefficients o f 
uncompressed and JPEG2000 compressed images based on the Benford’s Law. A comparative evaluation of 
compression rates will also be investigated. In contrast with Fu et a l [5], we analyse the DWT coefficients instead of 
DCT coefficients before the quantisation step. This is due to the fact that the quantization has no effect in the 
compression process in a JPEG2000 compression coding system, which will be explained in the next section [12].
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the background of JPEG2000, DWT and the 
Benford’s Law. In this section, a brief description of the JPEG2000 core coding system is given, along with an 
explanation of DWT, and the advantages of using DWT over DCT in JPEG2000 compression. It also provides a brief 
discussion of why Benford’s Law is a useful tool for image forensics. Section 3 discusses the results obtained using the 
proposed method of utilising Benford’s Law to analyse DWT coefficients of both uncompressed and JPEG2000 
compressed images. Finally, Section 4 presents the conclusions and future work.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 JPEG2000 Compression
In the literature, there are two major classes of image compressions: lossy and lossless [13]. Lossy image compression 
produces an image with acceptable visual quality but with a significantly smaller file size. One of the most popular lossy 
compression techniques is the JPEG (Joint Photographic Experts Group) format, which was implemented based on the 
block Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) [13]. In JPEG, the compression is achieved by applying the quantization and 
coding process to the DCT coefficients of an image. The purpose of the quantization step is to remove redundancies of 
the image data with a Quality Factor (QF), that represents different compression rates. However, the JPEG compressed 
image can possess blocking artefacts at low quality factors, due to the use of the block DCT. To overcome this, a newer 
version of JPEG was introduced, JPEG2000 (file extensions jp2 or j2k) [14, 15]. JPEG2000, based on the Discrete 
Wavelet Transform (DWT) [12], has better quality, with no blocking artefacts; it is more complex in implementation 
than JPEG. A block diagram of the JPEG2000 core coding system is shown in Figure 1 [15].
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Figure 1: Block diagram of core coding system of JPEG2000 [15]
As shown in Figure 1, there are three important components: DWT; Quantization; and Embedded Block Coding with 
Optimized Truncation (EBCOT). Firstly, DWT is applied to the image, followed by quantization. In contrast to JPEG, 
the quantization is performed by dividing each coefficient with the step size (which does not affect the compression rate 
in JPEG20000). EBCOT coding is the next step in the process, where the quantized coefficients are formed into bit- 
planes starting from the Most Significant Bit (MSB) to Least Significant Bit (LSB). These bit-planes then undergo three 
coding passes: the significance propagation pass; the amplitude refinement pass; and the cleanup pass. Then, the coded 
stream is achieved by arranging coded bits into quality layers according to desired compression rate. Finally, the code 
stream is used to reconstruct the JPEG2000 compressed image [12, 14, 15].
In this paper, we used JASPER [16], an open source implementation of JPEG2000 in C, with MATLAB for our 
experiments. In JASPER, compression parameters are used to apply different compression rates between 0.01 and 1, 
which represent the percentage size of the original image. A total of 1338 test images, from UCID [17] database are used 
for our experiment and analysis.
2.2 DWT for JPEG2000
As mentioned above, DWT is used in JPEG2000 for mapping spatial pixels of an image into coefficients in the 
frequency domain. In contrast with DCT, which divides the image into 8 by 8 blocks, the DWT is applied to the entire 
image, yielding a much better energy compaction while reducing discontinuities at the same time [12]. As shown in 
Figure 2, DWT decomposes an image into power of 2 resolution levels by applying a collection of low-pass and high- 
pass filters onto the image in vertical and horizontal directions. Each resolution level consists of four sub-bands, which 
are LL, HL, LH, and HH. In JPEG2000, the resolution levels are often between 3 to 8. JPEG2000 compression can be 
both lossy and lossless, depending upon the type of filter applied in DWT. For instance, Le Gall 5/3 filter is used for 
lossless compression, and Daubechies 9/7 filter is used for lossy compression [6, 7, 8]. In this paper we will analyse the 
lossy JPEG2000 images using Benford’s Law in comparison with DCT in [5].
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Figure 2: DWT decomposition
2.3 Benford’s Law
The Benford’s Law, was introduced by Frank Benford in 1938 [7] and was later developed by Hill [8] for analysis of the 
probability distribution of the first digit (1-9) numbers obtained from natural data in statistics. A typical probability 
distribution of Benford's Law is shown in Figure 3. By using Benford’s Law, the 1st digit of natural numbers (1-9) can 
be classified in a specific way, that is smaller digit occurs more often than larger digit. Hill explained the law in terms of 
statistics, concluding that the nature of probabilities of first digits from 1 to 9 is logarithmic [8]. The distribution for 
Benford's Law can be expressed by Equation 1.
j9 ( * ) = l0 g 10 1+ -
X
x = l,2 ,...9 (1)
where X is the first digits of the number and p  ( x )  is the probability distribution of X .
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Figure 3: Probability distribution of Benford’s Law
3. METHOD AND RESULTS
3.1 DWT coefficients and Benford’s Law
We analyse the DWT coefficients of the uncompressed images to investigate if these coefficients follow the Benford’s 
Law, and the result will also be a benchmark for the next experiment on JPEG2000 images. The DCT coefficients are 
non-uniformly distributed; therefore, the Benford’s Law can be successfully applied to the first digits of DCT 
coefficients [5]. The DWT coefficients have similar property of the DCT, which is illustrated in the following figures. 
Figure 4 illustrated the image ‘Cameraman’ and its associated probabilities of DCT and DWT coefficients as compared 
with the Benford’s Law as shown in Figure 5. The ‘Lena’ image is shown in Figure 6 and the associated probabilities of 
DCT and DWT are shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 6: image ‘Lena’
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The results are obtained by applying level 3 DWT of the image, and non-overlapped 8 by 8 block of DCT to 
uncompressed images, and then calculate the 1st digits probabilities of their corresponded coefficients. Figures 5 and 7 
show that the DWT coefficients for the two test images are following the trend of the Benford’s Law. Furthermore, for 
the lower complexity image ‘Cameraman’ in Figure 5, the trend of DWT coefficients is closer to the Benford's Law than 
DCT coefficients. One the other hand, for the higher complexity image ‘Lena’ in Figure 7, both DWT and DCT have 
similar trends and follow the Benford’s Law. Hence, the results implied that the 1st digits probabilities for DWT 
coefficients perform better in lower complexity images.
In order to substantiate the results, we conduct the experiment of evaluating the 1st digits probabilities for 1338 
uncompressed grayscale images from the Uncompressed Image Database (UCID) [17]. Figure 8 illustrates the 
comparison between the probability distribution of Benford’s Law, and the mean distribution of 1st digit of 
uncompressed DWT coefficients of 1338 images. The results also show that the distribution of the 1st digits of the 
uncompressed DWT coefficients obeys the Benford’s Law closely. In order to evaluate how much deviation of the mean 
distribution to Benford’s Law, we calculate the average divergence [18], as given in Equation 2.
z2=É
1=1
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for i=1...9 (2)
where p f 1 is the actual 1st digits probability of the DWT coefficients and /?.is the 1st digits probability from Benford’s
Law in Equation (1). Based on 1338 test images, the average divergence of mean probability is 0.0016, which is even 
lower than the divergence of DCT coefficients at 0.0034, observed by Fu et al. [5], Therefore, the results indicate a good 
fitting between the probability distribution of Benford’s Law and the uncompressed DWT images.
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Figure 8: 1st digits probabilities o f uncompressed DWT coefficients
3.2 Benford's Law and Compressed JPEG2000 Images
From the results analysed from the last section, we conclude that the uncompressed DWT coefficients follow the 
Benford’s Law. We will further analyse the compressed DWT coefficients from JPEG2000 images. The schematic 
diagram of the conducted experiment is shown in Figure 9. The grayscale original image is first compressed and saved 
into JPEG2000 format (jp2 ) via the JPEG2000 compression software, JASPER. Next, the compressed image is then 
saved to a different format (.bmp, .tiff). The saved image can be passed to the receiver since the compression rate is 
unknown. Afterwards, the receiver can read the BMP format image and apply DWT to it. Finally, the receiver calculates 
the 1st digits Benford’s Law of this test image to detect unknown compression rate. In JASPER, compression parameters 
are used to apply different compression rates between 0.01 and 1, which represent the percentage size o f the original 
image. The bits-per-pixel parameter is set at 8 bits in our experiment.
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Figure 9: Block diagram o f experiment conducted
Based on 1338 images, Figures 10 to 13 show the 1st digits probabilities o f compressed DWT coefficients (extract from 
JPEG2000 compressed image) with different compression rates, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5 and 0.9, which are compared with the 
Benford’s Law, respectively. As we can see from the figures, most o f the 1st digital probabilities obey the Benford’s Law 
under different compression rates. However, the trends of compression rates at 0.9 and 0.5 are closer to the Benford’s 
Law than 0.3 and 0.1, respectively. For the divergence evaluation, the mean divergence for JPEG2000 images 
compression rate at 0.1 is 0.0108, which is approximately 10 times higher than the compression rate at 0.9. These 
variations in the divergences could be used to detect the compressions rate o f JPEG2000 images. Hence, for JPEG2000 
images, we can conclude that the 1st digits probabilities o f compressed DWT coefficients follow the Benford’s Law 
based on the different compression rates. This property could be further explored to accurately estimate unknown 
JPEG2000 compression in image forensics.
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Figure 10: 1st digits probabilities of JPEG2000 compression rate at 0.1
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4. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a scheme to analyse DWT coefficients and JPEG2000 compressed images using the 
Benford’s Law for image forensic applications. The uncompressed DWT coefficients were found to obey the Benford’s 
Law based on 1338 test images. By using a divergence factor, the mean divergence for DWT coefficients was estimated 
to be 0.0016, which was lower than the DCT coefficients at 0.0034. These deviations indicated that the DWT 
coefficients followed the Benford’s Law much closer than the DCT coefficients. In our second experiment, we analysed 
the compressed DWT coefficients with different compression rates for JPEG2000 images. The results indicated that the 
compressed DWT coefficients still obeyed the Benford’s Law with some slight difference between them. For example, 
the mean divergence for JPEG2000 compression rate at 0.1 was 0.0108, which was much higher than uncompressed
DWT coefficients. Hence, from these initial results, we can estimate a presence of JPEG2000 compression and could 
further analyse to estimate the unknown JPEG2000 compression rates in the image.
For future work, we plan to improve our scheme to accurately estimate unknown compression rates for watermarked 
images. The coded stream of JPEG2000 can be analysed to further improve the accuracy of detecting unknown 
JPEG2000 compression rates, as well as using the proposed method to accurately estimate double compression in 
JPEG2000 images.
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1 Introduction
The primary reason for the requirement of authenticating images stems from the in­
creasing amount of doctored images that are presented as accurate representations 
of real-life events, but are later discovered to be faked. The history of manipulating 
images reaches back almost as far as photography itself, and with the ease of use and 
availability of image editing software, it has become ubiquitous in the digital age. 
Image authentication schemes attempt to restore trust in the image by accurately val­
idating the data, positively or negatively. Especially for law enforcement scenarios, 
images captured at the scene, such as for crime scene investigation and traffic en­
forcement, potentially be used as evidence in the court of law. If an image presented 
in court as evidence from a crime scene is to be effectively used by the jury, the 
integrity of the information must not be in question. The role of a scene of crime of­
ficer (SoCOs) is to capture, as much as possible, the left-over evidence at the crime 
scene by taking photographs and collecting any exhibits found. After the collection 
of evidence, there is no other way of examining the crime scene as a whole, apart 
from analysing the collected exhibits and photographs taken [1], In order to maintain 
the integrity of the images, not only it is essential to verify that the photographic 
evidence remains unchanged and authentic, but any manipulated regions should also 
be localised to help identify which parts of the image cannot be trusted. With the 
tremendous growth and usage of digital cameras and video devices, the requirement 
to verify the digital content is paramount, especially if it is to be used as evidence in 
court [2], Therefore, digital watermarking technique can be utilised for image con­
tent authentication applications to verify or authenticate the integrity of the digital 
media content.
Digital watermarking is the process of embedding relevant information (such as 
a logo, fingerprint and serial number), into a media. This technique can be applied to 
different media types such as video, audio and image content. An example of digital 
visible watermark is the translucent logos that are often seen embedded at the comer 
of videos or images, in an attempt to prevent copyright infringement. However, these 
visible watermarks can be targeted and removed rather simply by cropping the media,
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or overwriting the logos. Subsequently, the field of digital watermarking is primarily 
focused on invisible watermarks, which are imperceptible and operate by tweaking 
the physical data of the media [3, 4]. There are three different classifications asso­
ciated with digital watermarking, depending on the applications: robust, fragile and 
semi-fragile. Robust watermarking is primarily designed to provide copyright pro­
tection and proof of ownership for digital images. The most important property of 
robust watermarking is its ability to tolerate certain signal processing operations that 
usually occur during the lifetime of a media object, as well as preventing any more 
deliberate attacks.
Fragile and semi-fragile digital watermarking techniques are often utilised for 
image content authentication. Fragile watermarking schemes are designed to detect 
any possible manipulations that affect the watermarked image pixel values [5, 6]. 
In comparison, while fragile watermarking is aptly named because of its sensitivity 
to any form of attack, semi-fragile watermarking is more robust against attack, and 
can be used to verify tampered content within images for both malicious and non- 
malicious manipulations [7-9]. In addition, semi-fragile schemes make it possible 
to verify the content of the original image, as well as permitting alterations caused 
by non-malicious (unintentional) modifications such as system processes. Moreover, 
semi-fragile watermarking is more focused on detecting intentional attacks than val­
idating the originality of the image [10,11], During the image transmission, the mild 
signal processing errors caused by signal reconstruction and storage, such as trans­
mission noise or JPEG compression, are permissible. However, the image content 
tampering such as copy and paste attack will be identified as a malicious attack. 
Additionally, in the literature, a significant amount of research has been focused 
on the design of semi-fragile algorithms that could tolerate JPEG compression and 
other common non-malicious manipulations [12-18]. However, watermarked images 
could be compressed by unknown JPEG compression rates of various quality factors 
(QFs). As a result, in order to authenticate the images, these algorithms have to set a 
pre-determined threshold that could allow them to tolerate different QF values when 
extracting the watermarks. To determine the threshold more accurately, the gener­
alised Benford’s law can be utilised to estimate the unknown JPEG compression QF, 
then appropriate thresholds could be adapted for each test image, before initialising 
the watermark extraction and authentication process. This law has already been suc­
cessfully used in image forensics technique for JPEG compression evaluation [19]. 
This adaptive threshold could help to decrease the false alarm and missed detection 
rates.
In contrast to authenticate the image using active watermarking technique, the 
image forensics as passive technique has attracted much attention [20-22]. The sig­
nificant difference is that image forensics seeks to authenticate images based solely 
on the image data provided in image statistical analysis, meaning it is a passive ap­
proach to the problem. As such, no embedded information is loaded into an image, 
and so the security risks and robustness issues associated with a payload, are avoided. 
Therefore, image forensics presents itself as an alternative approach to the active in­
sertion of watermarking data to authenticate images. In this chapter, we will review 
active watermarking techniques, such as fragile and semi-fragile methods as well as
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passive image forensics techniques such as camera identification and forgery detec­
tion methods for image authentication. Furthermore, we will introduce our three pro­
posed image authentication related methods, which are fragile watermarking scheme 
in Slant transform (SLT) domain, utilising the generalised Benford’s Law as image 
forensics technique to improve semi-fragile watermarking technique and the use of 
the statistical process control (SPC) for camera identification in image forensics re­
search.
The chapter is organized as follows:
•  In Section 2, several fragile and semi-fragile watermarking schemes will be re­
viewed. Our proposed SLT semi-fragile watermarking algorithm is then intro­
duced. The watermark embedding, detection and authentication processes are 
described in detail as well as the proposed experimental results are analysed and 
evaluated by comparing with two other transform based scheme, which in Dis­
crete Cosine transform (DCT) and Pinned Sine transform (PST) domain.
•  Section 3 discusses three typical methods of employing predetermined thresh­
olds in semi-fragile watermarking algorithms and the limitations of using pre­
determined thresholds were highlighted from the literature. Then we proposed 
a framework incorporating the generalised Benford’s Law that could detect un­
known JPEG compression QFs in semi-fragile watermarked images to adjust the 
appropriate threshold with experimental results.
• Section 4 will review image forensics techniques that focus on two main areas, 
camera identification and image forgery detection and their applications. Then 
we propose to utilise SPC methods to analyses images captured from different 
digital camera devices.
•  Section 5 gives the conclusion of this chapter and presents some directions for 
future work of the research.
2 Fragile and Semi-fragile Watermarking
In this section, both fragile and semi-fragile watermarking algorithms for image au­
thentication are reviewed. A detailed discussion on our proposed semi-fragile wa­
termarking schemes in SLT domain to further explain the concept of semi-fragile 
watermarking is also presented. The results of miss detection rates and false alarm 
rates are then compared with two existing transforms based on the DCT and PST 
transforms.
2.1 Literature Review for Fragile and Semi-fragile Watermarking 
Fragile Watermarking
As mentioned in Section 1, fragile watermarking schemes should be able to de­
tect any possible manipulations that affect the watermarked image any pixel val­
ues. Therefore, it is possible to exploit the inherent weakness of the LSB schemes,
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and implement a fragile watermarking scheme in the spatial domain. Fridrich [23] 
proposed a spatial domain based fragile watermarking scheme that could localise 
tampered regions of a watermarked image, by adapting Wongs method [24]. The 
watermark embedding process is shown in Figure 1. The original image is first di­
vided into non-overlapping blocks of equal size 8 by 16. In each block, the seven 
Most Significant Bits (MSB) of each pixel are extracted, and a cryptographic hash 
function is applied as illustrated in Figure 2. The logo is also divided into 816 blocks 
and each block contains information about the original block position, image index, 
original image dimensions (resolution), camera ID and author ID (PIN). The hashed 
seven MSBs of each block and its corresponding logo block are subjected to an 
Exclusive-OR (XOR) operation and then encrypted using a key. Finally, the LSBs of 
the original image are replaced with the result of the XOR operation and encrypted 
watermark bits, and the watermarked image is created. In the authentication process, 
the LSBs of the test image are extracted, and the seven MSBs from each block are 
hashed as shown in Figure 3. For each block, the LSBs are decrypted with a key, 
along with its corresponding hashed seven MSBs using the XOR operation. Finally, 
the authentication process itself is achieved by comparing each block of the image 
with the corresponding block from the logo. If this set of the block is not the same, 
the block of the image is flagged as a tampered block.
Original 
image "
Watermarked
image
Key
Logo Divided into block (8 * 16)
Divided into 
block (8 * 16)
XOR&
Encryption
Replace LSB
Hash 7 MSBs
Fig. 1. Fridrich’s fragile watermark embedding algorithm.
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
7 MSBs LSB
Fig. 2. MSBs and LSB of pixel value 221 in 8 bits binary sequence.
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Test
image
Authenticated
image
Logo
Hash 7 MSBs
Extract LSB
Divided into 
block (8 * 16)
Divided into 
block (8 * 16)
Decryption
&XOR
Authentication
Fig. 3. Fridrich’s fragile watermark detection algorithm.
Zhang and Wang [25] proposed a statistical scheme of fragile watermarking 
scheme that embed a folded version of the authentication data derived from five 
most significant bits (5MSBs) of the original image along with other additional 
data into the image with acceptable watermarked image quality PSNR as 37.9dB. 
Their results showed their algorithm could localized the tampered pixels accurately. 
Then they further improved their method in [25] that could restore the tampered 
image content after localized the tampered area without any errors [26]. He et a l 
[27] proposed a conventional self-embedding fragile watermarking scheme based on 
adjacent-block based statistical detection method (SDM) that could against copy- 
paste attack and collage attack. Their algorithm could identify the tampered blocks 
with a probability more than 98% even the tampered area is up to 70% of the host 
image.
Fragile watermarking scheme can also be applied in transform domain. Li and 
Shi [5] proposed a fragile watermarking algorithm in Discrete Wavelet Transform 
(DWT) to achieve the requirements of high security, low distortion, and high ac­
curacy of tamper localization for authenticating JPEG2000 images. Their algorithm 
could also tolerate vector quantization attack, Holliman-Memon attack, college at­
tack and transplantation attack. Aslantas et.al [28] proposed intelligent optimization 
algorithms (IOA) to improve fragile watermarking schemes in discrete cosine trans­
form (DCT) domain. They used IOA which including four genetic algorithm (GA), 
clonal selection algorithm (CSA), particle swarm optimization (PSO), and Differen­
tial Evolution (De) to correct rounding errors caused by transforming an image from 
the frequency domain to the spatial domain with the objective of improving DCT- 
based fragile watermarking. The experimental results showed that the CSA produces 
better PSNR results whereas DE has lower computational time than other algorithms. 
Yeh and Lee [29] proposed reversible fragile watermarking by utilizing the pyra­
midal structure method. They select appropriate embedding areas by analysing the 
pyramid-structure of the image for embed watermark bits in wavelet domain. The ex­
perimental results showed that their scheme could successfully localized even when 
50% of the watermarked image is tampered as well as detect counterfeiting attack.
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Semi-fragile Watermarking
Many semi-fragile watermarking techniques have been already proposed by re­
searchers. Lin et a l [31] proposed embedding algorithm that first applied Discrete 
Cosine Transform (DCT) to 16 by 16 blocks of the cover image, then embed the 
watermarks in middle to low frequency (except DC coefficient) of each block. Their 
scheme could identify the tampered area with 75% accuracy under moderate com­
pression and with near 90% accuracy under light compression. Ho et al. [7] pro­
posed a semi-fragile watermarking scheme in Pinned Sine Transform (PST) domain. 
In their algorithm, the original image is applied by using PST to get the pinned and 
boundary fields in 8 by 8 blocks. The watermark bits are then inserted into middle 
to high frequency of each block in the pinned field. The scheme also used a self­
restoration method, originally proposed by Fiidrich and Goljan [33] to recover the 
tampered regions. Their scheme could tolerate some common image processing ma­
nipulations such as JPEG and wavelet compression, and the detection rate is higher 
than DCT-based scheme. The algorithm has been further improved by using irregu­
lar Sampling instead of the LSB method [15],which aimed to improve the robustness 
of tampering restoration. Kundur and Hatziankos [18] proposed a DWT based algo­
rithm called telltale tamper-proofing, which made it possible to determine tampered 
regions in multi-resolutions. Unlike other schemes that use DCT, this method does 
not require a block division process to detect the tampered regions due to the local­
isation ability of the wavelet transform. The localization ability of the wavelets in 
both spatial and frequency domains would potentially indicate a good candidate for 
semi-fragile watermarking.
Maeno et a l [34] presented two algorithms that focused on signature generation 
techniques. The first algorithm used random bias to enhance the block based DCT 
watermarking scheme proposed by Lin and Chang [12]. The second algorithm used 
nonuniform quantisation on a non-block based semi-fragile watermarking scheme 
in the wavelet domain. Their experimental results showed their method was frag­
ile to malicious manipulations, but robust to non-malicious manipulations such as 
JPEG and JPEG2000 compression. Ding et a l [35] also proposed a method by using 
DWT. In their algorithm, chaos was used to generate a pseudo-random sequence as 
a watermark, in an effort to improve the overall security. This made an improvement 
to the more traditional methods of generating a pseudo-random sequence. The sub­
bands (H L 2 ,LH 2,H H 2) were used for embedding the watermark after applying a 2- 
level wavelet decomposition of the original image. The normalized cross-correlation 
(NC) was used to evaluate their algorithm by comparing between the original wa­
termark and the extracted watermark after applying JPEG compression and Additive 
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) manipulations. Ni et a l [30] proposed a robust loss­
less data hiding technique that could be employed into semi-fragile watermarking 
scheme. The different bit-embedding strategies for groups of pixels with different 
pixel grayscale value distributions and error correction codes are utilized in their 
scheme. They analyzed their results into two modules, which are lossless and lossy. 
If the watermarked image has experienced losslessly compression, the watermark 
bits can be extracted correctly and the image will be classified as authentic and the
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original image can be recovered exactly. If this losslessly compressed watermarked 
image has been further undergone lossy compression, the original image will not be 
able to be recovered and will be rendered authentic as long as the compression is not 
so severe that the content has been changed.
2.2 Proposed Slant Transform (SIT) Semi-Fragile Watermarking
This section will discuss our proposed method [36] in detail, which consist of the 
embedding, detection and authentication processes associated with watermarking.
Slant Transform (SLT)
The Slant Transform has been applied to image coding in the past [37] and was re­
cently adopted for robust image watermarking [38]. The SLT can be considered as 
a fast computational algorithm provides a significant bandwidth reduction and result 
in a lower mean-square error for moderate size image blocks [37]. In addition, for 
textured images, the quality of the Slant Transformed images is higher than images 
coded by using other transforms such as DCT and Hadamard [39]. Moreover, as a 
similar image processing application to Walsh-Hadamard transform, Slant transform 
can be identified as a sub-optimum for energy compaction, which is essential for 
digital watermarking as the robust information hiding can be ensured by capitalizing 
the spread of middle to higher frequency bands. Furthermore, Slant transform is sim­
pler, faster and especially suitable for highly textured images [38]. Hence, the Slant 
Transform is proposed for semi-fragile watermarking and authentication of images 
in this section. The authentication as the method to corroborate the genuineness of 
an object is mainly focusing on examining whether the image has been tempered 
or not, the location(s) of tampered region(s) and to what extent it has been changed 
can also be identified. Furthermore, the SLT can also be used for compressing the 
original image [39], providing a means to self-recovering the tampered regions by 
embedding the compressed cover image into the LSBs of the watermarked image 
[33]. The forward and inverse of SLT [37-39] can be expressed as follows:
[VI =  [Sn 1[U1[S„]t  [U] =  [Sjv]r [V][Sw] (1)
where [U] represents the original image of size N  x  N , [V] represents the trans­
formed components and [S#] is the AT x TV unitary Slant matrix given by
Sjv/2 I 0 
' 0 ] S N/2[Sjv] =
0
V2
1 0 ,
ûjv J>jy |_____
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00 1 1—bpi aNi 
0 'I (AT/2)-2
01 0 ,
— t t N  6jv'
_ _ _ _ J  JGyZ.2L-2 
0 - 1'
am 
~ ~ 5 ~  ' - I
o
(JV/2)-2.
where I(jv/2 ) - 2  is the identity matrix of dimension {N/2) -  2 and
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are constants.
Watermark Embedding
A novel semi-fragile Slant Transform digital watermarking method is adopted based 
on previous work relating to PST [7] and self-restoration method [33]. The entire 
embedding process using the Slant Transform is illustrated in Figure 4, which con­
sists of two parts. The first 7 bits of the cover image are extracted and divided into 
8 x 8  blocks, SLT method is then applied to each block. The watermark embedding 
algorithm is then utilised, which is illustrated in the pseudo-code below. The wa­
termarks for each block are then random generated by input a key as a seed. The 
obtained watermarks are embedded into the midband of each 8 x 8  block. After wa­
termark embedding, frequency coefficients of each block of the watermarked image 
are converted back by using the inverse Slant Transform. Consequently, the first 7 
bits of final watermark image is obtained. The SLT watermark embedding algorithm 
in pseudo-code form is shown as follows:
I f  w  = =  1 And x  > t ,  Then y — x ,  E ls e  y = a .
I f  w  = =  0 And x  <  —r .  Then y — x ,  E ls e  y  =  —a .
where w  is the watermark bit, x  is the SLT coefficient of the host, y  is the mod­
ified SLT coefficient, r  is the threshold which controls the perceptual quality of the 
watermarked image and a  is a constant. Similar to part 1, the original image is di­
vided into 8 x 8  sub-blocks and also undergoes the same Slant Transform; compres­
sion for each sub-block is then achieved by discarding the high frequency coeffi­
cients. Accordingly, 64 bits information for each block is acquired after compression 
and then encrypted by utilizing a key as a seed. Obtained blocks are then shuffled, 
e.g. the value of block 1 moves to block 50, the value of block 35 moves to block 
10. Therefore, LSBs of the final watermark image are then gained. Finally, the com­
bination of parti and part 2 forms the final watermarked image and the key file is 
generated, which contains information that mentioned previously.
Watermark Detection, Authentication and Restoration
The proposed semi-fragile Slant Transform for image authentication and restoration 
method is shown in Figure 5. Similar to embedding process, the first 7 bits of the 
test image are extracted and divided into 8 x 8  blocks by applying SLT and then 
apply the detection algorithm to the first 7 bits, which is explained in the paragraph 
below. Meanwhile, the LSBs are extracted from the test image and only the LSBs of 
the detected regions are quantized back for recovery by according to authentication 
result. Consequently, authenticated and recovered images can be output.
The watermark bits can be detected by extracting the watermarked coefficients 
y. If y  larger than 0, the watermark bit value is 1; if y  smaller than 0, the watermark
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Original Divided into SLT Compressedimage 8 by 8 blocks &Encrypted
Extract 
1st 7 bits
SLT
Inverse SLT -> LSBs replace & blocks shuffle
y
>t
Watermark
embedding
Merge blocks 
back to image
Key— ^
Watermark
Watermarked
image
Fig. 4. Our proposed SLT watermark embedding process.
bit value is 0. The retrieved watermark needs to be compared with the watermark 
that exists in the key file. After the watermark bits from the entire block have been 
retrieved, the comparison between the watermark bits can be accomplished by using 
the correlation coefficient p, computed as follows:
E E ( w ' - w ' )  ( w - w )  
p  — . - \A)
v E E ( w/- wz) E E ( w -w)
where w  is the original and w ' is the retrieved watermarks corresponding to the 
block. For error correction, the correlation coefficient p can be compared with a pre­
determined threshold value A. If p <  A, which indicates that the block has been 
tampered as authentication, and which is followed by restoration of the tampered 
regions based on the decompression and extraction of the LSBs for the watermarked 
image.
2.3 Results & Evaluation
A number of experiments have been carried out to evaluate the performance of the 
proposed SLT watermarking scheme. The proposed watermarking scheme is com­
pared with two other watermarking schemes: the PST-based [7] and the DCT-based 
[31]. For a fair comparison, the embedding strength of the watermark in each scheme 
is adjusted such that the peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) of the watermarked im­
ages is around 33 dB, which is subjectively considered as acceptable. The perfor­
mance of the watermarking schemes is measured in terms of the false positive detec­
tion rate ( P f p ),  false negative detection rate ( P f n ) and the average detection rate 
(Pavg) ,  defined as:
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Test
image
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image
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Fig. 5. Our proposed SLT watermark detection, authentication and restoration process.
p  _  Number of pixels in the untampared region as detected as tampered 
Total number of pixels in the untampered region 
p  _  Number of pixels in the tampared region as detected as untampered 
Total number of pixels in the tampered region
and
=  0  x 10a (3)
where N  is the number of area(s) have been tampered with. A number of standard 
test images are used in the experiments and the results for 6 images, each of size 
512 x 512 are reported.
JPEG  Compression Attack
Table 1 shows that SLT, DCT and PST are compared by applying JPEG compres­
sion attack to 6 different grayscale images (512 x 512) in order to determine the 
false positive rate, i.e. over detected rate. As can be seen from the table below, SLT, 
DCT and PST have similar error detection rates when Q F  =  85. After experiencing 
75% JPEG compression attack, the over detection rate of SLT is still considerably 
low with average rate of 1.2, whereas PST and DCT have the higher average over 
detection rates of 86 and 31.4, respectively. Although the over detection rates of all 
three methods have increased when Q F  =  65, SLT still has the lowest increased rate 
of 30.8 comparing with the average value of over detection rates of PST and DCT, 
of 92.2 and 88.2 respectively. The reason for the relatively better results using the 
Slant Transform was that the embedding locations concentrated mainly in the mid­
dle frequency band, which is considered to be more robust, whereas DCT and PST 
mainly concentrated more on high frequencies. Overall, the results indicate that the 
SLT watermarking method achieves lower errors than PST and DCT based on the 
JPEG compression attack.
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Table 1. Comparative performance of the watermarking schemes against JPEG compression 
with varying quality factor.
Test Image Q F =  85 Q F =  75 Q F =  65
SLT PST DCT SLT PST DCT SLT PST DCT
Lena 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.7 91.2 31.5 37.2 93.5 81.4
Baboon 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.9 91.2 31.6 24.1 91.2 91.0
Bridge 0.4 1.2 0.5 1.6 83.7 32.9 28.4 91.8 91.5
Trucks 0.2 0.8 0.4 1.4 87.4 31.2 33.3 92.8 90.1
Ship 0.2 0.8 0.4 2.0 89.0 31.3 37.5 92.3 85.0
San Diego 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.6 83.4 30.0 24.2 91.3 90.2
Average 0.2 0.7 0.2 1.2 86.0 31.4 30.8 92.2 88.2
Copy and Paste Attack
The copy and paste attack is utilized to compare the performance of detection rates 
SLT, DCT and PST for six grayscale test images (512 x 512) as given in Table
2. Three different tampering rates of 10%,20% and 30% will be applied to each 
test image to analyse the overall detection rate of the three transform methods. The 
tamper tests are performed with 100 random locations on each image. Consequently, 
5400 test images are obtained based on this experimental setup. Table 2 shows the 
comparative performance of the three watermarking schemes against copy and paste 
attack with different amount of tampering. However, the results show that PST is the 
most sensitive method as it has the highest overall detection rate after experiencing 
all three tamper tests (10%, 20% and 30%) of all images. Figure 6(a-e), shows the 
original, watermarked, tampered, authenticated and restored images for the image 
Trucks, respectively.
Table 2. Comparative performance of the watermarking schemes against copy-paste attack.
Test Image 10% tamper 20% tamper 30% tamper 
SLT PST DCT SLT PST DCT SLT PST DCT
Lena 96.0 97.6 95.5 97.9 98.7 97.1 98.3 99.0 97.3
Baboon 96.7 97.3 96.3 98.1 98.8 96.5 98.5 99.0 97.0
Bridge 96.3 97.5 95.4 97.9 98.6 97.0 98.2 98.8 96.9
Trucks 95.7 97.6 95.1 97.6 98.7 96.7 98.3 98.8 96.9
Ship 96.1 97.6 95.2 97.7 98.8 96.2 98.3 98.8 96.7
San Diego 96.6 97.6 95.4 98.1 98.8 96.6 98.6 99.0 97.5
Average 96.2 97.5 95.5 97.9 98.7 96.7 98.4 98.9 97.0
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(a) Original (b) Watermarked (c) Tampered
(d) Authenticated (e) Restored
Fig. 6. Demonstration of the image Trucks in SLT semi-fragile watermarking scheme 
JPEG Compression + Copy and Paste Attack
In Table 3, the six watermarked images (512 x 512) are compressed with three dif­
ferent JPEG compression rates QF of 85, 75 and 65. Th experimental setup is similar 
to the previous copy and paste attack with 100 random locations for tampered areas. 
Overall, the PST achieves a relatively higher detection rate than DCT and SLT after 
experiencing QF of 85. However, for detection, it is worse at 54.1% with Q F  =  75. 
In comparison, SLT has the highest overall detection rate as 91.9% at Q F  =  75 and 
65. From the analysis, SLT is showed to achieve a more accurate detection result 
than PST and DCT. On the whole, the result indicates that the best overall detection 
rate among the three methods is SLT, which has 91.9% detection rate with Q F  =  75. 
However, all the attacked images could not be recovered by any of the three trans­
form schemes after applying JPEG compression attack. This is duo to the fact that 
the restoration technique is based on LSB embedding in the spatial domain of the 
watermarked image which is fragile. As such, it can be easily removed by JPEG 
compression.
2.4 Summary
In this section, we reviewed a number of different fragile and semi-fragile water­
marking schemes. Our proposed SLT semi-fragile watermarking scheme was dis­
cussed in detail. The performance of the SLT based semi-fragile scheme was com-
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Table 3. Comparative performance of the watermarking schemes against copy-paste attack 
(20% tampering) followed by JPEG compression with varying quality factor.
Test Image QF = 85 Q F = 75 Q F = 65
SLT PST DCT SLT PST DCT SLT PST DCT
Lena 92.1 94.9 91.6 91.6 51.4 77.0 75.3 50.7 54.0
Baboon 92.1 94.7 92.1 92.3 56.1 77.0 81.8 51.8 49.9
Bridge 91.9 94.0 91.6 92.3 55.3 76.6 79.5 51.6 49.5
Trucks 92.0 94.5 91.2 91.4 53.5 76.9 76.7 51.0 50.4
Ship 91.5 93.7 91.9 91.4 52.7 76.9 75.7 50.8 52.7
San Diego 93.1 94.5 92.2 92.4 55.4 77.6 81.6 51.5 49.7
Average 92.1 94.4 91.8 91.9 54.1 77.0 78.4 51.2 51.0
pared with the PST and DCT based schemes by using average detection rate calcu­
lated from false positive and false negative detection rates. The comparative studies 
showed that the SLT-domain watermarking scheme performed better against JPEG 
compression, copy-paste attack, as well as combined JPEG compression and copy- 
paste attacks than the PST and DCT-domain watermarking schemes.
3 Image Forensics Technique - Benford’s Law for Semi-fragile 
Watermarking
As mentioned in Section 1, semi-fragile watermarking scheme has been used to 
authenticate and localise malicious tampering of image content, while permitting 
some non-malicious or unintentional manipulations. These manipulations can in­
clude some mild signal processing operations such as those caused by transmission 
and storage of JPEG images. However, watermarked images could be compressed 
by unknown JPEG QFs. As a result, in order to authenticate the images, these al­
gorithms have to set a pre-determined threshold that could allow them to tolerate 
different QF values when extracting the watermarks.
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the overall relationship between the threshold, false 
positive and false negative detection rates. The watermarked image Lena has been 
tampered with a rectangular block and JPEG compressed at Q F  =  75. Figure 7(a) 
shows the pre-determined threshold T  =  0.5 used for authentication. The authenti­
cated image shows that the proposed semi-fragile watermarking scheme can localise 
the tampered region with reasonable accuracy, but with some false positive detection 
errors. In Figures 7(b) and 7(c), the lower and upper thresholds T  =  0.3 and T  =  0.7 
were used for comparison, respectively. Figure 7(b) shows that the false positive rate 
has decreased whilst the false negative rate has increased in the authenticated image. 
Figure 7(c) shows the image has a lower false negative rate but with a higher false 
positive rate. From this comparison, T  =  0.5 was chosen for JPEG compression at 
Q F  =  75. However, if Q F  =  95, then T  =  0.5 may not be adequate as shown in 
Figure 8(a). The false negative rate is higher than Figure 8(b) with T  = 0.9. There­
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fore, it would be advantageous to be able to estimate the QF of JPEG compression, 
so that an adaptive threshold can be applied for increasing the authentication accu­
racy. In this section, we discuss our proposed method [40] to utilise the generalised 
Benford’s Law,as an image forensics technique to estimate the QF for semi-fragile 
watermarked images. The background of Benford’s Law, generalised Benford’s Law 
and their relationship with the watermarked image, JPEG compressed watermarked 
image are also described.
(a) T  =  0.5 (b) T  =  0.3 (c) T  = 0.7
Fig. 7. Different thresholds for Q F  — 75
(a) T  =  0.5 (b) T  =  0.9
Fig. 8. Different thresholds for Q F  = 95
3.1 Benford’s Law and Generalised Benford’s Law
Benford’s Law was introduced by Frank Benford in 1938 [41] and was developed 
by Hill [42] for analysis of the probability distribution of the first digit (1 -  9) of 
the number from natural data in statistics. Benford’s Law has also been applied to 
accounting forensics [43, 44]. The DCT coefficients of a digital image was forward 
to obey Benford’s Law, it has recently attracted a significant amount of research
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interests in image processing and image forensics [19, 45, 46]. The basic principle 
of Benford’s Law is given as follows:
where x  is the first digit of the number and p{x) is the probability distribution of 
x. In contrast to digital image watermarking which is an active approach by embed­
ding bits into an image for authentication, image forensics is essentially a passive 
approach of analysing the image statistically to determine whether it has been tam­
pered with. Fu et al. [19] proposed a generalised Benford’s Law, used for estimating 
the QF of the JPEG compressed image, as shown in equation 5.
where AT is a normalisation, and s and q are model parameters [19]. Their research 
indicated that the probability distribution of the 1st digit of the JPEG coefficients 
obey generalised Benford’s Law after the quantisation. Moreover, the probability 
distributions were not following the generahzed Benford’s Law if the image had been 
compressed twice with different quality factors. Thus, by utilizing this property, the 
QF of the image can be estimated.
Figures 9 to 11 illustrate the comparisons between the probability distribution of 
Benford’s Law, generalized Benford’s Law and the mean distributions of the 1st dig­
its of block JPEG coefficients of the watermarked images compressed at Q F  =  100, 
75, 50, respectively. Throughout this section we adhere to the same terminology as 
used in [19], where JPEG coefficients refers to the 8 x 8 block-DCT coefficients after 
the quantisation. These results based on 1338 images from [47] indicate a good fitting 
between generalized Benford’s Law and watermarked images compressed with dif­
ferent QFs. The results indicate that the probability distributions of the 1st digits of 
JPEG coefficients of the watermarked images, as shown in Figures 9 to 11, obey the 
generalised Benford’s Law model proposed by Fu et al. [19], in equation 5. Hence, 
we could employ their model to estimate the unknown QF of test images to adjust 
the threshold for authentication. The improved authentication process is described in 
the next section.
3.2 The Improved Authentication Method
In order to improve the detection rate in semi-fragile authentication process, the test 
image is first used for detecting the QF by the quality factor estimation process. This 
process works by firstly classifying the test image as compressed or uncompressed 
by adapting from [19]. If the test image has been compressed, the test image is then 
recompressed with the largest QF, from Q F = 100 to Q F  =  50, in decreasing steps 
of 5. We decrease in steps of 5 as this gives us the most frequently used quality factors 
for JPEG compressed images (i.e. 95, 90, 85 etc.). For each compressed test image, 
the probability distribution of the 1st digits of JPEG coefficients is obtained. Each set
(4)
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of values are then analysed by employing the generalized Benford’s Law equation 
and using the best curve-fitting to plot the data. In order to obtain the goodness of 
fit, we calculate the sum of squares due to error (SSE) of the recompressed images. 
We can detect the QF of the test image by iteratively calculating the SSE for all 
QFs (starting at Q F  =  100, and decreasing in steps of 5), and as soon as S S E  < 
10-6 , we have reached the estimated QF for the test image. The threshold 10-6 , was 
reported in [19], has been set to allow us to detect the QF of the test image, and has 
also been verified by the results in our experiment.
Figure 12 illustrates the results of estimating the QF for a test image that has 
previously been compressed with Q F  =  70. Three curves have been drawn in or­
der to fit the three probability distribution data sets: generalized Benford’s Law for 
Q F  =  70, the test image recompressed with Q F  =  70, and separately recompressed 
at Q F  =  90. The distribution of Q F  =  90 shows the worst fit and is considerably 
fluctuated, while the distribution of Q F  =  70 is a generally decreasing curve, which 
also follows the trend of generalized Benford’s Law. These results indicate that if the 
test image has been double compressed without the same quality factor, the proba­
bility distribution would not obey the generalised Benford’s Law.
Once the QF is estimated, the threshold T  can be adapted according to different 
estimated QFs, based on the following conditions in Equation 6. Finally, the cor­
relation coefficient between original watermarks and extracted watermarks for each 
block is compared using the attuned threshold T  to authenticate, in order to deter­
mine whether any blocks have been tampered with.
Benford's Law 
I I Generalised Benford's Law 
m i  Mean distribution of 1338 watermarked images
I In  Ini lL  IlflM I n -  I r
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
First digit
Fig. 11.1st digit of JPEG coefficients (QF =  50)
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Fig. 12. Estimating the QF of a watermarked image
f 0.9 Q F > 90 
T  =  < 0.7 90 <  Q F < 75 (6)
|'0.5 Q F < 75
3.3 Results & Evaluation
The watermarked images are generated based on a simple DCT domain based semi- 
fragile watermark embedding scheme by using the 1338 test images from [47]. In 
order to achieve a fair comparison, different embedding parameters are randomised 
for each image such as the watermarks location, watermark string and watermark 
bits. For our analysis, four types of test images with and without attacks are consid­
ered as shown in Figure ??.
Table 4 summaries the results obtained for test images that have been JPEG com­
pressed only. To evaluate the accuracy of the quality factor estimation process, each 
test image has been blind compressed from QF  =  100 to Q F =  50 in decreasing 
steps of 5. For each JPEG compression, the quality factor estimation process was 
used to determine the QF. The mean estimated QFs for all 1338 test images and each 
correctly identified detection accuracy rate Pde for each JPEG compression quality 
factor are shown in Table 4, based on equation 7.
Pde =  |  x 100% (7)
where d  is the number of correctly detected QF and /? is the number of images 
tested. The mean estimated QF results indicate the QFs can be estimated with high 
accuracy. The only exceptions for lower correct detection rates, Pde, were obtained
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Fig. 13. Four types of test images with and without attacks
for Q F  =  50, Q F  =  60, and Q F  =  100. In the case of Q F  =  50, Pde was very 
low at approximately 18.2%, meaning that the process was probably detecting QFs 
close to Q F  =  55. For Q F  =  60, and Q F  = 100, the detection rates were slightly 
better at 38.6% and 65.7%, respectively. For comparison, both the mean estimated 
QF value and correct detection rate were used for each result to estimate the actual 
QF for the images. The QFs were then grouped into three different ranges: Q F  > 90, 
90 <  Q F  < 75 and Q F  < 75. The grouping into three QF ranges did not have an 
overall effect on the authentication process. Results obtained for Pde2 also showed 
the correct detection accuracy rates in these QF ranges were on average at 99%.
Table 4. QF estimation for watermarked images (JPEG compression only)
Actual QF Estimated QF Pde T  Pde2
100 98.16 65.7%
95 94.87 97.3% 0.9 98.8%
90 90.06 98.2%
85 84.20 91'4^ 1 0.7 99.1%80 79.77 97.5%
75 75.35 97.0%
70 69.77 98.8%
65 64.42 93‘7?  0.5 99.4%60 62.42 38.6%
55 55.15 94.1%
50 54.25 18.2%
Table 5 summaries the results obtained for test images that have been attacked 
via copy-paste and then JPEG compressed. Each watermarked image has been tam­
pered randomly in different regions by applying a copy-paste attack to 5% of the 
watermarked image (9830 pixels in 384512 pixels image), and also compressed with 
different QF values. The results showed that the quality factor estimation process was 
highly accurate even under these attacks. From Table 5, the lowest correct detection
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rates were obtained for Q F  =  50, Q F  =  60, and Q F  =  100. Two other experiments 
were performed with the test image subjected to only the copy and paste attack and 
with the test image without any modification. The detected QFs achieved for both 
experiments were approximately 99, and fit well in the upper range of Q F > 90. 
Similarly, the results of Pde2 also showed the correct detection rates in the three 
ranges were highly accurate with an overall average of 99%. As such, the threshold 
can be adapted into the three QF ranges according to the estimated QF of each test 
image as described in Section 3.2.
Table 5. QF estimation for watermarked images (Copy and paste attack + JPEG compression)
Actual QF Estimated QF Pde T  Pde2
100 98.60 72%
95 95.00 100% 0.9 99.1%
90 90.14 98.6%
85 84.83
80 79.95 99.6% %
75 75.22 99.1%
70 69.87 99.5%
65 64.46
60 61.54 63.9% "  %
55 54.93 96.6%
50 53.32 20.4%
3.4 Summary
In this section, we presented the relationship between QF and threshold, and pro­
posed a framework incorporating the generalised Benford’s Law as an image foren­
sics technique to accurately detect unknown JPEG compression levels in semi-fragile 
watermarked images. We discussed the limitations of using predetermined thresholds 
in semi-fragile watermarking algorithm. In our improved semi-fragile watermarking 
method, the test image was first analysed to detect its previously unknown qual­
ity factor for JPEG compression by using generalised Benford’s Law model, before 
proceeding with the semi-fragile authentication process. The results showed that QFs 
can be accurately detected for most unknown JPEG compressions. In particular, the 
average QF detection rate was as high as 96% for watermarked images compressed 
with QFs between 95 — 65, and 99% when the image was subjected to tampering of 
5% pixels of the image and compressed with QFs between 95 — 65. The threshold 
was adapted into three specific ranges according to the estimated QF of each test 
image.
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4 Image Forensics
Recently, an interest has developed in identifying reliable techniques that are ca­
pable of accurately proving the authenticity of an image, without the requirement 
of actively inserting a digital watermark or signature into the data. Whilst the wa­
termarking schemes discussed in section 2 have been shown to be useful for pro­
tecting the integrity of the image, there always exists the underlying risk that the 
watermark data might be forcibly or accidentally removed. When this happens, the 
image is effectively stripped of its identity, and its integrity is extremely difficult to 
prove. Forensic techniques aspire to achieve similar objectives but do not rely on the 
strength of embedded data. Instead, the ambition is to prove the authenticity of an 
image based solely on the data provided.
The two main areas of focus within the field of image forensics are camera iden­
tification and forgery detection. Camera identification is the task of successfully link­
ing suspect images to the source camera that captured the image, in order to provide 
evidence that the origin of the image is as claimed. For example, a claim might be 
made by Person A that they captured an image of a compelling real-life event in or­
der to gain acclamation. However, it is possible that Person B makes the same claim, 
and suggests that it was taken from their camera which happens to be a different 
make or model. A scrutinised forensic evaluation would attempt to review the prop­
erties of both cameras’ image acquisition process, and determine the correct source 
for the image. This exercise might be relatively trivial if both camera’s are vastly 
different, but what happens if Person A and Person B both own the same make and 
model camera? The forensic expert must then locate features in the image acquisi­
tion process of both cameras that differ. It should be possible to locate this feature 
within the data of the image in question, and therefore conclude which device cap­
tured the image. Forgeiy detection, on the other hand, is the practise of ensuring that 
the content of the image has not been manipulated. One of the most typical forms of 
content manipulation is splicing, which involves removing content from one image 
and overwriting it with something similar from another image to form a composite. 
This type of modification dates back over 150 years; a famous example of which 
is the Abraham Lincoln portrait [48]. In this example, a portrait of John Calhoun 
was manipulated such that it appeared as if the portrait was of Abraham Lincoln. In 
fact, Lincoln never posed for the portrait, and the image was actually constructed by 
flipping and resizing Lincoln’s head from a head-shot photograph taken by Mathew 
Brady such that it resembled the same proportions as the Calhoun portrait. Calhoun’s 
face was then replaced by Lincoln’s face to produce a composite image.
Part of the challenge for image forensics lies in the fact that it is rarely immedi­
ately obvious whether or not an image has been manipulated. If a good job has been 
made of doctoring the image, it will look completely legitimate in plain sight. There­
fore a distinction must be made between clean images that have not been altered in 
any way, and dirty images that are no longer true to their original form. Clean images 
are typically those that have come directly from the source that created them, without 
having been subjected to any external post-processing. However, it is often extremely 
rare to locate an image as clean as this, as most photographers (even at an amateur
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(a) John Calhoun portrait. (b) Lincoln head-shot. (c) Composite image.
Fig. 14. The Lincoln composite.
level) are likely to enhance their images through image editing software to provide 
better visual clarity, even though the content itself will remain true. To what extent 
such enhancements constitute a manipulation remains uncertain at this point. For 
this chapter we define clean images as those extracted straight from the camera that 
captured them, and dirty images as any image that has been manipulated in any way, 
including enhancements. By classifying the images according to these terms, we are 
effectively suggesting that a clean image accurately represents the exact scene from 
which the image was captured, and also inherits only the characteristic properties 
marked into the image data by camera processing.
Figure 15 presents a diagram of the two main areas of research in image foren­
sics. The diagram shows that a given image can either be captured by a digital camera 
(in which case, the task is to identify anomalies in the camera processes that are also 
found in the image data), or the image will have been edited by software (in which 
case, anomalies are found in the image data that reflect manipulations). A suspect 
image is usually intercepted after either or both of these processes have been instan­
tiated, and it is the job of the forensic specialist to establish the origin of the image.
In this section, we begin by explaining the most significant techniques that have 
been developed for the camera identification and forgery detection areas. In Section 
4.2 we focus purely on camera identification, and present a novel approach to iden­
tifying anomalies within image data, before discussing the results of this work in 
Section 4.3. We then provide a concluding summary in Section 4.4.
4.1 Literature Survey 
Camera Identification
One of the earliest reported approaches for digital camera identification characterised 
the imaging sensor from the device [49]. The imaging sensor is arguably the most im­
portant component of the image acquisition process, as it captures the light intensity
Image Authentication - Active Watermarking & Passive Forensics 23
r -  -
— i Optical Prectum
(. W u 'JC  »horr.LM, Cl A dcreuieing
! , ! 1 ■
........................ - 1  -
C-.-tutntM
t . . - - < „ _______ . . . . . . ---------- • S^DigSM IProcnwi
Digital Camera
Format Content
CompressionConversion Manipulation
.... —  g "
# 3
Anomaly
Investigation
Software Editing
Fig. 15. Examples of camera-based and software-based image manipulations.
of the scene on a pixel-by-pixel basis, and converts it into an electrical signal. From 
here, the signal will pass through a Colour Filter Array (CFA), which interpolates the 
colours for each pixel and the image is effectively bom. However, it is possible that 
the imaging sensor operates with an element of noise, caused by hot or dead pixels. 
Errors such as this can often be seen in the final image, even if the image has been 
lossy compressed. As the error is likely to be slightly different for several devices, 
the technique is useful for reliably linking images to the source sensor - and therefore 
the source camera - that captured the image. However, most modem cameras are able 
to detect deficiencies in the processing such as this, and often remove the hot or dead 
pixels altogether. As the scheme relies on the existence of such pixels, it can only be 
targeted towards cameras that do not correct errors such as these.
In 2006, research by K. S. Choi et al. led to the discovery that the camera lens 
produces aberrations in images, due to the design and manufacturing process [50]. 
Lens radial distortion was found to be quite a common property for inexpensive 
wide-angle lenses, and it causes straight lines to render as curved lines on the camera 
sensor. A camera lens has various focal lengths and magnifications in different areas, 
and when the transverse magnification M t  increases with the off-axis image distance 
r, a barrel distortion presents itself, as shown in Fig 16.
By calculating the precise radial distortion for a given device, as well as the rela­
tive radial distortion witnessed from a suspect image, it is possible to infer whether or 
not the image originated from that device. The technique acts as an excellent feature 
for providing a successful classification, but is likely to be insufficient in isolation. 
Instead, this feature will need to be used in conjunction with several other similar 
techniques in order to make a more informed and justified classification.
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(a) An undistorted rectan­
gular grid.
Z|
_
(b) Grid with barrel distor­
tion.
Fig. 16. Barrel distortion of a rectangular grid [50].
Arguably the most prominent research in the camera identification area, is that 
proposed by J. Lukâs et al. [20,51], and verified by N. Khanna et al. in 2009 [22]. The 
technique relies on pattern noise, which is a deterministic component that remains 
consistent for all images that the sensor captures. Pattern noise can be sub-divided 
into two categories: fixed pattern noise (FPN) and photo-response non-uniformity 
noise (PRNU). The FPN is an additive noise that is supressed to vaiying standards 
by many camera manufacturers, and is relative to exposure and temperature [20]. For 
these reasons, it is not reliable for camera identification purposes as it is inconsistent. 
PRNU, on the other hand, is a multiplicative noise and contains a property refered to 
as pixel non-uniformity (PNU), which is defined as the sensitivity differences to light 
at each pixel. The PNU is a direct result of the manufacturing process and is therefore 
not influenced by exposure and light. Indeed, the PNU noise remains the same for 
each image that is taken, meaning this component is extremely useful for determining 
the source camera that captured an image. To complete the classification, a reference 
pattern for the camera must first be identified. This is achieved by using a denoising 
filter F  and averaging the noise residuals n (fc) from multiple images pM .
= pW -  F(pW). (g)
Selected regions from image p  are then checked for the existence of the pattern 
noise from camera C  by calculating the correlation Pc  between the noise residual 
n = p -  F(p) with the camera reference pattern Pc , as shown in Equation (9).
Po(p) =  corrin .P c)  =  (9)
where the bar above a symbol denotes the mean value [52].
The pattern noise obtained from a suspect image can now be compared with the 
pattern noise obtained from the device itself. If the correlation is identical, then there 
can be little doubt that the image originated from the device, as the chances of two 
camera’s producing the same pattern noise are extremely remote.
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Forgery Detection
Significant progress has also been made in the forgery detection research area for 
authenticating image content, such as the splicing example discussed at the beginning 
of this section. In fact, the sensor pattern noise technique introduced by J. LukâS et 
al. can easily be adapted to authenticate images. As the complete pattern noise exists 
for every pixel in an image, a manipulated image can be derived when the pattern 
noise is not present at a particular region of interest. It is important to note, however, 
that the PRNU noise will not be present in highly saturated areas of clean images, 
and is also highly supressed in dark areas, as the noise is multiplicative. Therefore, a 
region that does not contain the pattern noise should be checked to ensure that neither 
of these two properties hold true before classifying the image as tampered. Further 
details of how this can be achieved statistically are discussed in [52].
Whilst much research is concentrated on calculating anomalies in the image ac­
quisition process of digital cameras, and then locating marks of those anomalies in 
the image data, some researchers have taken a different approach and are considering 
how ’’fingerprints” of software manipulation also exist in the image data. The most 
prolifent work from this angle is lead by H. Farid’s research group at Dartmouth 
college. Specifically, they have reviewed how certain image manipulation operations 
such as resizing, alter the underlying pattern of pixels in a distinct way [53]. When 
creating a composite from two or more images, parts of an image are often enlarged 
(up-sampled), and when this happens, extra pixels are formed. Figure 17 shows what 
happens when a small 4x4 pixel patch is stretched to produce a 4x7 pixel patch. The 
numbers contained within the original 4x4 block shown in 17(a), correspond to the 
brightness at each location. The highlighted rows in 17(b) indicate added informa­
tion, which is calculated by averaging the values of the immediate neighbours.
3 5 4 2
5 3 6 4
3 5 8 6
1 3 6 2
(a) A 4x4 pixel patch.
3 5 4 2
4 4 5 3
5 3 6 4
4 4 7 5
3 5 8 6
2 4 7 4
1 3 6 2
(b) Extra pixels added 
when enlarging.
Fig. 17. Enlarging a 4x4 pixel patch [53].
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When images are enlarged in this manner, there exists a perfect correlation be­
tween neighbouring pixels, which is a rare property to find in natural images. There­
fore, whenever this property is detected by a forensics specialist, they can derive a 
probability that the image has been manipulated.
In other work, H. Farid’s research group also found that composite images can 
also be identified by studying the light reflected into the subjects eyes. The position­
ing of white dots (caused by flash photography) indicate the direction of the light 
when the image was captured [53]. When images are spliced together, these issues 
are often overlooked. For a clean image, when several people all appear in the scene 
the correlation of the light direction will match almost exactly. However, when a per­
son has been spliced into the image from another image, the direction of light on the 
subjects eyes will not match. By studying the light pattern, it is often a fairly trivial 
process to determine whether the image is genuine or not. Similarly, the author dis­
cusses how lighting observations can be applied more generally to images in [21]. 
In this work, the author explains how the light striking a surface is dependant on the 
position of the light source. An estimate of the direction of the light source can be 
derived from an image by reviewing a given object’s 2-D surface contour, such as 
a human jawline and chin. The lighting of this object can ultimately be compared 
against that of other objects in the photo, and if there exists a mismatch in lighting 
direction, then the image is likely faked.
As described in this section, there have been significant advances made in the 
fields of camera identification and forgery detection in recent years. For the re­
mainder of this chapter, we concentrate solely on the camera identification area, and 
present a novel technique for locating anomalies in image data.
4.2 Statistical Process Control
At present, much research for camera identification has been based around identi­
fying anomalies in a camera’s image acquisition process, and then hoping to find a 
’’fingerprint” of these properties in the image data. Whilst this research has produced 
some promising results, it is never easy to generalise the image acquisition process 
for a wide range of digital cameras, as each process can be quite vastly different from 
manufacturer to manufacturer. Instead, it is desirable to create a model such that the 
anomalies for any type of digital camera can be quickly and easily identified. In this 
section, we discuss how Statistical Process Control (SPC) can be used for such a 
purpose, and how it fits into the camera identification model as shown in Figure 18.
Introducing Statistical Process Control
The theory of SPC was developed in the late 1920’s by Dr. Walter Shewhart, a physi­
cist and statistician at the AT&T Bell Laboratories, USA, and was designed in an 
effort to acknowledge quality control and improvement for the manufacture of goods
[54]. Shewhart recognised that products built to a high standard with good quality 
components, often produced better results in the field. In 1931, Shewhart released a
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Fig. 18. SPC alternative to the camera identification process.
study of his work that outlined a statistical approach for detecting the degree of con­
trol within processes over time [55]. The aim of Shewhart’s work was to eliminate 
unexpected sources of variation that cause the process to operate with less accuracy. 
These variations were refered to as special-cause, and are caused by irregular events 
or circumstances that have an obvious impact on the process. Any variation that 
could be explained, was refered to as common-cause variation. In a perfect world, 
each measurement taken over time would produce the exact same result. However, 
in the real world, there are often external influences that affect the performance of 
processes.
SPC has been successfully applied to many areas of manufacture to maximise 
the efficiency of production processes to deliver high quality products. It was first 
applied to automobile manufacture by several Japanese manufacturers, and such was 
the success of its use on the end product, the Ford Motor Company soon followed
[56]. It has since also been applied to industrial applications such as the pulp and 
paper industry [57-59], and has even been considered for improving healthcare pro­
cesses [60].
The use of SPC can easily be adapted for use in image processing by substituting 
the measurements with image data taken from a digital camera. The quality of the 
complete image acquisition process for the camera can be infered, and a study of any 
widely varying images can lead to the discovery of a unique feature of the device 
that can act as a ’’fingerprint” for camera identification.
Control Charts
A key tool of SPC for reviewing process variation, are control charts, which are 
used to graphically display the variation shifts from each measurement. Typically, 
two control charts are required to expose the data obtained from the process in its 
entirety: one to display the shifts in the process mean, and one to display the shifts or 
changes in the amount of process availability [55]. There are several types of control 
chart, each calculated in different ways, and chosen according to the best fit for the 
application. Our initial work is focused on individuals charts (commonly referred to 
as X  charts) to display the process mean, and moving range charts (referred to as R m 
charts) to display an estimate of the common-cause variability of the process. X  and
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R m charts are suited to instances where individual measurements are obtained, and 
will therefore be useful for representing data collected from multiple images taken 
by several digital cameras.
Both control charts are comprised of a centreline C L  (which is the mean value 
obtained from all measurements), an upper control limit UCL, and a lower con­
trol limit LC L, as well as the physical data obtained from each measurement X .  
The U CL  and L C L  are calculated at around ±3 standard deviations above and be­
low CL, respectively, to obtain results with a false-positive margin of approximately 
0.27% [55]. If any measurement falls outside of these control limits, then the mea­
surement is considered out-of-control.
Constructing the Control Charts
The construction of the control charts is based completely on the data measurements 
obtained for X .  Traditionally, the jRm chart is plotted first, as these charts provide 
information on the overall process variability. The first step is to calculate the differ­
ences between neighbouring values in X  to produce R m. The C L  is simply the mean 
of all measurements of Rm, denoted as R m, and is therefore calculated according to 
Equation (10).
k
Rm  =  -----• ( 10)
where k  refers to the total number of elements in R m. A table of constants (Table 6) 
is then used to calculate the UCL and LCL control limits.
Table 6. Constants for Calculating Control Limits [54].
Observations in Sample da A2 £>3 £>4
2 1.128 1.880 0 3.267
3 1.693 1.023 0 2.575
4 2.059 0.729 0 2.282
5 2.326 0.577 0 2.115
6 2.534 0.483 0 2.004
7 2.704 0.419 0.076 1.924
8 2.847 0.373 0.136 1.864
9 2.970 0.337 0.184 1.816
10 3.078 0.308 0.223 1.777
15 3.472 0.223 0.348 1.652
20 3.735 0.180 0.414 1.586
The UCL and LCL values are calculated by using Equation (11), where D 3 and 
£>4 are obtained when observations in sample n  =  2.
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U C Lnm =  D^Rm
LCLRm =  D zRm. (11)
When constructing X  charts, the C L  refers to the mean value of all measure­
ments in X ,  and is denoted as X .  The U CL  and L C L  values are calculated by 
adding or subtracting 3 standard deviations from this value, where an estimate of the 
standard deviation is obtained from Equation (12).
O x  — ~ T ~ ' ( 12)
“ 2
where dg is taken from the table of constants, again when observations in sample 
n  =  2. The U CL  and L C L  control limits can then be calculated from Equation
(13).
U C L x  = X  + 3<tx
L C L x  = X  — 3&x- (13)
Using Statistical Process Control for Image Forensics
SPC can be used to identify anomalies in the image acquisition process of a digi­
tal camera by collecting a series of identical images from the device, and using the 
mean pixel data (across each colour plane) as the measurements for X .  As men­
tioned previously, the aspiration is that the anomaly investigation process will lead 
to the uncovering of unique ’’fingerprints” for camera identification. According to 
Flickr (a popular image and video hosting site), the current most commonly used 
cameraphone device on their website is the Apple iPhone.
For our experiments, we therefore use four Apple iPhone 3G devices as primary 
devices. As cameraphones by definition are not primarily engineered for photog­
raphy, inexpensive components are typically used, meaning the expectancy of wit­
nessing a poor statistical control is increased. The Apple iPhone devices contain a 
2 MegaPixel CMOS sensor and do not process any user settings or a zoom of any 
kind, meaning the exposure settings, focus, ISO settings, aperture, etc. are all au­
tomatically defined, if indeed they exist at all. The results obtained from the Apple 
iPhone 3G devices are later compared with those obtained from similar devices such 
as a Sony Ericsson WBlOi, and two Nokia N97 devices.
When acquiring the image data, it is important to nullify any environmental is­
sues that could affect the data negatively. If the external conditions remain uncon­
trolled, it is likely that each device produces quite contrasting results, not necessarily 
because their image acquisition processes are different, but because, for example, the 
temperature or lighting conditions suddenly change. In our initial work in [61], the
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images are acquired from a room that is not subjected to outside lighting as this con­
stantly changes. Instead, the lest scene was lit via fluorescent lighting. In addition, 
the room was air-conditioned to a constant temperature so as to reduce the influence 
of temperature changes on the image acquisition process. It is worth noting, how­
ever, that the SPC model can be applied when these external influences do exist, so 
long as they are taken into consideration when reviewing the data. For instance, if the 
temperature increases as each image is taken, this will have an affect on the image 
acquisition process. As such, if the process becomes less and less controlled over 
time, then the temperature is a likely cause.
The scene itself comprises a white bowl of colourful confectionaries (Figure 19, 
where the bright colours maximise the load on the CFA. A location reference point 
is then set up to determine the position for each device, and a series of 10 images are 
collected one after the other for each device.
Fig. 19. Example image obtained from test scene.
4.3 Results & Evaluation
In this section, we present the results from our initial implementation of SPC for 
image forensics, as reported in [61]. We also evaluate the significance of these results, 
and consider a refined implementation of a similar model based on images captured 
from a controlled environment. Comparisons are then made between both models, 
and a critique of how SPC can aid camera identification is provided.
The mean pixel values obtained from 10 images for all four Apple iPhone 3G 
devices is shown below in Table 7. By taking the 10 values for each device as X ,  
control charts can be plotted to display the degree of control about the process mean 
X .  First, the i?m values are determined by calculating the difference between neigh­
bouring values of X .  Table 8 shows the X  and R m data for iPhone A.
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Table 7. Mean pixel values obtained for ail Apple iPhone 3G devices [61].
Shot No. iPhone A iPhone B iPhone C iPhone D
1 110.2097 105.4888 104.6182 104.4518
2 109.6045 106.5222 104.6503 97.4483
3 109.1334 106.7678 105.4275 97.1251
4 109.1161 98.0294 105.4614 97.0542
5 109.2108 98.064 105.676 97.0346
6 101.3616 97.7303 105.1278 97.0085
7 101.7246 98.9264 105.4571 97.4346
8 101.2875 96.9707 105.5588 97.4245
9 101.2724 98.4508 105.5459 97.0113
10 101.6922 97.4999 105.4956 97.0198
Table 8. X  and R m  values obtained for iPhone A.
Shot No. X R m
1 110.2097
2 109.6045 0.605
3 109.1334 0.471
4 109.1161 0.017
5 109.2108 0.095
6 101.3616 7.849
7 101.7246 0.363
8 101.2875 0.437
9 101.2724 0.015
10 101.6922 0.420
Using this data, the C L  for the Rm  control chart is calculated as 1.141. The table 
of constants from Table 6 is used, where n =  2 to obtain Dg =  0 and — 3.27.
Subsequently, the UCL  and L C L  are then calculated as follows:
U C LRm =  DAR m =  (3.27)(1.141) =  3.729
L C L n m =  D^Rm  =  (0.0) (0.294) =  0.0 (14)
Similarly, the C L  for the X  chart, X  is calculated as 105.461. The U CL  and 
L C L  control limits are calculated according to Equation (15).
U C LX =  Z  +  3<7X =  105.461 +  (3)(1.011) =  108.497 
L C L X =  Z  -  3&x =  105.461 -  (3)(1.011) =  102.426.
(15)
The final control charts for iPhone A are shown in Figure 20, where circled nodes 
indicate that the measurements are out-of-control as they fall outside the control 
limits.
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Fig. 20. X  and R m  control charts for iPhone A.
The X  chart (top) shows that every measurement taken from iPhone A is out- 
of-control. This indicates that the complete image acquisition process is statistically 
unstable. The R m chart shows that sample 5 is out-of-control. When mapped to 
the X  chart, this corresponds to the bth and 6t/l images. The values of these two 
images are quite vastly different. The value for image 5 is 109.2108 compared to 
image 6 which yields the value 101.3616. By reviewing these two images further, it 
is possible to see a significant change in brightness between these images.
It is now worth evaluating how the results for iPhone A compare with the data 
obtained from the other iPhone devices. The control charts for iPhone B are shown 
in Figure 21.
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Fig. 21. X  and Rm control charts for iPhone B.
Whilst the X  chart is undoubtedly far more controlled than the X  chart for 
iPhone A, the same significant drop in values can be seen, this time between image 
3 and image 4. Again, when reviewing these two images, a large shift in brightness 
is observed.
Figure 22 illustrates the X  and control charts for iPhone C. For this device, 
there appears to be no significant shift in measurements, and in fact, the two out-of­
control measurements are only marginally outside the control limits. This indicates 
that this device was far more controlled than the previous two, at least for the 10 
observations reviewed.
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Fig. 22. X  and Rm control charts for iPhone C.
To complete the exercise for the iPhone devices, the X  and Rm  control charts are 
plotted for iPhone D, as shown in Figure 23. The same property of significant shifts 
in measurement values that was observed for iPhone A and iPhone B, also exists for 
iPhone D between the first and second images. Again, when reviewing both these 
images, a change in brightness value can be observed.
For comparison purposes, the same experiment was performed with the Sony Er­
icsson W810i cameraphone and standalone Samsung NV3 camera. We would expect 
that the quality of the image acquisition process should be greatly improved for the 
Samsung NV3, as it is likely to use higher quality components, and more care is 
likely to have been taken to ensure errors are corrected in the pixel data. The Sony 
Ericsson W810i on the hand should be more comparable to the iPhone 3G devices,
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Fig. 23. X and control charts for iPhone D.
and if it does not posess the same brightness problem, it may be more controlled - 
although not as controlled as the Samsung NV3 is expected to be. The control charts 
for the Sony Ericsson W810i cameraphone are shown in Figure 24.
This device contains no out-of-control measurements, meaning that the image 
acquisition process is far more controlled compared to that of the iPhone 3G de­
vices. The Samsung NV3 device is even more controlled, with the difference be­
tween the highest value measurement (132.04) and the lowest value measurement 
(131.89) only 0.15.
As we only have access to one Sony Ericsson W8101 and one Samsung NV3, we 
cannot collect enough data to make an informed review of any errors found within
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Fig. 24. X  and Rm control charts for a Sony Ericsson W810i cameraphone.
the image data. However, it is clear that the SPC model is reacting to the quality of 
each device.
Based on these observations it is obvious that there is some aspect of the iPhone 
image acquisition process that is affecting the brightness. The measurements taken 
before and after the decrease in data values are actually quite consistent, but the 
change in brightness is so vast that it renders much of the process out-of-control. It 
also appears from the SPC experiment as though the change in brightness is time 
dependant. Whilst iPhone C did not display any signs of this characteristic, it might 
have showed itself if we took more than 10 measurements. The initial work has there­
fore highlighted a feature of the image acquisition process for iPhone 3G devices,
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Fig. 25. % and control charts for a Samsung NV3.
that could be analysed in more detail to potentially create a unique ’’fingerprint” for 
identifying images captured from these devices.
In our most recent work, we have studied the effect that the lighting conditions 
have on the image acquisition process. As fluorescent lighting is known to flicker, 
the overall intensity of light could vary from shot to shot depending from when the 
image was captured. The environment was therefore adapted such that the fluores­
cent lighting was replaced by a flicker-free task lamp. The bulb itself emitted a true 
representation of daylight based on the Spectral Power Distribution (SPD). It is im­
portant to simulate daylight conditions as this ensures the digital camera’s are still
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processing the images based on real-world lighting. Some lamps will emit light that 
is faded or distorted, which would not provide useful results for our experiments.
The scene itself was also modified such that we use a light tent to ensure no exter­
nal light sources filter onto the object. The bowl of confectionaries was also replaced 
with an X-Rite ColorChecker®  chart, as this comprises 24 carefully selected colour 
squares, that each represent real-world colours (i.e. skin, sky, and landscape tones). 
The chart is specially designed such that each colour is reflected just as it is in the 
real-world. The colours within the chart arc also defined in terms of their exact RGB 
reference values which means it will be possible to review exactly how each device 
is interpreting the colours if necessary. Figure 26 shows a sample image that was 
captured from this revised environment.
Fig. 26. Sample image taken from the modified test scene.
Finally, the number of measurements taken from each device is increased from 
10 to 30 to provide us with a more complete representation of the processing. The 
calculations involved for constructing the control charts, however, remain the same.
Figure 27 shows the X  control chart obtained from iPhone A. Again, the same 
variation shifts that appeared in the earlier experiment can be noted. At each of these 
points, the brightness of the images shifted quite significantly. It can also be observed 
that the fluorescent lighting conditions from the first experiment was not the cause 
for the error scene in the camera processing, as the difference between the highest 
and lowest measurements for both experiments is approximately equal with that of 
this controlled experiment.
Whilst carrying out the experiment, an updated iPhone 3G model was released 
by Apple called the iPhone 3GS. The updated model carries a 3.2 Megapixel camera, 
and allows the user to define the focal point of the image. To identify the significance 
of these improvements, we ran the SPC experiment on the new model. The results of 
which are expressed as an X  chart in Figure 28
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Fig. 27. X  control chart acquired from iPhone A.
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Fig. 28. X  control chart acquired from an iPhone 3GS.
This chart shows that the image acquisition process is far more controlled than 
that of its predecessor. Each of the 30 measurements taken are under perfect control, 
and there are no significant shifts in variation as seen for the iPhone 3G devices. 
A more diligent review of the new ’focus’ setting on the iPhone 3GS shows that 
the exposure of the image is also defined when the focus is set. The exposure then 
remains the same until the camera is moved, or the conditions of the environment 
change drastically. This backs up our assumption that the brightness issues witnessed
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for the iPhone 3G devices are due to an exposure calculation error, which is why the 
brightness flicks between dark and bright over time.
The experiment was also performed against two Nokia N97 devices. The camera 
on the Nokia N97 devices contains a 5 Megapixel resolution, and allows the user to 
define white balance settings, ISO settings, and also zoom. To form the most suitable 
comparison with the results obtained from the iPhone devices, the resolution was set 
to 2 Megapixels, and all other settings were disabled where possible, or otherwise 
set to ’’Automatic”. The X  control charts for the two Nokia N97 devices are shown 
in Figures 29 and 30.
64
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Fig. 29. X  control chart acquired from Nokia N97 A.
The control charts for the N97 devices show that each measurement - whilst 
more closely centred around % - is again not under complete statistical control. The 
second N97 device shows even less control than the first. By analysing the out-of­
control measurements in greater detail, (or indeed any contrasting measurements) 
and comparing them with the more controlled images, it is likely that the variation 
can be explained and a unique ’’fingerprint" uncovered.
4.4 Summary
In this section, we have introduced image forensics, and outlined the most prolifent 
research in the field - specifically, the latest research for camera identification and 
forgery detection have been introduced. In addition, we have demonstrated the bene­
fits of using Statistical Process Control for analysing image data on a range of differ­
ent digital cameras. Based on our initial research in [61], an anomaly in the camera 
processing elements was identified for iPhone 3G devices, whereby the brightness 
of the images was fluctuating. By analysing the latest iPhone 3GS model under the
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Fig. 30. X  control chart acquired from Nokia N97 B.
same conditions, we have been able to prove that the newer model does not contain 
this property, meaning there is promise for the reliable detection of images obtained 
from iPhone 3G devices, and images captured from the iPhone 3GS.
We have also proved through both experiments, that SPC is useful for modelling 
the overall control of the image acquisition process for a particular camera. Figure 
31 illustrates the degree of variability obtained from the initial experiment in [61] for 
6 devices. It is clear from this illustration that the iPhone 3G devices all operate with 
a similar degree of variation (approximately 21%). The Sony Ericsson W810i is far 
more controlled, and outputs a degree of variance of approximately 1%. The Sam­
sung NV3 standalone digital camera is even further controlled, and offers a variation 
of only 0.5%.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
Our future work in the image forensics domain will be concentrated on identifying 
more benefits of the SPC framework for camera identification. Further control charts 
can be examined, such as the Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) 
chart, to determine whether there is an even more descriptive tool that can replace 
the X  and R m control charts. In SPC control charts, the formation of the measure­
ments along C L  can be used to derive common-cause and special-cause variation. 
Therefore, a scrutinised analysis of this content might be useful for isolating unique 
’’fingerprints” for digital cameras. Similarly, Pareto charts and Cause & Effect dia­
grams have also been proved to be useful for identifying the cause of variation for a 
range of processes. These techniques could be adapted for use in the image forensics 
domain for identifying anomalies in the image data.
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